CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted defendant Benjamin Paul Knotts of domestic battery with corporal injury (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a) ; count one); making a criminal threat
(§ 422, subd. (a); count two), unlawful taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count three), assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count four), unlawful attempting to prevent or dissuade a witness from prosecuting a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(2); counts five and six), and violating a protective order (§ 166, subd. (c)(1); count seven). The trial court found true allegations defendant had been previously convicted of a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (d), (e)(1), 1170.12, subds. (b), (c)(1)) and a prior serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and had served three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). It denied defendant’s motion under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero) to strike two of defendant’s prison priors, and senten

James Hinton pled guilty to one count of making or possessing a counterfeit die or apparatus (Pen. Code, § 480, subd. (a)) and one count of uttering and passing counterfeit paper (§ 648). He admitted allegations that he had one prior strike conviction (§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and five prior convictions for which he had served a prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) (prison priors). When he entered his plea, the court informed Hinton that he could receive a maximum sentence of 13 years six months. Hinton later filed a Romero motion asking the court to strike his prior strike conviction under section 1385 in the interests of justice. The prosecution filed opposition and the court denied the motion. Hinton contends the court's denial of the motion was an abuse of discretion. We affirm.

A jury convicted Marc Gitelman of one count of oral copulation with a minor, one count of sexual intercourse with a minor, and one count of committing a lewd or lascivious act on a minor. (Pen. Code, §§ 288a, subd. (b)(1), 261.5, subd. (c), 288, subd. (c)(1).) Gitelman contends that the court made numerous prejudicial evidentiary errors and that the prosecutor committed several acts of misconduct.
Although the majority agrees with Gitelman that the trial court made certain evidentiary errors, my colleagues conclude that the errors do not individually or cumulatively require reversal.

Defendant and appellant Jeffrey James DeCarlos was charged by information with felony vandalism with damages over $400. (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (a).) The information also alleged that he had one prior strike conviction. (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d) & 667, subds. (b)-(i).) A jury found defendant guilty and found true the allegation that the damage caused was over $400. The jury also found the prior strike allegation to be true. Defendant filed a Romero motion to dismiss the prior strike conviction, which the court denied. The court then sentenced him to the middle term of four years in state prison. The court subsequently held a restitution hearing. The parties submitted, and the court ordered defendant to pay $2,316.66 in victim restitution.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. We affirm.

A jury convicted William Gene Crawford (Crawford) of misdemeanor assault (Pen. Code, § 240 ) and making criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a)), a felony. The trial court sentenced Crawford to a total prison term of 35 years to life, consisting of 25 years to life on the criminal threats count pursuant to the “Three Strikes” law, plus two additional five-year terms for Crawford’s prior serious or violent felony strike convictions.

Gabriel Hernandez Casas appeals after a jury convicted him on two counts of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant. (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a) .) In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury found that appellant (1) had suffered a prior conviction for battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)); (2) had admitted the crime was a serious felony (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)); and (3) had served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Based on these findings, the trial court found true an allegation that appellant had a prior strike conviction. (§§ 667, subds. (c)(1), (e)(1), 1170.12, subds. (a)(1), (c)(1)).

Defendant Dana Bernard Brown, Jr., appeals the trial court’s imposition of sentence following entry of a negotiated plea. He claims the prosecution breached the plea agreement and he should therefore be permitted to withdraw his plea. The People concede the error. We will accept the People’s concession, reverse the judgment, and remand the matter for further proceedings.

Plaintiff Dennis Ponte is asking defendant County of Calaveras (County) to pay him over $150,000 to reimburse him for work purportedly performed on the County’s behalf pursuant to an oral contract. The contract did not contain any fixed payment, and no bid was submitted--far less approved--pursuant to relevant county ordinances governing public contracts. Ponte disregarded opportunities to abandon his claims after the County provided him with pertinent legal authority demonstrating that his claims lacked merit. After multiple sustained demurrers, the trial court granted summary judgment to the County on Ponte’s third amended complaint. The court later awarded substantial attorney fees, finding Ponte’s claims--including those based on promissory estoppel--were not brought or maintained in both subjective and objective good faith.
Ponte appeals. We shall affirm.

This dispute, between siblings Stephen Christopher Nifong and Aimee Caroline Nozzi, concerns a missing coin collection. Stephen claimed that Aimee converted the coins, his inheritance from a grandparent. The trial court declined to find a conversion of Stephen’s property, but found Aimee liable for breach of an oral trust or for gross negligence in handling a bailment.

P.A. appeals from the judgment declaring her a ward of the juvenile court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) and placing her home on probation after the trial court found that appellant committed a misdemeanor battery on a school teacher. (Pen. Code, § 243.6.) We affirm.
On April 28, 2016, 14-year-old appellant was in Robert Curtis’s in-school suspension classroom at a continuation high school. Appellant was repeatedly told to put her purse on the floor and do her school work. Appellant refused to follow directions and, after a back-and-forth discussion, slammed her purse down on the floor.

When J.C. was two weeks old, he was removed from his parents’ custody because of his mother’s substance abuse, domestic violence, and the family’s unsafe living environment. J.C.’s mother (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights to J.C. and selecting adoption as the preferred permanent plan. She contends the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). We affirm the judgment.

Appellant Shelley W. (Mother), mother of ten-year old Anabel R., appeals the order of the juvenile court finding jurisdiction appropriate under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b) based on Mother’s mental condition and abuse of marijuana, and the court’s dispositional order terminating jurisdiction and granting physical custody of Anabel to her father, Salvador R. Mother contends substantial evidence does not support that Anabel was at risk of serious physical harm, or that she was unable to care for Anabel due to her mental condition or substance abuse. We disagree and affirm.

A juvenile court found true allegations that Moses T. (minor) committed one count of felony vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subds. (a), (b)(1)). The court declared him a ward of the court and ordered him to perform 100 hours of community service. On appeal, minor contends the court erred in aggregating damage from multiple acts of graffiti to arrive at an amount exceeding the felony threshold of $400. We disagree and affirm the order.

Appellant E.B., the father of M.B., challenges the findings and orders of the juvenile court after a contested disposition hearing on August 23, 2016, sustaining the dependency petition under subdivision (e) of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 [severe physical abuse], and denying father reunification services with his daughter.
Substantial evidence showed that M.B. had suffered a broken femur and abdominal injury while in father’s care. The juvenile court’s findings of severe physical abuse and serious or severe physical harm (§§ 300, subds. (a), (b), and (e) and 361.5, subd. (b)(5) and (6)), and its denial of family reunification services were not an abuse of discretion. We affirm the juvenile court’s orders.