CA Unpub Decisions

On February 8, 2016, a second amended information charged defendant and appellant Edward Lee Clayton with battery with serious bodily injury under Penal Code section 243, subdivision (d) (count 1); assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury under Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(4) (count 2); and injuring a spouse, cohabitant, fiancé, boyfriend, girlfriend, or child’s parent under Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (a). As to counts 2 and 3, the information also alleged that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim under circumstances involving domestic violence. (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (e)). The information further alleged that defendant suffered one serious felony prior and one strike prior.

Appointed counsel for defendant Jonathan Wayne Brejcha asked this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.
Defendant pleaded no contest to second degree robbery. (Pen. Code, § 211.) Sentencing was deferred on condition that defendant complete a six-month residential rehabilitation program, but if he failed to do so he would be sentenced to a stipulated upper term of five years in state prison with credits calculated at 85 percent. On successful completion of the program, he would receive probation for two to five years with up to one year in county jail. The prosecutor stated the factual basis for the plea as follows: “The defendant pushed the victim to the ground and took the victim’s hunting knife, wallet containing approximately $235 in cash along with his

Michael Avila (defendant) stands convicted, following a jury trial, of first degree burglary, during the commission of which someone other than an accomplice was present in the residence (Pen. Code, §§ 460, subd. (a), 667.5, subd. (c)(21); count 1), possessing a burglary tool (§ 466; count 3), and delaying a peace officer in performance of his or her duties (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count 4). After a bifurcated court trial, he was found to have suffered two convictions for serious felonies (§ 667, subd. (a)) that were also strikes (id., subds. (c)-(j), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(e)) and to have served four prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). His motion to strike one of his prior convictions was denied, and he was sentenced to a total of 11 years plus 25 years to life in prison and ordered to pay restitution as well as various fees, fines, and assessments. He now appeals, raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and instructional error. We affirm.

After a lender initiated foreclosure proceedings against a homeowner for falling behind in his mortgage payments, the homeowner paid the $5,657 in arrearages, and the lender halted the foreclosure. The homeowner nevertheless sued the lender. After the homeowner refused to comply with the lender’s second set of requests for discovery, refused to comply after the lender filed motions to compel, refused to comply after the lender refiled its motions to compel, and refused to comply after the trial court ordered him to comply, the trial court issued terminating sanctions and dismissed the case. The homeowner appeals. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion and affirm.

The juvenile court asserted dependency jurisdiction over 13-year-old Sergio C. (Sergio) after he had repeatedly run away from home. Lupita R. (mother) argues that the juvenile court was wrong to do so because Sergio’s risky conduct stemmed from behavioral and psychological problems that were in no way exacerbated by anything mother or Sergio C., Sr. (father) did; without a finding mother and father were to blame, mother argues, the court’s assertion of dependency jurisdiction was unconstitutional. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that mother and father were partly to blame; this obviates any need to reach mother’s constitutional challenges. Accordingly, we affirm.

M.G. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s orders exerting dependency jurisdiction over her one-year-old daughter M.P. and removing M.P. from her custody. We conclude that substantial evidence supports both orders, and that mother’s challenge to the removal order is also moot because the juvenile court subsequently returned M.P. to her custody. Accordingly, we affirm.
Filed 7/26/17 In re M.P. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO


In re M.P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. B279395

(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. DK20056)

LOS

Appellant M.M. admitted one count of attempted arson (Pen. Code, § 455, subd. (a)), as alleged in an amended Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition. M.M. repeatedly violated the terms of his juvenile probation and refused to be housed in juvenile hall. When M.M. was 18 years old, the juvenile court held a disposition hearing and committed M.M. to county jail for two years. M.M. argues, and the People concede, that the juvenile court improperly committed M.M. to county jail because that is not an approved placement option for a ward who commits his or her offense while under 18 years old. For the reasons stated here, we accept the People’s concession and will reverse the disposition order and remand for a new dispositional hearing.

