CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The motion was based on the insufficiency of the first amended complaint to allege a basis in a statute or other enactment for public entity liability for the death of plaintiff’s daughter. We conclude the pleading is insufficient and plaintiff has not demonstrated she could amend it to allege a viable cause of action. Accordingly, we affirm.

Keith Thomas brought a petition under Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Proposition 36), to recall his sentence under the Three Strikes Law and for resentencing under Proposition 36, specifically Penal Code section 1170.126. Among other things, section 1170.126 allows a court to deny a petition for resentencing under Proposition 36 if it determines "resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety." (§ 1170.126, subd. (f).)

Following a jury trial, defendant and appellant Antonio Lenis Smith, was found guilty of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury, with a great bodily injury enhancement. (Pen. Code §§ 245, subd. (a)(4), 12022.7.) Smith subsequently admitted a prior serious felony conviction enhancement allegation. (§ 667, subds. (a)-(i).) He was sentenced to a state prison term of 12 years. We affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Jesse Anthony Quintanar of one count of robbery with personal use of a knife. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 12022, subd. (b)(1).) Defendant waived jury trial and admitted four prior strike convictions (§§ 1170.12, 667, subds. (b)-(i)), and four five-year serious felony priors (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and that he had served four prior prison terms. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) After denying defendant’s motion to strike his prior convictions pursuant to section 1385, the court sentenced appellant to a total term of 38 years to life, consisting of 25 years to life for the robbery under the Three Strikes Law, one year for the weapon use, 10 years for two serious felony priors, and two years for two prior prison terms. The court stayed two five-year priors and two prior prison terms. It dismissed two strikes at the prosecution’s request.

In 1996, defendant Richard S. Hodge was convicted of a murder and a robbery he committed when he was 17 years old. Hodge was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole (LWOP), plus 10 years to run consecutively for the robbery conviction and firearm enhancement. In 2013, Hodge filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the superior court, requesting the court resentence him in accordance with Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (Miller). In 2015, the court granted Hodge’s petition, vacated Hodge’s LWOP sentence, and conducted a new sentencing hearing. After considering the factors discussed in Miller, the court reimposed Hodge’s LWOP sentence.

On January 31, 2016, police responded to a domestic violence call. Hicks’s brother had held a knife to T.B., the brother’s pregnant girlfriend.
Police Officer Daniel Visser spoke with T.B. As he was interviewing her, Hicks approached the area and in a loud voice said, “Where is my brother?”Police Officer Gabriel Ruiz noticed that Hicks was “looking over intently to the area where [T.B.] and the officers . . . were conducting their investigation . . . .[Hicks] looked at her in that direction pretty much the entire time.” Ruiz told Hicks that his brother “was being detained for a domestic violence incident.”Hicks was “very upset and began to yell and curse.” He was “upset that his brother was being arrested.”

This is a Wende appeal from an order denying a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. (See People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Appellant challenges the validity of two prior conviction enhancements he admitted as part of a plea agreement back in 1992. Although appellant did not appeal the judgment encompassing that agreement, he contends he is not the person who suffered the prior convictions that were alleged in that quarter-century-old case. Finding no arguable issues for briefing, we affirm the trial court’s order.

Defendant and appellant Alta Los Angeles Hospitals, Inc. (Alta) contends it was error to award statutory damages and attorney fees to plaintiff and respondent Christopher Oliver under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (the Unruh Act) (Civ. Code, § 51 et seq.), where the jury found Alta denied Oliver full and equal services, but Alta’s conduct was not a substantial factor in causing Oliver harm. Oliver contends that because harm is presumed, the court correctly awarded him statutory damages and attorney fees under section 52, subdivision (a). We affirm.

Plaintiff Dane Nielsen, representing himself in both the trial and appellate courts, appeals after the trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer on statute of limitations grounds and dismissed his legal malpractice case. We find that all of Nielsen’s claims are barred by the four-year statute of limitations of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6, subdivision (a) because none fall within the fraud exception and no tolling provisions apply. Accordingly, we affirm.

D.S. (father) appeals from a jurisdictional finding declaring his daughter, S.M., a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). Father contends substantial evidence does not support the jurisdictional finding against him, but he does not challenge the jurisdictional finding against mother. We affirm.The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) filed a dependency petition in June 2015 when K.M. (mother) prematurely gave birth to her fourth child after she was shot in the street. Mother tested positive for cocaine upon admission to the hospital. At the time, mother’s children, including S.M., lived with maternal grandmother and wished to remain in her care. The children were nine, five, and two years old. They required constant care and supervision due to mother’s drug use, criminal history, and homelessness.

Don E. (father), the presumed father of M.G. (the minor) (born in April 2016), appeals the juvenile court’s jurisdictional/dispositional order that changed father’s visitation from unmonitored to monitored.
Father contends his due process rights were violated when the juvenile court refused to allow him to testify about visitation before it changed his visits from unmonitored to monitored, and he further argues that the error was prejudicial.

Gary C. (father) and Reyna C. (mother) appeal from orders of the juvenile court terminating their parental rights and finding that adoption is the permanent plan for minors G.C. and R.C. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395; further undesignated statutory references are to this code.) Parents contend the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the exception to adoption based on avoiding interference with a sibling relationship. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) We will affirm the juvenile court ordersThe selection and implementation hearing held pursuant to section 366.26, “is designed to protect children’s ‘compelling rights . . . to have a placement that is stable, permanent, and that allows the caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to the child.’ [Citation.]” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 52-53.) “ ‘The permanent plan preferred by the Legislature is adoption. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] If the court finds the child is adoptable, it must termi

Plaintiff and appellant Willie McMullen, in propria persona, appeals from the trial court’s order granting respondents’ special motion to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute. He also contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for reconsideration. McMullen sued the law firm and attorney representing opposing parties in a prior litigation, claiming that they improperly sought to force him to pay sanctions and/or settle the first lawsuit based on an invalid court order. We conclude that because McMullen’s claims were based on written communications to McMullen from opposing counsel in connection with issues under consideration in the prior lawsuit, they were properly stricken under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) (section 425.16(e)(2)). We further find McMullen failed to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on his causes of action. We therefore affirm.

In connection with a registration of foreign judgment of an out-of-state marital dissolution judgment filed by respondent Diana A. MacRobie (Diana), the court made a finding of spousal support arrearages owed her by appellant Graham C. MacRobie (Graham). Graham appeals from the order claiming the court had no jurisdiction to consider arrearages at the hearing on the registration. We disagree and affirm.Graham and Diana’s 17-year marriage was dissolved in 2011 by a judgment entered in Guam (Judgment). The Judgment included, among other things, a provision for Graham to pay $5,000 per month spousal support to Diana and $1,000 per month for child support.