CA Unpub Decisions

In case No. PCF308556, appellant Michael Anthony Bennett pled no contest to first degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a)/count 3), possession of ammunition by a person prohibited from possessing a firearm (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)/
count 5), and misdemeanor receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)/count 6). In case No. VCF311602, Bennett pled no contest to bringing an alcoholic beverage into jail (§ 4573.5).
Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm.

After visiting a store fitting room, Ryan Alvarez turned shoplifting into a conviction for second degree robbery by choking a Kohl’s store loss prevention officer who chased him down after he left the store with various items of clothing (socks, boxers and another pair of pants) stuffed into his trousers. This sort of escalation of crimes from what would ordinarily be a misdemeanor into a felony is commonly referred to among lawyers specializing in criminal law as an “Estes robbery,” after People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23 (Estes ). That court held Estes committed a robbery because he used force to prevent a “guard from retaking the property and to facilitate his escape.” (Id. at p. 28.)

Plaintiff and appellant Jasmine Cirujeda Mastache, a self-represented litigant, appeals from a judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained without leave to amend the demurrer of her former employer, defendant and respondent San Diego Unified School District (District), to her third amended complaint. Plaintiff sued District following termination of her employment, alleging in her operative pleading that District discriminated against her on the basis of her age and national origin, subjected her to retaliation and harassment and failed to prevent discrimination and harassment, wrongfully terminated her without warning, then ignored her attempts to undergo an internal grievance process. The trial court ruled in part that plaintiff's entire action was barred on grounds she failed to comply with the claim filing requirements of the Government Tort Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq., at times, the Act), her common law claims failed because District was absolutel

M.S. and R.A., the parents of R.A. and P.A., appeal an order terminating their parental rights and selecting adoption as the children’s permanent plan. Mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by failing to apply the parental relationship exception and/or the sibling relationship exception to adoption. Father also asserts the sibling relationship exception.

Appellant D.O. (father) seeks review of a juvenile court order terminating his parental rights to his son L.O. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. On appeal, father contends that the court abused its discretion by selecting adoption as the permanent plan for L.O., because he and the minor enjoyed a beneficial relationship that was not outweighed by the benefits of adoption. We find the court’s decision fully supported by the evidence and within the bounds of its discretion. We will therefore affirm the order.

Objector Brianne Johnson (Mother) appeals from a probate court order granting a petition by Grace Schellhous to be appointed guardian of two of Mother’s minor children, K.S. and T.S. Mother argues that the probate court denied her the opportunity to be heard in connection with the petition, and abused its discretion in ordering visitation at the discretion of the guardian. We conclude that Mother has not demonstrated any error by the probate court, and we will affirm.

Peter Heller appeals from a judgment of dismissal, following an order granting summary judgment in favor of respondents The Regents of the University of California and Laura Parker. Appellant’s complaint alleged that respondents retaliated against him for his whistleblowing activities. The trial court granted respondents’ motion for summary judgment, after determining that appellant could not establish a prima facie case of whistleblower retaliation because he could not show he engaged in protected whistleblowing activity. Appellant argues the record shows he did engage in protected activity. We conclude that appellant failed to demonstrate a triable issue of fact as to his whistleblowing activity. Accordingly, we affirm.

Carolyn Fisher appeals a judgment of dismissal in her wrongful termination and retaliation lawsuit against her former employer, San Diego Unified School District (the District), following an order granting the District's motion for summary judgment. We affirm because Fisher has forfeited her contentions on appeal by failing to provide an adequate record for appellate review. Moreover, presuming the record would support the court's factual findings, summary judgment was properly granted because Fisher did not timely exhaust her administrative remedies under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA, Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.), as she is required to do in order to maintain her lawsuit.

The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s notice of adverse action to plaintiff Alvin Andres was barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act. (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq.) We conclude the notice of adverse action was served “within one year of the public agency’s discovery by a person authorized to initiate an investigation of the allegation of an act, omission, or other misconduct” and thus reverse the trial court’s judgment granting plaintiff’s petition for a writ of mandate. (Gov. Code, § 3304, subd. (d)(1).)

After he was terminated from his employment, Sergio Aguirre sued his employer, its business-entity affiliates, and several individuals alleging violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12940 et seq. (the FEHA)) and the Labor Code, along with tort and declaratory relief claims. The trial court granted summary adjudication in favor of four individual employees on the ground that as a matter of law they could not be held individually liable for the FEHA claims alleged against them and they did not engage in extreme and outrageous behavior so as to be liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Aguirre appeals from the judgment dismissing those four defendants from the action (case No. B262618).

Aleksei E. Sviridov appeals a judgment after the trial court awarded the City of San Diego and the San Diego Police Department (collectively the City or defendants) $90,387.28 in costs. Sviridov contends the City is not entitled to costs based upon Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 97, 99 (Williams), which held that in actions based upon the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA; Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.), costs should not be awarded under Government Code section 12965, subdivision (b), to a defendant against an unsuccessful FEHA plaintiff "unless the plaintiff brought or continued litigating the action without an objective basis for believing it had potential merit." (Williams, supra, at pp. 99–100.)

Appellants Rodolfo and San Juana Sandoval asserted claims for negligence, strict liability, premises liability, breach of warranty, and loss of consortium against respondent American Appliance Manufacturing Corp. (AAMC), alleging that Rodolfo’s exposure to asbestos while employed by AAMC resulted in San Juana’s mesothelioma. The trial court granted summary judgment in AAMC’s favor on appellants’ claims, concluding that AAMC owed no duty of care to San Juana and that there was insufficient evidence that she was exposed to asbestos due to AAMC’s employment of Rodolfo. We reverse the grant of summary judgment on the complaint and of summary adjudication on the claims for negligence, strict liability and loss of consortium, and on the request for punitive damages. We affirm summary adjudication on the unchallenged portions of the judgment.

Appellant Ryan Allen Vanostrand pled no contest to vehicle theft with a prior (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a) & Pen. Code, § 666.5; count I) and evading a police officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count III). Vanostrand also admitted two prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and allegations that he had a prior conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)).
On January 8, 2016, the court sentenced Vanostrand to an aggregate eight–year term. The court, however, put the matter over to allow the probation department to calculate Vanostrand’s presentence custody credit.

Appointed counsel for defendant Antonio Lamar Thomas has filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm the judgment.