CA Unpub Decisions
California Unpublished Decisions
On September 13, 2014, defendant Joe Julian Castro, Jr., and his 16-year-old son I.C. attended a birthday party at defendant’s mother’s house. Later that night, when defendant indicated it was time to go home, I.C. stated he “wanted to stay the night [at] [his] cousin’s house . . . .” An argument ensued. At some point, defendant asked I.C., “What do you want to do, suck their dicks?” I.C. shoved defendant. Defendant then smashed a beer bottle over I.C.’s head.
Defendant was charged with assault with a deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1).) The information further alleged he personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon within the meaning of Penal Code sections 667 and 1192.7. |
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant Kermen Brown pled no contest to one count of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)), and admitted a prior conviction within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). He was sentenced to four years in state prison. He filed a notice of appeal from the judgment, and his appointed counsel filed a brief under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We have examined the record and conclude that no arguable issues exist. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
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Defendant Palmer G. Beverly appeals from the trial court’s denial of his Penal Code section 1170.18 (undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code) application to redesignate his conviction for grand theft from a person (§ 487, subd. (c)) from a felony to a misdemeanor. He contends the trial court erred in finding his crime was not eligible for relief. Agreeing, we shall reverse and remand with directions to enter an order granting the application.
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After moving unsuccessfully for the return of her marijuana, seized as part of a criminal matter, plaintiff Kimberly R. Olson brought the instant civil suit against Siskiyou County and additional parties. Siskiyou County successfully demurred, and the trial court entered judgment against Olson. Olson now appeals, contending the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer. However, because Olson’s causes of action all stem from an issue already litigated and decided, the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars her claims. We affirm the judgment.
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Plaintiffs Peggy Murphy, Genevieve Peterson and Nicole Juckes appeal from multiple judgments entered against them after the trial court granted summary judgment motions in favor of defendants Peter Spennato, Jr., Candace Spennato, Peter Spennato DDS Ortho & Pedo, Inc., W. 8th Street, LLC, and Painless Properties LLC, in this action arising out of employment relationships and issues and alleged oral agreements. We affirm the judgments in these consolidated appeals.
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Denise Thomas (wife) appeals from an order dissolving a domestic violence temporary restraining order issued against respondent Gary Everett Thomas II (husband), who is appearing in propria persona. She also appeals from orders (1) concerning custody and visitation of their child; (2) quashing bench warrants for the arrest of four witnesses; and (3) requiring her to pay fees to dissolve the warrants. We affirm.
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Patrick Herman and Jasmine Cirujeda Mastache divorced many years ago. In January 2015, the family court (Judge Stone) ordered the sale of their former marital residence—a condominium that they had acquired during the marriage (the January 2015 order). Mastache did not appeal that order.
In 2016, the court (Judges Powers and Epley) denied Mastache's requests and/or motion to set aside the January 2015 order. In her motion, Mastache asserted arguments that she could have raised in a timely appeal of the January 2015 order. The court also issued orders to enforce the January 2015 order, such as appointing an elisor. Mastache appeals from the court's 2016 orders denying her motion to set aside, and otherwise enforcing, the January 2015 order. We conclude that she may not appeal the court's 2016 orders to the extent that she is in substance challenging the January 2015 order, which she did not timely appeal. |
After prevailing in a civil lawsuit, William Mandrick brought a malicious prosecution action against the parties who unsuccessfully sued him and their attorney, Allen Hyman. The trial court granted Hyman’s motion to strike the action under the anti-strategic lawsuit against public participation (anti-SLAPP) statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) Mandrick appeals the order granting the anti-SLAPP motion. We affirm.
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Defendant Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Company (Coldwell) marketed for sale a vacant, bank-owned property located in Simi Valley. The property had a backyard with an empty swimming pool and diving board. While plaintiffs Jacques Jacobs (Jacques) and his wife, Xenia Jacobs (Xenia), were viewing the property as potential buyers, Jacques stepped onto the diving board to look over the fence. The diving board base collapsed and Jacques fell into the empty pool. Plaintiffs sued Coldwell for negligence and loss of consortium.
The trial court granted Coldwell’s motion for summary judgment. It determined that Coldwell was entitled to judgment on plaintiffs’ claim regarding the negligent condition of the diving board. In opposition to the motion, plaintiffs argued that they also were claiming that the empty pool was a dangerous condition. The court rejected this unpled, undisclosed theory of liability. |
After a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition was filed, Z.D. admitted one count of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and a Penal Code section 12022.5, subdivision (a) weapon enhancement. At disposition, the juvenile court set a maximum period of confinement at 15 years and two months. Z.D. appeals, contending the juvenile court did not understand it had discretion to set a maximum period of confinement that is less than the maximum to which an adult offender could be sentenced. We agree. The matter will be remanded for the juvenile court to exercise its discretion.
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In February, 2016, 17-year-old Y.W. lived with four other young men in a therapeutic group home in Santa Maria. Y.W. shared a bedroom with minor resident A.L.
L.W. was employed as a child care worker in the group home. She worked a 12-hour shift from 10:00 p.m. to 10:00 a.m.; her duties included helping the minors with homework, dinner, chores, and bedtime. L.W. was also employed as a juvenile institutions officer and for that employment received training in self-defense. In the evening of February 5, 2016, Y.W. informed another resident, J.F., that A.L. planned to “attack” L.W. that night. Y.W. asked J.F. to “stop” A.L. from attacking her. J.F. agreed but did not think an assault would occur because A.L. “is not that dumb.” |
H.M. (mother) appeals from the denial of her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition seeking the return of Jayden M. (Jayden, born Dec. 2013) to her custody. If the denial is reversed, mother seeks a reversal of the order terminating her parental rights. Three of Jayden’s siblings—Am. E (born Jan. 2003), Ad. E (born Mar. 2006), and N.M. (born Jan. 2010) (collectively minor sisters) —appeal from the denial of their section 388 petition seeking the return of Jayden to mother’s custody.
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A Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition alleging E.M. was a minor in possession of alcohol in a vehicle, in violation of Vehicle Code section 23224, subdivision (b), was found true by the juvenile court. The juvenile court declared E.M. a ward of the court and placed him on probation. E.M. appeals, contending the probation condition that his electronic devices be subject to search was not imposed by the juvenile court; the condition is overbroad; the condition is unreasonable; and counsel was ineffective for failing to object. We disagree and affirm.
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E.D. (Mother) appeals from orders of the juvenile court terminating parental rights to Christina F. and Richard F., Jr. (collectively, Minors). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Mother contends the court failed to ensure the Kern County Department of Human Services (Department) provided proper notice under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) to the Colorado River Indian Tribes of which Mother is an enrolled member.
Mother’s contention on appeal does not challenge the adequacy of the content of the ICWA notices sent by Department for Minors in this case. Rather, Mother essentially claims that service of the notices was defective because, although Department undisputedly mailed the notices to the correct address for service on the Colorado River Indian Tribes, the notices were addressed to the wrong person. (See § 224.2, subd. (a)(2) [“Notice to the tribe shall be to the tribal chairperson, unless the tribe has designated another agent for s |
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