CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Jedidiah Oropeza pleaded no contest to carrying a loaded firearm (Pen. Code, § 25850, subd. (a)), and he admitted that he was not the registered owner of the firearm (§ 25850, subd. (c)(6)). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for a period of three years.
The trial court imposed various terms and conditions of probation, including gang conditions. As pertinent here, the trial court imposed the following probation condition: “You shall not be present at any criminal court proceeding where you know, have reason to know, or the probation officer informs you that a member of a criminal street gang is present or that the proceeding concerns a member of a criminal street gang unless you are a party, you are a defendant in a criminal action, you are subpoenaed as a witness, or you have the prior permission of your probation officer.”

Defendant Tarik Jamal Nelson pleaded no contest to one count of felony forgery. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on three years’ probation. When defendant admitted to violating his probation, the court imposed a sentence of two years in county jail.
Defendant’s counsel filed an opening brief in which no issues are raised and asked this court for an independent review of the record as required by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). We notified defendant of his right to submit a written argument on his own behalf. He has not done so.
After independent review of the record, we conclude that there are no arguable issues on appeal. As required by People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, we will provide “a brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case, the crimes of which defendant was convicted, and the punishment imposed.”

Faustino M. Milan sold approximately one ounce of methamphetamine to an individual cooperating with the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), a jury found him guilty of one count of sale of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)), and the superior court sentenced him to formal probation for a term of three years. Among other conditions of Milan's probation, the superior court required Milan to submit to warrantless searches of his computers and recordable media and to obtain approval of his residence and employment from his probation officer.

Defendant Wilber Lovato pleaded no contest to felony charges of unlawful sexual intercourse by a person age 21 or older with a minor under age 16 (Pen. Code, § 261.5, subd. (d)) and possession of matter depicting a person under age 18 engaging in or simulating sexual conduct (§ 311.11, subd. (a)). He was placed on probation for three years.
Defendant’s conditions of probation included a condition requiring that he “enter and participate in and complete an approved sex offender management program” (§ 1203.067, subd. (b)(2)); a condition requiring that he “waive [the] privilege against self-incrimination and participate in polygraph examination[s]” (id., subd. (b)(3)); and a condition requiring that he “waive any psychotherapist patient therapist privilege” (id., subd. (b)(4)).

Defendant Jia Hang Li appeals from his conviction, after jury trial, of unlawful possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359) and unlawful transportation of marijuana (§ 11360, subd. (a)). He raises two issues on appeal: (1) insufficient evidence supports the guilty verdicts because he raised a reasonable doubt his actions were protected under the Medical Marijuana Program (MMP) (§§ 11362.7 et seq. ), and (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct in closing argument. We affirm.

When Marcellous Lewis was between 15 and 17 years of age, he committed three forcible sex offenses, against two different victims (Crystal Doe and Sabrina Doe), and shot and killed a third victim (Robert Tibbs). Lewis was tried as an adult and convicted, by a jury, of the forcible sexual penetration (Pen. Code, § 289, subd. (a)(1)) and forcible rape of Crystal (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)), the forcible rape of Sabrina (ibid.), and the second degree murder of Tibbs (§ 187, subd. (a)). In 2011, the trial court sentenced Lewis to an aggregate sentence of 115 years to life.

On January 29, 2015, defendant Armando Guizar entered no contest pleas in four separate cases. In superior court case number F1450335, defendant pleaded no contest to attempted first degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 459, and 460, subd. (a)). In superior court case number F1450336, defendant pleaded no contest to transportation or sale of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379) and possession of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357, subd. (c)). In superior court case number C1367023, defendant pleaded no contest to grand theft from the person of another (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (c)), being under the influence of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (a)), and fleeing a pursuing police officer’s vehicle (Veh. Code, § 2800.1). In superior court case number C1371225, defendant pleaded no contest to failure to register as a sex offender (Pen. Code, § 290.015). In all four cases, defendant admitted a prior conviction for forcible sodomy (Pen. Code, §

Lonnie Fantroy appeals from a judgment following his conviction for second degree robbery. He contends his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to object to an allegedly impermissibly suggestive pretrial identification procedure. He further contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his request under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero) to strike one of his prior “strike” convictions. Finding no error, we affirm.

Tyree C. Davis (appellant) appeals from a judgment entered after a jury convicted him of one misdemeanor count of resisting, obstructing, or delaying an officer (Penal Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1) ) and the trial court placed him on probation for two years. He contends the court erred in ordering him to “pay a probation supervision fee of $50 per month” “prior to making an ability to pay determination.” We reject the contention and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Jonathan Curtis appeals from the trial court’s denial of his Proposition 47 petitions (Pen. Code, § 1170.18) for resentencing. He contends the trial court erred in finding his convictions for unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle and receiving a stolen vehicle were not subject to resentencing. Finding the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain his petitions, we shall dismiss the appeal and direct the trial court to vacate its rulings on the matter.

Defendant Tremaine Deon Carroll appeals from an order denying his petition to recall his sentence and to be resentenced under Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Pen. Code, § 1170.126). The trial court denied the petition based on a finding that resentencing Carroll would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. (Id., subd. (f).) Carroll contends the court committed legal error in making that finding because it failed to apply the definition of “‘unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’” contained in Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act of 2014 (§ 1170.18, subd. (c)).

Defendant Jaime Batrez Campa was convicted by jury of the unauthorized taking or driving of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851) and receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d). In a bifurcated proceeding, defendant admitted he had served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5) and had one prior strike conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170, subds. (a)-(d)). The trial court sentenced him to serve five years in state prison.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, that it was required to find the value of the stolen vehicle exceeded $950 in order to convict him of felony violations of section 496d and Vehicle Code section 10851. This contention is based on the premise that under Proposition 47 (as approved by voters Gen. Elec., Nov. 4, 2014, eff. Nov. 5, 2014) (Proposition 47), the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, violations of these provisions are now misdemeanors

A jury convicted appellant Tritisse Bruner of assault with a deadly weapon, and found true that she personally inflicted great bodily injury (GBI) in the commission of the offense. (Pen. Code, §§ 245, subd. (a)(1); 12022.7, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced Bruner to a total term of five years as follows: the low term of two-years for the substantive offense, plus three years for the GBI enhancement. The court awarded Bruner presentence credits and imposed a series of ordinary fines and fees. Bruner’s appointed counsel on appeal filed an opening brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). We affirm the judgment.

Series Group, LLC (plaintiff) appeals following a court trial in which the trial court found against it and in favor of Unique Management Associates, Inc. (UMAI) and Naresh Dhadhal (collectively defendants) in plaintiff’s action for breach of contract and other related causes of action. On appeal, plaintiff contends (1) the trial court erred in failing to provide for an accounting; (2) the court erred in finding plaintiff materially breached the parties’ partnership agreement; (3) the court erred in failing to find a waiver of plaintiff’s purported breach of the partnership agreement; (4) the court erred in denying quantum meruit recovery to plaintiff; (5) the court’s analysis as to plaintiff’s cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty was insufficient; and (6) the court erred in finding plaintiff failed to meet its burden as to damages. We shall affirm the judgment