CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Roberto Velasco in counts 3 and 5–10 of second degree robbery (§ 211), in count 11 of attempted second degree robbery (§§ 664, 211), and found true the allegations that defendant had personally used a firearm as to all counts (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). After imposing and recalling the original 43-year sentence, the trial court sentenced defendant to 34 years 4 months in state prison.

Luis Medrano appeals from a summary judgment in favor of the City of San Diego (City) in the City's lawsuit against him for an injunction and civil penalties. The lawsuit arose from the illegal operation of a marijuana dispensary at Medrano's property. Medrano contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because the City did not demonstrate he maintained a marijuana dispensary, and the City failed to submit admissible evidence to establish the property's zoning classification. We conclude Medrano's appeal lacks merit, and accordingly we affirm the judgment.

D.S. (Father) appeals the juvenile court's judgment declaring his two minor daughters, I.S. and A.S. (the children), to be dependents under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). Father initially contends there is no substantial evidence to support the court's jurisdictional findings as to his own behavior. Father, joined by O.S. (Mother), appeals the dispositional judgment on the grounds that (a) no substantial evidence was presented that removing the children from parental custody was necessary to protect them from substantial danger, and (b) the court failed to identify or consider reasonable alternatives to such removal. (§ 361, subds. (c)(1)(A)-(B), (d).) Further, Father contends the court abused its discretion in affording him only supervised visits with the children, while giving the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) authority to determine whether unsupervised or extended visitation would be appropriate. (§ 362.1

On January 2, 2015, the district attorney filed a petition against minor under section 602, alleging that minor was in possession of marijuana on school grounds, a misdemeanor. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357, subd. (e).) Minor was 17 years old at the time. The juvenile court referred minor to the probation department for recommendation. At the probation department’s recommendation, the juvenile court granted a six-month continuance and placed minor on a program of informal probation pursuant to section 654.2 with terms and conditions. Among other conditions, the juvenile court ordered that minor not commit any crimes, obey teachers and school officials, have good behavior at school and receive satisfactory grades, not knowingly use or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, submit to random drug tests, and attend substance abuse counseling.

T.G. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights to the minor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395 [statutory section references that follow are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise set forth].) Father contends the court failed to determine the applicability of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. 1901, et seq.) before terminating his parental rights. We will reverse and remand for limited ICWA proceedings.

Jack S. and Joseph S. (collectively appellants), twin brothers, appeal from a final judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Coastal Developmental Services Foundation, Inc. doing business as Westside Regional Center (respondent) on appellants’ claim against respondent for negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of respondent on the ground that respondent had no duty to protect appellants from the criminal conduct of a third party, Marco Sandoval (Sandoval), who repeatedly molested appellants over a period of two years. Finding no error in the trial court’s decision, we affirm the judgment.

Defendant Ahmad Tarek Rashid Alam, a real estate agent, appeals from the judgment confirming the arbitration award in favor of plaintiffs George E. Kalo and Rimonda Kalo, as individuals and as trustees of the George E. Kalo and Rimonda Kalo Revocable Living Trust (collectively, Kalo). The arbitrator found that although Alam canceled the written listing agreement between him and Kalo for the sale of real property shortly after signing it, he “orally and by conduct led . . . Kalo to believe he would help him sell the property and would represent him as his agent,” thereby creating an oral listing agreement.

In 2002, the juvenile court sustained a dependency petition under section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code on behalf of Alexis, then four years of age. She was detained from her parents and placed with a family member, Ms. M. Several years later, in June 2007, the court appointed Ms. M. as Alexis’s legal guardian under the Kinship Guardianship Assistance Payment (Kin-GAP) program, and dismissed the dependency action. Notwithstanding the termination of its dependency jurisdiction, the juvenile court retained general jurisdiction over Alexis as a ward of the guardianship. (In re Priscilla D., supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 1216.)

A jury convicted defendants Noah Keoni Akuna and Frank Nathan Escalante of the first degree murder of German Palacious (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and of conspiracy to commit that murder (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)), with true findings in both counts that each defendant personally discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), that a principal discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)(1)), and that the crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)). The jury also convicted each defendant of one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1).) Defendant Escalante admitted a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and was sentenced to an aggregate term of 80 years to life in state prison. Defendant Akuna was sentenced to an aggregate term of 50 years to life in state prison.

Defendant Erik Bunnell used a metal pole to smash the glass door of a laundry room in an apartment complex that contained washing machines, dryers, and a few vending machines. After he entered the laundry room, apartment tenants could hear loud banging noises like someone was trying to break into the vending machines. He was later apprehended hiding behind a bathroom door in a friend’s nearby apartment.
A jury convicted defendant of second degree burglary. (Pen. Code, § 459.) He was sentenced to serve a total of five years four months in prison for the offense and for four prior prison term allegations the court found true. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).)

In May 2016, defendant forged checks and obtained J.R.’s personal identifying information and used that information to cash a check and obtain money without J.R’s consent. Defendant forged the check for the benefit of the west Roseville Nortenos. Defendant also served a prior prison term. An information charged defendant with identity theft (Pen. Code, § 530.5, subd. (a)--count 1), street terrorism (§ 186.22, subd. (a)--count 2), possession of ammunition by a felon (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)--count 5), possession of identifying information of 10 or more victims (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(3)--count 6), and forgery (§ 470, subd. (d)--count 8). As to counts 1 and 8, the information also alleged defendant committed the offenses for the benefit of a street gang. (§ 186.22, subds. (b) & (d).) The information further alleged defendant had served a prior prison term. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) Defendant pleaded no contest to identity theft and forgery, admitted the forgery was committed fo

Appellant Kristy Flores appeals from the denial of her petition for resentencing,
pursuant to Proposition 47, with respect to 11 convictions for second degree burglary in
two cases. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Defendant Jason Grizzell appeals from the trial court order denying his application pursuant to Proposition 47 and Penal Code section 1170.18 to reduce his prior conviction for grand theft of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (d)) from a felony to a misdemeanor. The issues at the hearing centered around who had the burden of proof, whether the “conviction” was for one firearm or four firearms, and whether the value of the firearm(s) exceeded $950, thereby making defendant ineligible for reduction to a misdemeanor. It is unclear from the record whether the trial court had the entire file concerning the grand theft conviction or portions of it, or what it reviewed. In addition, the trial court made no factual findings concerning the value of the stolen firearm(s).At defendant’s request, we ordered augmentation of the appellate record to include the record from the theft case. A review of that record tends to support defendant’s claim he was convicted of stealing a single fi

Following a jury trial, defendant Phillip Stone was convicted of all five charged counts arising from a traffic stop and subsequent car chase: evading a peace officer while driving recklessly (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd (a); count 1) and in opposing traffic lanes (Veh. Code, § 2800.4; count 2), being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 3) and ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a); count 4), and possession of an assault weapon (§ 30605, subd. (a); count 5). On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in excluding evidence of third party culpability. He also asserts two sentencing errors. First, he contends the court erred in imposing the upper term for all five counts without giving reasons for doing so. Second, he argues the abstract of judgment incorrectly fails to reflect that three of the terms were stayed pursuant to section 654. The Attorney General concedes the second claim of sentencing error.