CA Unpub Decisions

In 1991, defendant James Brownlee was convicted of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187) with an enhancement that a principal to the offense was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)), crimes for which he received a sentence of 16 years to life. As recounted in our unpublished opinion upholding this conviction, defendant was drinking beer outside a supermarket with a minor named Freddie. Freddie was speaking to two girls who had driven up in a car, when another man walked up and banged on the car’s window. Freddie and the man exchanged words, and the man’s friend pointed a gun at Freddie from a truck parked nearby and told Freddie to back off. The girls drove away and Freddie told defendant about the man with the gun.
“Defendant retrieved a shotgun from his car, asked Freddie if he wanted to ‘handle it’ and gave him the shotgun. Freddie thereafter shot the victim fatally in the head. T

After an argument precipitated by references to their respective gangs, the victim Christopher Sisoukchaleun, took off his shirt to fight defendant Antoine Lamar Blessett. Instead, defendant followed Sisoukchaleun into the street and shot him between the eyes at nearly point-blank range with a firearm he had retrieved only moments earlier from his pickup truck, which was parked nearby. Defendant then fired a second close-range shot, striking Sisoukchaleun in the torso.
A jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189) and possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). The jury also found true enhancement allegations that defendant personally used a firearm and proximately caused death or great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), that he personally used a firearm in the commission of a felony (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (b)), and that he committed the murder for the benefit of a criminal street gang

On a September afternoon in 2010, 16-year-old C.T. was “hanging out” outside a house on Bishopgate Court in South Sacramento with friends, three of whom were affiliated with a street gang called Guttah Boyz. Their good time together ended and her life was to be changed forever after one of the friends came out of the house and made a face that caused the other friends to turn and look at a group of boys coming up the court, whereupon everyone started running into the house.
C.T. ran as well but was able during her escape to recognize two of the faces in the approaching group of boys, though she was reluctant to disclose their names in response to questioning at trial. Prodded, she testified that she recognized “Little Diddy” (defendant Allen Deshaun Oliver) and a boy she knew as Isiah (defendant Quincy Isiah Washington);

S.B. (Father) appeals an order of the superior court granting a petition by M.S. and D.S. (Petitioners) to declare his minor child S.R.B. freed from his custody and control under Probate Code section 1516.5. Father contends the court erred by finding S.R.B. was not an Indian child and that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) did not apply. The court found ICWA did not apply. We affirm.

J.F. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights to her children—J.D., A.D., and Jo.D.—contending that the court and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) failed to comply with their duties under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related state statutes (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.) and court rules (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.480 et seq.). We conditionally reverse the court’s order and remand for the limited purpose of ensuring compliance with ICWA’s requirements.

When Heidi C. (mother) discovered that her teenage daughter, Alison C., was using a secret cell phone to exchange sexually explicit content and other disturbing images with males online, mother punished Alison by flogging her with a cell phone charging cord. This was not the first time mother used physical force to discipline Alison, despite knowing that her daughter was suffering with a years-long struggle of self-harming behavior. The juvenile court exerted dependency jurisdiction over Alison on numerous grounds and removed her from mother’s care. Mother challenges these orders. Because the orders are supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.

Ivan E. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings against him and dispositional orders made on August 16, 2021. Father concedes that the court’s jurisdiction over his children will be unaffected by the outcome of this appeal but requests that we exercise our discretion to review the jurisdictional orders as to him to avoid future prejudice. Because he has failed to identify any specific prejudice, we decline to do so. We also reject Father’s challenge to the court’s dispositional orders, which is premised on authority that has been superseded by statute.

Sean Sutton appeals an order determining him to be a mentally disordered offender (MDO) and committing him to the State Department of State Hospitals for involuntary treatment. (Pen. Code, § 2962 et seq.) We conclude that sufficient evidence supports the jury’s determination that during commission of the underlying offense, Sutton impliedly threatened to use force or violence likely to cause substantial physical harm. We affirm. (§ 2962, subd. (e)(2)(Q).)

A judgment creditor sought to amend a judgment to add the two brothers who ran the company that was the original judgment debtor. The trial court denied the creditor’s motion. This was undoubtedly the right result, so we affirm.

Plaintiff Ken Okuyama Design USA, Inc. appeals an order setting aside and vacating a default and default judgment entered against defendant R Motor Company. The evidence showed plaintiff served defendant’s designated agent for service of process with the summons and complaint, but the designated agent apparently failed to forward the documents to defendant. Based on this evidence, the trial court determined defendant was not entitled to relief from default under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5, subdivision (a) (section 473.5(a)), because service upon the designated agent constituted “actual notice” under the statute, but defendant was entitled to relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) (section 473(b)), because defendant only “became aware” of the action after the default judgment was entered.

T.F. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional orders concerning two of her five children, T.F.D. and Tr.F. She contends that the court erred by placing Tr.F. with his previously noncustodial father, Brandon J., and terminating the court’s jurisdiction over Tr.F. As to T.F.D., Mother contends that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to comply with its duty of inquiry to determine whether there is a reason to believe or know that T.F.D. is an Indian child within the meaning of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.).
We hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in giving custody of Tr.F. to Brandon J. and terminating its jurisdiction. We also conclude that Mother’s ICWA inquiry argument is moot because the court has placed T.F.D. with Mother. We therefore do not include the facts related to that subject.

Plaintiff and respondent Trident Group, Inc. brought an action alleging breach of a loan agreement against defendant OnlyBusiness.com, LLC (OB). After OB took no action to defend the lawsuit, appellant Daniel Meyerov, a former manager of OB, successfully intervened. When Trident moved for summary judgment, Meyerov opposed, arguing that Trident’s complaint was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court granted summary judgment for Trident, rejecting Meyerov’s statute of limitations defense based on a written tolling agreement between Trident and OB. The court also denied Meyerov’s summary judgment motion on the same basis.
Meyerov appeals from both summary judgment orders. He argues Trident failed to establish that the tolling agreement was enforceable, because it put forth no evidence that the agreement was accepted by OB or that any such acceptance was properly transmitted under applicable notice provisions.

Defendants Sandra Nickerson, Survival Systems Staffing Inc. (Survival Systems), SJNDEN LLC and SJNDEN Services, LLC appeal the trial court’s order denying their motion to compel arbitration in this action by a former employee, plaintiff Christina Leeper. They contend the trial court erred by finding they had failed to meet their burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement. We affirm.

Plaintiff Ma Irma Alvarado sued her employers, defendants S.D.S. Industries, Inc. and Timely Industries, for wrongful termination and other claims. Defendants moved to compel arbitration, presenting an arbitration agreement in English that Alvarado signed on the day of her termination. Alvarado opposed the motion, stating in a declaration that she spoke and read only Spanish, and that a human resources employee had misrepresented the nature of the arbitration agreement to her before she signed it. With their reply, defendants submitted an opposing declaration stating that the arbitration agreement was accurately described to Alvarado before she signed it. The trial court held that the arbitration agreement was void due to fraud in the execution and denied defendants’ motion.
We affirm. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants’ request for an evidentiary hearing.