CA Unpub Decisions

Dmitry Kogan appeals after a jury convicted him of arson of property of another (Pen. Code, § 451, subd. (d)). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed appellant on three years probation with terms and conditions including that he served 360 days in county jail.
In January 2012, appellant was living in a townhouse complex in Thousand Oaks. Kevin Reid operated a maintenance repair business and often performed jobs for other residents of the complex. On January 5, appellant and Reid argued over Reid’s van, which appellant claimed was parked in a manner that partially blocked his driveway.

Defendant Khamphanh Keosodsay was charged with obstructing a peace officer by force or violence (Pen. Code, § 69; unless otherwise stated, statutory sections that follow are to the Penal Code), attempting to take a firearm from a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (d)), and providing false identification to a peace officer, a misdemeanor (§ 148.9, subd. (a)). A jury convicted defendant on the false identification count and acquitted him of the remaining counts. The trial court found defendant was in violation of his probation in another case based on his conduct in this case, and sentenced him to 180 days in county jail with 180 days of credit for time served.
On appeal, defendant contends (1) the trial court’s response to a question from the jury deprived him of a fair trial, (2) the court erred in failing to give a unanimity instruction, and (3) the court’s response to the jury’s question constituted a partial directed verdict for the prosecution. We affirm the judgment.

This case involved a drive-by shooting on Christmas night by members of the 111 Neighborhood Crips gang, who drove into rival territory and ended up targeting two nongang members, killing a woman in front of her three-year-old daughter. At the time of the crimes, appellant Darnell Deshon Houston (Houston) (the shooter) was 33 years old, appellant and codefendant Lamar McKnight (McKnight) (the driver) was 23 years old, and appellant and codefendant Derrick Williams (Williams) (in the backseat) was 15 years old.

Henry Eugene Herrera appeals from the trial court’s order denying his petition for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon (Pen. Code, § 4852.01; all further statutory references are to this code). He argues the court abused its discretion in summarily denying his petition on grounds that the certificate procedure, by it terms, “does not apply to persons . . . convicted of a violation of . . . section 288.” (§ 4852.01, subd. (c).) Herrera contends this statutory bar violates equal protection because it does not extend to offenders who jointly commit with another person more serious crimes, specifically those who are convicted of forcible oral copulation in concert on a child under the age of 14 (§ 288a, subd. (d)(2)) or forcible sodomy in concert on a child (§ 286, subd. (d)(2)).

In the early morning of August 12, 2008, defendant Nicholas John Harris stabbed victim Mark Henson multiple times while Henson sat in his car. After Henson, who would die from his wounds shortly thereafter, fled down the street on foot, defendant threw gasoline on the car and lit it on fire.
Almost six years later, a jury convicted defendant of second degree murder and arson, and found he used a deadly or dangerous weapon during the commission of the murder. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 451, subd. (d), 12022, subd. (b).) Following the second phase of trial, the jury found defendant not insane when he committed the crimes.

On September 8, 2014, defendants Jason Grizzell and Ynez Maria Chavez were both convicted after a jury trial of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 460, subd. (a); count 1) and two counts of receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a); counts 3 & 4). Grizzell was acquitted of receiving stolen property in count 5; Chavez was convicted of that count. Grizzell was separately charged and convicted of attempted burglary (§§ 664, 460, subd. (a); count 2). Chavez was separately charged with receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a); count 6) and possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a); count 7). Chavez was acquitted of count 6 and convicted of count 7. In a bifurcated proceeding, Grizzell admitted allegations he had committed two prior offenses that qualified as serious felonies within the meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (c)–(j), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(e)), two prior serious felony conviction enhancements (§ 667, subd. (a)), an

Defendant Raymond Gallegos pleaded no contest to charges of driving under the influence of alcohol and causing injury, driving on a suspended license, and hit and run driving causing property damage, and admitted one prior strike offense from a 1997 robbery conviction. The trial court sentenced Gallegos to 32 months in prison in accordance with the plea agreement and awarded credit for time served.
Gallegos appeals only from the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea that do not affect the validity of the plea. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b).) We appointed counsel to represent Gallegos in this court. His counsel has filed an opening brief in which no issues are raised and asks this court for an independent review of the record as required by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). We advised Gallegos of his right to submit written argument on his own behalf within 30 days.

