CA Unpub Decisions

June Taylor died in September 2014. She was 90 years old. Eight weeks after her death, her son filed a complaint seeking to partition residential property in Ben Lomond she had purchased in 1992. He alleged a tenancy-in-common with his sister, defendant Lea Taylor Babcock, with each holding a 50 percent interest in the property. Plaintiff later filed an amended complaint claiming a 75 percent interest in the property, with his sister holding the remaining 25 percent interest.
A short cause bench trial was held in March 2016, with plaintiff represented by counsel and defendant representing herself. Soon thereafter the trial court issued a written decision finding that defendant owned the property (subject only to a lien by Bank of America) and denying the partition request.

Plaintiff and appellant Buashie Amatokwu (plaintiff) brought a libel action against defendants and respondents the County of Los Angeles (County), the Los Angeles County Superior Court Clerk (Clerk), and the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) (collectively defendants). The trial court sustained without leave to amend defendants’ respective demurrers, and plaintiff appeals from the ensuing judgments. We affirm.

In this "move-away" case, the family court found a one-year-old boy's mother had always been his primary custodian, that the mother's plan to move to Texas was made in good faith and not for the purpose of interfering with the father's relationship with his son and that it was in the child's best interest to maintain the existing custody arrangement. Contrary to the father's argument on appeal, the family court's findings are fully supported by the record and the record shows he received both a reasonable opportunity to mediate the controversy and to prepare for a hearing on his objection to the move. The record also shows the family court did not abuse its discretion in denying his request for a custody evaluation.

A jury convicted Genesis C. Shellock of various felonies and misdemeanors, including felony false impersonation (Pen. Code, § 529, subd. (a)(3)). The trial court found Shellock’s prior conviction allegations true and sentenced him to state prison.
Shellock appeals, contending insufficient evidence supports the false impersonation conviction. We disagree and affirm.

Anthony Joseph Hall was convicted of one count of first degree burglary of a residence in which a person other than an accomplice was present, and one count of receipt of stolen property. His sentence of 35 years to life included a third-strike enhancement. In this appeal, he contends: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion under Penal Code section 1118.1 to find unproven the allegation that a person other than an accomplice was present during the burglary; (2) because two break-in points were found, the court erred by not giving the jury an instruction to decide unanimously which of these formed the basis of its finding on that allegation; (3) the court failed to understand its discretion regarding his Romero motion to dismiss a prior strike or strikes, and would have granted the motion if it had understood; and (4) we should remand to allow the trial court to supply statutory citations in support of some of the fees imposed at sentencing.

Christopher Mark Chastang appeals from a postjudgment order revoking his probation and sentencing him to two years in prison. He contends we must reverse the order because the court erred by failing to obtain and consider a supplemental probation report before revoking his probation. We conclude any error was harmless under the circumstances of this case. We, therefore, affirm the order.

Defendant and appellant Harby Ausbon Burden appeals from his conviction for first degree murder by torture, with a special circumstance of torture; torture; and assault on a child, causing death. His primary contention is that the evidence is insufficient to support the torture verdicts and findings because the evidence showed nothing more than “explosive outbursts of violence” in disciplining his four-year-old son and did not show a “malicious intent to torture.” We conclude that substantial evidence supports the torture and torture-murder verdicts, as well as the torture-murder special circumstance. We also reject defendant’s contention that the parole revocation restitution fine imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.45, subdivision (a), must be stricken. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment.

Appellants Investment Co. of Santa Monica (ICSM), Pacific Systems, Thompson Industrial Properties (collectively, the Companies), and Robert Thompson (Thompson) appeal from a postjudgment order requiring them to produce to respondent Pamela Worman, also known as Pamela Wells (Worman), attorney billing invoices and other financial documents disclosing the Companies’ litigation expenses in certain pending and active legal matters. We reverse the order because it requires appellants to disclose information protected by the attorney-client privilege and contravenes the California Supreme Court’s holding in Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors v. Superior Court (2016) 2 Cal.5th 282 (Board of Supervisors).

Appellant Lalit Chandh Sawh (Lee) appeals from a judgment entered in favor of respondent Chinta Mani Sawh (Mani) following a bench trial on Mani's action for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract as well as the cross-complaints of Lee and LSMS Investments (LSMS) seeking an accounting. The actions arose from the two brothers' oral agreement to develop a commercial property.
Lee contends insufficient evidence supports the trial court's findings that (1) in his capacity as successor in interest to LMK Investments (LMK), he owed $119,336 in damages to cross-complainant LSMS; (2) he owed Mani $319,509 based on the brothers' oral agreement to "true-up" or settle accounts; and (3) he owed Mani $233,477 in accrued interest. We conclude sufficient evidence supports the court's findings and accordingly affirm.

Defendant Dane Besneatte appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to set aside a default judgment entered against him. On appeal, he argues that (1) the denial of the motion was improper and (2) the default judgment wrongly awarded punitive damages to plaintiff Rhonda Rayn. We disagree with the first claim and lack jurisdiction to consider the second. Accordingly, we affirm.

Defendant Gary Xavier, while incarcerated on unrelated charges, attacked fellow inmates with manufactured weapons on two separate occasions. He was subsequently convicted by a jury of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon by a state prisoner (Pen. Code, § 4501, counts 1 & 3) and two counts of custodial possession of a weapon (§ 4502, subd. (a), counts 2 & 4). The jury further found true the allegations that the offenses constituted serious felonies (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)) and that Xavier personally inflicted great bodily injury on each of the victims (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found Xavier had suffered four prior felony convictions within the meaning of section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(2).

Defendant Francisco ChislomVega appeals his conviction following a plea bargain asserting that his prior juvenile adjudication for assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) was improperly used to enhance his sentence as a strike.
On appeal, defendant concedes that we are bound by People v. Nguyen (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1007 (Nguyen), wherein our Supreme Court held that prior juvenile adjudications may be used to increase a sentence under the “Three Strikes” law without violating the right to a jury trial. He brings this appeal to preserve his federal appellate rights.

A jury convicted Henry Vasquez of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a); count 1) and found true the special allegation that another person was present in the residence during the burglary. (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (c)(21).) The jury also convicted him of felony vandalism. (Pen. Code, § 594, subds. (a) & (b)(1); count 3.) In a bifurcated proceeding, Vasquez admitted he had two strike prior convictions (Pen. Code, § 667, subds. (b)-(i)), two serious felony prior convictions (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a)(1)), and two prison prior convictions (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced Vasquez to a total prison term of 41 years to life.

Pursuant to the order of the Supreme Court filed February 16, 2017, reversing this court’s order dated July 15, 2015, which granted the petition for writ of mandate directing the Superior Court of San Bernardino County to vacate its order for preservation of evidence and to enter a new order denying real party in interest’s motion, this matter is hereby remanded to the superior court for proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion in People v. Superior Court (Morales) (2017) 2 Cal.5th 523, 535 (Morales).