CA Unpub Decisions

In this consolidated appeal, Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (FC Surety) appeals two orders denying it relief from the forfeiture of a $150,000 bail bond. The trial court denied FC Surety’s bail agent’s initial motion to vacate the forfeiture under Penal Code section 980, subdivision (b). The trial court also denied FC Surety’s motion to set aside the summary judgment issued when FC Surety failed to exonerate the bond within the statutory period. FC Surety contends it was entitled to tolling of the appearance period under section 1305, subdivision (e); vacation of forfeiture due to defendant’s custody and good cause under section 1305.6, subdivision (b); and untimeliness of summary judgment under section 1306, subdivision (c). We agree FC Surety had valid grounds for relief under section 1305.6, subdivision (b), so we reverse.

Defendant Travis Neal Elliott appeals an order denying his request for his restitution fine to be waived or modified. His counsel has filed an opening brief raising no issues and asking this court for an independent review of the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) On May 23, 2017, defendant filed an “Objection to Attorney’s Wende Brief.” On June 5, 2017, he filed a “Mot[ion] for Judicial Notice, of Points and Authorit[ies] in Support of Objection to Wende Brief.” We shall construe the May 23, 2017 “Objection” and the June 5, 2017 memorandum of points and authorities together as defendant’s supplemental brief.

A jury found defendant Lucas Bragg guilty of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) based on two separate incidents against different victims. In the first incident, defendant swung at the victim with an object described as a “stick” or “club” that was “a good two feet” long, which caused the victim’s nose to bleed. Defendant then smashed the windshield of the victim’s truck and dented the truck’s hood. In the second incident, another victim was in the back seat of a car when defendant threw a brick at the car with such force that the brick broke the car’s rear window and hit the victim on her back, causing bruises.

Defendant Ariel Guerrero Andon appeals from the order denying his application to redesignate his 2013 felony conviction for unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) as a misdemeanor under Proposition 47 (Pen. Code, § 1170.18, subd. (f)).
On appeal, Andon argues the trial court erred in denying his application on the ground that this offense was not eligible for redesignation under Proposition 47. We agree, but because Andon did not present any evidence to establish that the value of the vehicle in question was less than $950, we will affirm the order without prejudice to Andon submitting a new application that addresses the valuation question.

In 2006, a jury convicted Adrian Nathaniel Cortez of first degree premeditated murder as either an aider and abettor, or as a conspirator. In closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that although Cortez was not present when the victim was killed by someone else, Cortez was culpable because the killing was a "natural and probable consequence of the common plan or design of the conspiracy. And this is the theory in which the defendant Cortez is responsible for the murder . . . ." (Italics added.)

San Diego County Sheriff's deputies arrived at the home of J.B. (Mother) and J.B., Sr. (Father) to find Father wandering around outside with a machete and a flashlight, looking for his minor children. Inside, there were knives all over the house, trash in the children's beds, exposed wires, and stairs with no safety barriers. Mother and Father both have a history of mental illnesses. Family members reported that Father is an alcoholic who has gotten "progressively worse."

Plaintiff and appellant Frank Y. Morales appeals an adverse judgment, following a court trial, in his suit for partition by sale of real property held in joint tenancy with defendant and respondent Eva Novoa, for partition by sale of four items of personal property allegedly owned jointly by the parties, and for the return of or compensation for a number of items of personal property he asserted were solely his property. The trial court concluded that plaintiff failed to present evidence sufficient to establish that he has “any recognized legal interest” in either the real property or in the personal property.

Appellant Robert Leung appeals from a judgment denying his petition for writ of administrative mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) challenging the termination of his employment as a police officer. The San Francisco Police Commission (Commission) terminated Leung’s employment after sustaining five charges of misconduct, consisting of his alleged unauthorized access of California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) data (specifications one, four, and five), unauthorized dissemination of certain confidential information and CLETS data (specification two), and bringing discredit to the department based on his alleged unauthorized access and dissemination of confidential information and CLETS data (specification three). Specifications one, two, and three, related to data concerning B.B. and specifications four and five related to data concerning brothers L.W and L.W. At the oral proceeding on the petition, the trial court found a legal error had occurred at the administ

T.B. (Mother) and J.B. (Father) appeal from the juvenile court's jurisdictional and dispositional order declaring their daughter, L.B., a dependent, and placing her in Father's care. The court's order arose from allegations Mother had thoughts of killing herself and L.B. and had submerged L.B. under water for three to five seconds. Mother and Father contend substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1). We affirm.

As part of a plea bargain, Kyle C. admitted to committing indecent exposure as to one minor victim and misdemeanor sexual battery as to another. The juvenile court adjudged him a ward and imposed several probation conditions. On appeal, he challenges certain of those conditions relating to his use of electronic devices and submission of their contents to search. We affirm.

Appellants, current and former employees of respondent Los Angeles County, appeal from a judgment dismissing their claims against respondent for violations of the Labor and Health and Safety Codes, and two orders imposing sanctions against appellants and their counsel. We affirm the judgment, and affirm the sanctions orders with a modification.

Appellant Shelby P. is a patient at Coalinga State Hospital (hospitalized after being committed as a sexually violent predator (SVP)). The Department of State Hospitals (Department) filed a petition seeking an order for involuntary administration of psychotropic medication to Shelby. After an evidentiary hearing, the superior court issued the order for involuntary treatment. Shelby appeals from this order, which expired July 20, 2016. We dismiss the appeal as moot.

Plaintiff Cynthia Beck brought this malpractice action against the attorneys who defended her in a case in which she was found liable for $2 million in compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive damages. The defendant attorneys initially prevailed on a motion to strike from Beck’s complaint any claim to recover the punitive damages which had been awarded against her, on the basis that California public policy prevents shifting an award of punitive damages to a party who was merely negligent. Thereafter, the defendant attorneys sought summary judgment on the basis that none of their alleged breaches of duty caused Beck any damages. The trial court agreed, with respect to several of the purported breaches of duty, and granted summary adjudication accordingly.

Salvador Velgara appeals from the judgment entered after pleading guilty to two counts of street gang coercion of persons under 18 years old (counts 1 & 2; Pen. Code, § 186.26, subds. (a) & (d) , conspiracy to commit a felony (count 3; § 182, subd. (a)(1)), and two counts of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (counts 4 & 5; § 245, subd. (a)(4)). Appellant admitted that counts 4 and 5 were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and admitted a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (c)(1) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subds. (a)(1) & (c)(1)). The trial court sentenced appellant to seven years four months state prison. We reverse and remand for resentencing because the trial court imposed a three-year gang enhancement on count 1 even though no gang enhancement was charged or admitted on that count.