Defendant John Jerome Faljean appeals his convictions for 14 sexual offenses committed against one young family member (“minor 1”) and a battery against another young family member (“minor 2”). He claims the trial court erred in admitting a compact disc (CD) containing photographs depicting fetishistic sexual acts between adults and unidentified children in sexually suggestive poses. Defense counsel did not object to the admission of this evidence, accordingly, the issue is forfeited. Anticipating this result, defendant also claims counsel’s failure to object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. We need not determine whether defendant’s counsel was deficient because we find that defendant was not prejudiced by the admission of the CD in any event. We affirm the judgment.

David DiMarino was convicted of committing lewd and lascivious acts with a minor in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a), sentenced to prison, and eventually released on parole subject to his agreement not to, among other things, “date, socialize, or form a romantic interest or sexual relationship with any person who has physical custody of a minor.” In these consolidated appeals from two orders revoking his parole based on repeated parole violations, DiMarino argues he was found to have violated unconstitutionally vague and overboard conditions of parole. In one of the appeals, he also claims that his due process rights were violated because his parole officer did not consider lesser sanctions first, before parole revocation proceedings were instituted.

On June 20, 2016, an amended information alleged that defendant and appellant Jaime Sandoval Delgadillo, on or about May 29, 2012, committed the following: attempted willful, deliberate and premeditated attempted murder against William Chartraw (the victim) under Penal Code sections 664 and 187, subdivision (b) (count 1). The information alleged that defendant personally used a knife, causing the offense to be a serious felony under sections 12022, subdivision (b)(1) and 1192.7, subdivision (c)(23). The information also alleged that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim, causing the offense to be a serious felony under sections 12022.7, subdivision (a) and 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8). The information further alleged that on September 17, 2013, defendant was convicted of being prohibited from owning/possessing ammunition, a felony (§ 30305, subd. (a)), and served a separate prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b).)

A sharpened screw with a handle and a sheath was found in defendant Lloyd Davison’s two-man prison cell. Following a trial by jury, defendant was convicted of being a prisoner in possession of a weapon, in violation of Penal Code section 4502, subdivision (a). In a subsequent bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true that defendant suffered a prior conviction for a serious and/or violent felony within the meaning of the Three Strikes law and he served three prior prison terms. (§§ 667, subds. (c)–(j), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(e), 667.5, subd. (b).)
The trial court sentenced defendant to a total determinate prison term of 11 years. Defendant received the upper term of four years for violation of section 4502, doubled for the strike, and an additional one-year term for each of the three prior prison term enhancements.

Defendant Thomas Robert Davis appeals following conviction on three counts: making criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422; unless otherwise stated, further statutory references are to the Penal Code), inflicting corporal injury on spouse (§ 273.5, subd. (a)), and misdemeanor possession of tear gas by a felon (§ 22810, subd. (a).) Defendant contends the trial court improperly (1) allowed evidence of prior domestic abuse by defendant, (2) excluded evidence of the victim’s pharmacy records, and (3) denied his motion to appoint new counsel under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118. Defendant also claims ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment.

Pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (f), a portion of Proposition 47, defendant Anthony Dabbs petitioned the superior court to reclassify as a misdemeanor his prior conviction of possessing stolen property, a conviction for which he had completed his sentence. The court denied the petition, citing the fact that the record indicated he had been charged with a residential burglary, a charge that was dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement when Dabbs entered a plea to the count of possessing stolen property.
In so ruling, the court failed to apply the correct standards for deciding the petition, as the existence of a dismissed charge is irrelevant to the decision on an application under section 1170.18, subdivision (f), for reclassification of an offense for which the sentence has been served.

Defendant Andre Ange Coray appeals from a judgment entered pursuant to a plea of no contest to one count of felony stalking (Pen. Code, § 646.9, subd. (a)). Consistent with the terms of the negotiated disposition, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on formal probation (the prosecution stipulated to unusual circumstances, making him eligible for probation) subject to numerous conditions, including that he serve 365 days in the county jail (with credits of 84 days) and abide by a three-year criminal protective order. His appellate counsel has raised no issues and asks this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any issues that would, if resolved favorably to defendant, result in reversal or modification of the judgment. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was notified of his right to file a supplemental brief, but has not done so.