A.H. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders summarily denying her modification petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 388, subd. (a)(1)) and terminating her parental rights as to her now 10-year-old daughter, M.L., at a contested section 366.26 hearing. Mother contends the juvenile court erred in finding her petition failed to make a prima facie showing that returning M.L. to her custody under family maintenance would serve M.L.’s best interest. She further contends the juvenile court erred in not finding that the beneficial parent-child relationship and sibling relationship exceptions to adoption (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i) & (B)(v)) barred termination of her parental rights. We affirm.

In 2015, Y.Q. (mother) and Justin W. (father) voluntarily petitioned the probate court to appoint Maria and Kevin S. as the legal guardians of mother and father’s daughter, Kayla W. Kayla later became a dependent of the court following an incident of domestic violence between Maria and Kevin. Shortly before the disposition hearing in Kayla’s dependency case, mother obtained an order from the probate court terminating the guardianship, a copy of which she provided to the juvenile court at the disposition hearing. The juvenile court told mother that the termination order was not valid because only the juvenile court had jurisdiction to modify or terminate the guardianship while Kayla’s dependency case was pending. The court then told mother that she did not have standing to appear in Kayla’s dependency case and denied mother’s request for appointed counsel.

In this dependency action, appellant Jamie C. (mother) appeals from an order summarily denying her petition for change of an order removing her children from her care. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 388.) Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
Mother has three children: S.R., born in March 1998, Jose R., born in August 1999, and Alexa P., born in August 2005. Mother has a long history of substance abuse which affected her ability to care for her children, who often stayed with their maternal grandmother, Minerva R. (grandmother). Respondent Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the department) received referrals related to mother’s drug use in October 2006, October 2013, January 2014, and February 2014. Following the February 2014 referral, grandmother applied to become the children’s legal guardian.

Minor J. B. appeals from a disposition declaring him a continued ward of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. After a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found he had committed unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and drove without a valid driver’s license (§ 12500, subd. (a)). The court ordered him to serve 83 days in juvenile hall with credit for 83 days served, revoked and reinstated his probation with various terms and conditions, and committed him to a level A facility for two years with credit for 216 days served. One of the minor’s conditions of probation requires him to “take psychotropic medications when prescribed by a licensed medical practitioner if [his] parent(s)/guardian consents.”

While a minor, appellant H.R. stole merchandise from three department stores. The Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office filed a felony petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleging that appellant conspired to commit a crime (Pen. Code, § 182, subd. (a)(1); count 1) and committed second degree commercial burglary (id., § 459; counts 2-4).
On August 10, 2015, appellant admitted to a reduced count of misdemeanor shoplifting (Pen. Code, § 459.5; count 2) in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts. Appellant was declared a ward of the juvenile court and the petition was sustained as to count 2. Appellant was placed on home probation with specified terms and conditions. Her maximum term of confinement was set at one year.

David C. admitted a misdemeanor battery on a juvenile hall correctional counselor. At a contested restitution hearing, the counselor testified that he lost private construction work due to an injury he incurred in the incident. David was ordered to pay $23,100 in restitution. David challenges the restitution order on the grounds that he was denied the benefits of a limit on restitution in Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6, subdivision (k) (section 730.6(k)) in violation of his equal protection rights; the order violated restrictions on mandatory restitution in section 730.6; the order was not supported by substantial evidence; and he received ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the order. We order the restitution order modified to correct a $1,000 error and otherwise affirm.

Real party in interest 1535 Carla Ridge of Louisiana (Carla Ridge) sought a building permit from the City of Beverly Hills (the City) in order to construct a single-family residence in the City’s Trousdale Estates area, known for its panoramic views. To preserve residents’ views, the Beverly Hills Municipal Code (BHMC) generally prohibits any new structure in Trousdale Estates from being taller than 14 feet above the grade upon which it stands, and also prohibits new grading that increases the elevation of an existing building pad. Rose Cheung, Carla Ridge’s upslope neighbor, objected to Carla Ridge’s project on the ground that it would result in a structure over 14 feet high on an elevated building pad. The City’s Planning Department nevertheless approved Carla Ridge’s plans, and over the next year the project was largely completed. During and after construction, Cheung requested that the City hold public hearings on the project.