CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted Lillian Johnson of theft from an elder (Pen. Code, § 368, subd. (e); count 1) and eight counts of burglary (§ 459; counts 2–9). With respect to the theft from an elder charge, the jury found true allegations that the total, aggregate losses to the victim from a common scheme and plan exceeded $65,000 (§ 12022.6, subds. (a)(1) & (b)). As to the burglary charges, the jury found true allegations that each burglary was of an inhabited dwelling house (§ 460, subd. (a)), and the victim was 65 years of age or older (§ 667.9, subd. (a)). Over the People's objection, the court granted Johnson five years of formal probation with specified terms and conditions.

William Lawrence Turner appeals from the trial court's order granting in part and denying in part his motion to recover attorney fees and costs from the defendants in an action in which Turner alleged a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51 et seq.) (the Unruh Act) based on the defendants' provision of a handicapped parking space at their place of business that did not conform to accessibility guidelines. Turner contends that the trial court erred in failing to award the attorney fees that Turner incurred in a previous action filed in federal district court against defendants, which was dismissed as moot after the defendants promptly fixed the parking space. We conclude that the trial court properly omitted the fees incurred in the federal action, and we accordingly affirm the order.

Plaintiff and appellant Todd Riffey, along with his wife, plaintiff and appellant April Riffey (collectively, the Riffeys) owned a business called AKA Interactive Entertainment (AKA). Defendant and respondent Henry E. Stickney was married to defendant and respondent Beverly Stickney (collectively, the Stickneys) and they created the Q-Tip Trust, which owned Dillstar Productions, Inc. (Dillstar). Dillstar owned the scripts to several dinner theater productions.

This appeal is from defense judgments in two legal malpractice cases that were consolidated below: ZF Micro Solutions, Inc. et al. v. Gordon & Rees et al. (Super. Ct. S.F. City and County, 2015) No. CGC-12-524815) (ZF/Feldman); and Ireland et al. v. Gordon & Rees et al. (Super. Ct. S.F. City and County, 2015) No. CGC-12-524546) (Ireland).
The ZF/Feldman and Ireland plaintiffs were all defendants in contentious litigation involving shareholders of two corporations, ZF Micro Devices Inc. (ZF Devices) and its successor in interest, appellant ZF Micro Solutions, Inc. (ZF Solutions). Appellant David Feldman is the chairman and chief executive officer (CEO) of both ZF companies. The Ireland appellants are individual shareholders of ZF Solutions.

Pope Trading, LLC (Pope Trading) contends that Twitter, Inc. (Twitter) is liable for losses that Pope Trading sustained while trading Twitter stock on April 28, 2015, after news of Twitter’s unfavorable quarterly earnings was disclosed to the public. Pope Trading’s theory of liability is that Twitter made a negligent misrepresentation of fact by announcing that financial information about its quarterly earnings would be released after the close of the trading day on April 28, 2015, when it did not take reasonable steps to prevent an early release of that information. The trial court sustained Twitter’s demurrer without leave to amend. We affirm the judgment.

In case No. SCN353387, Tomas Zavala pled guilty to causing corporal injury to a spouse or roommate (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subds. (a), (f)(1)). At sentencing, the trial court entered a 10-year criminal protective order prohibiting Zavala from contacting or coming within 100 yards of the victim or her home, place of employment, school or vehicle. Zavala appeals from the judgment, contending that the protective order is unconstitutionally vague because it does not include an explicit knowledge requirement and does not specify the exact locations and vehicles he is to avoid. We conclude that the protective order is not unconstitutionally vague.
In cases Nos. SCN356869 and SCN354747, Zavala has not identified any argument for reversal, and in our independent review of the record, we have found no arguable issues.

On May 5, 2015, defendant Hugo Sanchez pleaded no contest to inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)), evading an officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)), violating a protective order (Pen. Code, § 166, subd. (c)(1)), and driving with a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601.2, subd. (a)). On June 11, 2015, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for a period of three years.

Shaun Marshall Roper (defendant) appeals from the trial court’s postjudgment order denying his petition to reduce his 2003 conviction for receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496) to a misdemeanor pursuant to section 1170.18, subdivisions (b) and (g), also known as Proposition 47. He contends the trial court erred in finding that the value of the property exceeded $950, thus rendering him ineligible for a reduction. The law concerning the method for valuing the stolen checks at issue in this case was not settled when defendant filed his petition. The reasoning of the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903 (Romanowski) now shows the proper methodology to be applied. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand the matter for a determination of value.

On appeal from his criminal conviction, defendant Jose Miguel Rincon contends that the trial court erroneously imposed a $259.50 jail booking fee (booking fee). As set forth below, we will strike the booking fee.

Appellant Kevin Gerold Redd pled no contest to one count of assault with a deadly weapon. Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm.
On July 12, 2016, the Kern County District Attorney filed a complaint charging appellant as follows: attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187/count 1); and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)/count 2.) The complaint further alleged an enhancement that in the commission of the offense, appellant personally inflicted great bodily injury within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a).

Appellant William Dean Parks appeals from his sentence following his guilty plea to one count of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and his admission to a personal use of a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5). The sole issue raised on appeal is appellant’s contention that the trial court erred in imposing a restitution fine totaling $4,500, pursuant to section 1202.4. We conclude that the issue was forfeited when there was no legal objection made to the imposition of the fine, and that on the merits, appellant has failed to show the trial court misunderstood its discretion to impose a lower amount.

Jesse Ray Carver Newton, Jr., filed in the trial court a petition for relief pursuant to Proposition 47. The trial court reduced one of his felony convictions to a misdemeanor and resentenced him to a lower aggregate sentence by eliminating the eight-month term it had previously imposed for the Proposition 47 count. The court also structured the new aggregate term as a split sentence; Newton’s original sentence was also a split sentence. In the end, the eight-month reduction in the aggregate term amounted to a two-month reduction in the local custody term and a six-month reduction in the mandatory supervision term that together constituted the original split sentence.

A jury convicted defendant Juan Meza of false imprisonment, infliction of corporal injury on a person in a dating relationship, and assault with a deadly weapon, and the trial court sentenced him to five years and eight months in prison. On appeal, he contends that the court erred by admitting his prior conviction for unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor as impeachment evidence because (1) that offense is not a crime involving moral turpitude and (2) the evidence was unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352 (section 352). We disagree with both contentions and affirm.

A jury convicted German Rubalcaba Lopez (appellant) of voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)) and attempted voluntary manslaughter (§§ 664, 192, subd. (a)) and found true various sentencing enhancement allegations. The trial court imposed aggravated terms on the voluntary manslaughter conviction (§ 192, subd. (a)) and the firearm use enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)) and sentenced appellant to a total of 22 years in state prison.
On appeal, appellant claims his sentence was the “product of improper judicial bias” and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the bias. We affirm.