CA Unpub Decisions

This dependency case began when the twins C.M. and J.M. were born drug exposed. Several placements were unsuccessful, and family maintenance services were impeded by the mother’s desultory drug rehabilitation and the father’s incarceration, and were interrupted for a year when the parents absconded with the children to Arizona. Upon resumption, the juvenile court many times denied requests from all sides to remove the children from a successful placement with adoptive foster caregivers and place them with the maternal grandfather and his wife. In two appeals, which we consolidate for purposes of oral argument and decision, the parents contend the court abused its discretion by failing even to consider placing the children with the maternal grandfather and his wife.

In May 2015, then 12-year-old Amber H. was living with her father, Carl M., who obtained full custody of her in January 2013, and her stepmother. The Fresno County Department of Social Services (Department) initiated these dependency proceedings that month, after Amber physically attacked her stepmother. Amber’s mother, J.T. (mother), who was the noncustodial parent, asked that Amber be placed with her, but the juvenile court declined mother’s request and instead took dependency jurisdiction over Amber, removed her from father’s custody, and ordered reunification services for mother and Carl. Reunification services continued for both parents until the 12-month review hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (f).) At the contested 12-month review hearing held in August 2016, the juvenile court found reasonable services had been provided to mother and Carl, terminated reunification services for mother, suspended mother’s visitation, continued reunification services fo

J.T. (mother) appeals from an order denying her request for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition, by which she sought to reinstate visitation with her daughter, Amber H. She contends the juvenile court erred by denying the petition without a hearing. We affirm.

After the juvenile court found that appellant A.F. committed a lewd act upon his four-year-old niece A.G., it issued a protective order. Appellant challenges the protective order, contending that its duration exceeds the statutorily permitted maximum length, and that it contains a defective provision. We agree with those contentions, reverse those portions of the protective order, and direct the juvenile court to modify the order. We otherwise affirm the orders of the juvenile court.

David and Linda Hovannisian purchased property from Wells Fargo Bank (Wells Fargo) at a foreclosure sale. Several months later they discovered there was a first priority deed of trust on the property that had not been extinguished by the foreclosure. The Hovannisians sued Wells Fargo for intentional and negligent misrepresentation based on a statement in Wells Fargo’s deed of trust that it was a first deed of trust. Wells Fargo tendered defense of the action to its title insurer, First American Title Insurance Company (First American), which refused to indemnify or defend Wells Fargo. After Wells Fargo assigned any claim it had against First American to the Hovannisians, the Hovannisians sued First American for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. First American subsequently brought a summary judgment motion, arguing that coverage had terminated, there were no benefits due under the policy, and there was a genuine dispute as to co

In this malicious prosecution action, we reverse the trial court’s denial of a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, commonly known as an anti-SLAPP motion. Although plaintiff established a prima facie showing that defendant brought the underlying action without probable cause, she failed to show defendant filed or pursued the underlying action against her with malice.

Charles Cunningham (Cunningham) petitioned the superior court for a writ of administrative mandamus to set aside a decision by the City of Long Beach Civil Service Commission (Commission) denying his appeal from the City of Long Beach’s (City) decision to terminate his employment as a security officer at the Long Beach Airport (Airport). The trial court denied Cunningham’s petition; he appeals its ruling.
On appeal, Cunningham contends that substantial evidence supports neither the Commission’s findings nor the trial court’s independent determination of his guilt based on the record. He further asserts that the discipline imposed was excessive and the result of disparate treatment. We have reviewed the record and conclude that substantial evidence supports the findings of guilt. We further conclude that the discipline imposed was appropriate. Accordingly, we affirm.

After prevailing on the merits, City of Kingsburg (Kingsburg) recovered costs incurred for preparing the administrative record in this case under Public Resources Code section 21167.6. City of Selma (Selma) contends Kingsburg was not entitled to recover costs because it was the real party in interest, not the lead agency, and Selma did not consent to Kingsburg’s involvement in the preparation of the record. (See Hayward Area Planning Assn. v. City of Hayward (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 176, 183-185 (Hayward).)
While we agree the parties, including a petitioner under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), must “agree to an alternative method of preparation of the record of proceedings” (§ 21167.6, subd. (b)(2)) before a real party in interest may prepare the record, we conclude substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Selma did agree to that procedure here. Consequently, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Selma’s motion to strike the cost memorandum.

Based upon findings it made in granting summary adjudication of declaratory judgment and quiet title claims in a lawsuit filed by plaintiffs Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles (RCA), the California Institute of the Sisters of the Most Holy and Immaculate Heart of the Blessed Virgin Mary (the Institute), and Archdiocese of Los Angeles Education & Welfare Corporation (collectively, Plaintiffs) against defendant Dana Hollister, the trial court ordered intervenors Sister Rita Callanan, IHM, and Sister Catherine Rose Holzman, IHM (collectively, the Intervening Sisters) to turn over to Plaintiffs the books, records, and assets of the Institute. The Intervening Sisters appeal from the turnover order, arguing that the order must be vacated because it ordered relief that was not requested in or encompassed by the pleadings, and because the trial court improperly made the order on an ex parte basis.

Richard Gajardo appeals from an order extending for five years an existing domestic violence protective order. He contends that the order is not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

O.E. (Father) appeals a judgment terminating his parental rights to I.P., a minor child, in a stepparent adoption proceeding. (Fam. Code, § 7822, subds. (a)(3) & (b).) We conclude, among other things, that the juvenile court erred by proceeding to trial without Father and not complying with Penal Code section 2625, which protects an incarcerated parent’s right to participate in the proceedings. We reverse and remand.

Red Mountain Asset Fund II, LLC (Red Mountain) agreed to sell real property to South Coast Merced Land, LLC (South Coast). The agreement included an “outside closing date,” and provided that the agreement would terminate if escrow had not closed by the date specified. The outside closing date came and went, and escrow had not closed. Red Mountain therefore notified South Coast the agreement was terminated. South Coast sued for specific performance of the agreement. The trial court granted a motion in limine to exclude inadmissible parol evidence regarding the meaning of the agreement, and then granted Red Mountain’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court did so on the ground there was no reasonable interpretation of the agreement that would give South Coast a cause of action for specific performance. South Coast appeals.

The trial court sustained the demurrer of defendants California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and Anthony Kaestner to a complaint filed by plaintiff Lawrence Smith on December 10, 2013, on the grounds the action was not commenced within the statutory period and the CDCR has immunity under Government Code section 845.8, subdivision (a). The complaint alleged causes of action for intentional tort and negligence premised on allegations that defendants paroled one Joseph Kidd, and issued Kidd a parole identification card in Smith’s name. Defendants issued the parole identification card to Kidd in 2007, and Smith learned that Kidd had stolen his identity in early 2011.

In this wage-and-hour case, plaintiff Pete E. Sarantopoulos appeals portions of the judgment entered after a court trial denying his unpaid wage claims. Plaintiff, a licensed vocational nurse, provided in home health care services to Medicare patients on behalf of Shepherd Home Health Care, Inc. (Shepherd), and he received a fixed payment for each patient visit he completed. Shepherd’s records showed plaintiff visited as many as 15 patients a day and almost always worked seven days a week. The parties agreed plaintiff spent additional uncompensated time attending required training classes, visiting Shepherd’s home office to replenish his medical supplies and submit required paperwork, and traveling between patient visits. After Shepherd terminated plaintiff’s employment, he filed the present action, primarily seeking unpaid wages.