CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant and defendant Clarence Ray Allen was convicted of multiple felony offenses after a jury trial, and the judgment was affirmed on direct appeal. Thereafter, he requested the superior court to strike the restitution fine. The court dismissed and vacated certain fees and assessments but did not strike the restitution fine, and appellant filed this appeal.
On appeal, his appellate counsel has filed a brief that summarizes the facts with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks this court to independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We affirm.

Defendant Thomas Earl Pitts, Jr., contends on appeal that this court should order the correction of the clerical errors in the abstract of judgment and minute orders.
We also ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing regarding the impact of Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 567), which modified Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b), to require imposition of the middle term of imprisonment unless circumstances in aggravation justify imposition of a greater sentence. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) It further modified section 1170, subdivision (b), to require that the circumstances in aggravation be found true beyond a reasonable doubt or be stipulated to by the defendant. (Ibid.) Defendant contends his sentence must be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing in light of Senate Bill 567’s amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b).

Defendant Eddie Leyva and his girlfriend, Vanessa Wolfe, were arrested in 2014 in connection with the death of their three-month-old daughter, Adenalie. They were jointly charged with second degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (b); count 1), assault on a child causing death (§ 273ab; count 2), felony child endangerment of Adenalie (§ 273a, subd. (a); count 3), and misdemeanor child endangerment of Adenalie’s three siblings (§ 273a, subd. (b); count 4). As to defendant, count 3 included an enhancement for personal infliction of great bodily injury. (§ 12022.7, subd. (d).) Defendant and Wolfe were tried together before separate juries. Wolfe is not a party to this appeal.
After jury selection but prior to the commencement of evidence, the trial court dismissed counts 3 and 4 on the prosecution’s motion. (Former section 1385.) During jury deliberations, the trial court declared a mistrial on both counts.

Defendant Vanessa Wolfe and her boyfriend, Eddie Leyva, were arrested in 2014 in connection with the death of their three-month-old daughter, Adenalie. They were jointly charged with second degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (b); count 1), assault on a child causing death (§ 273ab; count 2), felony child endangerment of Adenalie (§ 273a, subd. (a); count 3), and misdemeanor child endangerment of Adenalie’s three siblings (§ 273a, subd. (b); count 4). Defendant and Leyva were tried together before separate juries. Leyva is not a party to this appeal.
After jury selection but prior to the commencement of evidence, the trial court dismissed counts 3 and 4 on the prosecution’s motion. (Former section 1385.) Defendant was subsequently convicted on count 1 and count 2, as charged.

In 1990, a jury convicted petitioner Jose Luis Rubio of the first degree murder of Jose Morales Araiza (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), with a special circumstance that the murder was committed during the commission or attempted commission of a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), and an enhancement for personal use of a deadly and dangerous weapon, to wit, a tire iron (§ 12022, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced petitioner to a term of life without the possibility of parole, plus one year.
In 2019, petitioner filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95. The court summarily denied the petition on the ground petitioner was the actual killer and a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life, disqualifying factors pursuant to section 1170.95, subdivision (a)(3).

C.R. (Mother) is the mother of 11-year-old S.H. and three-year-old R.H. Mother appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order removing the children from her custody (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361, subd. (c)(1)). Mother contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s order removing the children from her custody, the court misapplied the burden of proof, and there were reasonable means available to protect the children without removing them from her custody. We disagree and affirm the juvenile court’s order.

A jury found defendant and appellant Martin Grant Hill guilty of 14 counts of committing a lewd or lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 years old. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a).) The jury found true the allegations that, for 10 of the counts, defendant engaged in substantial sexual conduct with the victim. (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(8).) The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for a term of 24 years.
Defendant raises five issues on appeal. First, defendant contends the trial court erred by excluding expert testimony pertaining to false confessions. Second, defendant asserts the trial court erred by admitting the victim’s out of court statements under the fresh complaint doctrine. Third, defendant contends the trial court erred by admitting evidence of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS). Fourth, defendant asserts the trial court violated his constitutional rights of due process and confrontation by limiting his examination of the victim.

Mother appeals an order terminating her parental rights for infant K.K. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. The sole issue on appeal is whether the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) and the juvenile court failed to conduct an adequate initial inquiry as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) regarding any potential Indian ancestry of the child.
Counsel for Mother and the Agency have conferred and agree that the Agency’s investigation under the ICWA was inadequate, under the relevant statutory and decisional authority. The parties filed a joint stipulation seeking the issuance of an immediate remittitur. We accept the stipulation, conditionally reverse, and remand for the limited purpose of ensuring compliance with ICWA’s requirements.

Robert G. Cook appeals from the judgment denying his petition for writ of mandate, in which he sought an order requiring the California Department of Motor Vehicles (the DMV) to vacate and set aside its order suspending Cook’s driver’s license after Cook refused to submit to a chemical test to determine his blood-alcohol level. Cook contends that the hearing officer’s decision confirming the license suspension must be set aside because the hearing officer improperly relied on hearsay evidence to support a finding that the arresting officer had reasonable cause to suspect that Cook had unlawfully driven a vehicle under the influence of alcohol in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a).
We conclude that the hearing officer relied on admissible evidence in finding that the arresting officer had reasonable cause to suspect that Cook had driven under the influence of alcohol. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

This is an appeal from a disposition order in the juvenile court. D.L. (the Minor) contends the court erred in calculating the maximum potential custody for the instant case and the multiple prior adjudications the minor has accumulated. The Attorney General correctly agrees and concedes the case must be remanded to the juvenile court to correct the errors and to consider recent statutory changes in the rules for calculation of maximum custody in juvenile cases. We will accept the Attorney General’s concession and remand.

After having his first degree murder conviction reduced to second degree murder based on instructional Chiu error (People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155), Matthew Alexis Basler filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. Following an evidentiary hearing at which Basler was not present, the trial court denied the petition, ruling (1) Basler was ineligible for relief under section 1170.95, subdivision (a) because he was not convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory, but was convicted of first degree premeditated murder; and (2) Basler could still be convicted of murder even after the changes made to sections 188 and 189 effective January 1, 2019. The court further found “as an independent factfinder” beyond a reasonable doubt that Basler committed first degree premeditated murder and that he harbored premeditated intent before killing the victim.
On appeal, Basler contends the trial court erred by its ruling.

Tekle Mitiku, who is self-represented, appeals the superior court’s denial of his petition for a restraining order. Mitiku appears to argue that a neighbor is harassing his family and vandalizing his property. Because Mitiku fails to carry his burden to show any reversible error by the trial court, we must affirm.

Tekle Mitiku, who is self-represented, appeals the superior court’s denial of his petition for a restraining order. Mitiku appears to argue that a neighbor is harassing his family and vandalizing his property. Because Mitiku fails to carry his burden to show any reversible error by the trial court, we must affirm.

Appointed counsel for defendant Linda Maureen Dunn asked this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.