CA Unpub Decisions

Robert Voskanyan (defendant) filed a timely notice of appeal following his entry of a plea of no contest to one count of driving recklessly while fleeing from a police officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2), one count of burglary (Pen. Code, § 459), one count of receiving stolen property (§ 496d, subd. (a)) and one count of carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)), and admitted that he had served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Defendant was sentenced to a total term of eight years. The notice of appeal states that it is based on the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea that do not affect the validity of the plea. Defendant did not seek a certificate of probable cause to raise any other issues.

A jury convicted defendant James L. Spencer III of one count of assault with a deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1).) The court sentenced him to the low term of two years plus an additional five years for a serious prior felony under section 667, subdivision (a), for a total of seven years.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in answering the jury’s questions and providing further instruction regarding deliberations when it indicated it was divided. Additionally, defendant argues there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict because the victim’s testimony was inherently improbable. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

Following a jury trial, defendant and appellant Antoine Dion Ratcliffe was convicted of premeditated murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1), assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count 2), four counts of attempted premeditated murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); counts 3, 4, 5, 6), malicious discharge of a firearm into an occupied dwelling (§ 246; count 7), and felon in possession of a firearm (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1); count 8). It was further found true that defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death to another person who was not an accomplice (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)); that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c); counts 3, 4, 5, 6); and that he committed the crimes for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§§ 186.22, subd. (b), 190.2(a)(22)).

Defendant Bobby Jan Phommachanh was convicted of multiple crimes following an incident in which he fired multiple gunshots in a bar thereby injuring two people. On appeal, he contends (1) the trial court erred by instructing the jury with a “kill zone” instruction with respect to charges of attempted murder, (2) he cannot be convicted of multiple counts of shooting at an occupied building, (3) he should have been awarded more presentence custody credit, and (4) we must remand to the trial court to state the statutory authority for a $500 surcharge imposed. The People oppose some of defendant’s contentions, concede others, and request remand to the trial court for clarification of yet another aspect of sentencing.

A jury convicted Michael Israel Petrone of reckless driving while evading a police officer. (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a).) In bifurcated proceedings, Petrone admitted two probation denial priors under Penal Code section 1203, subdivision (e)(4), two prison priors under section 667.5, subdivision (b) and one strike prior under section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i). The trial court denied probation and sentenced Petrone to seven years in prison, which it calculated as follows: the upper term of three years for the current offense, doubled under section 667, subdivision (e)(1) for Petrone's strike prior, plus one year for one of his prison priors. The court struck the punishment for Petrone's other prison prior under section 1385.

Appellant David Perets appeals from the judgment after his convictions for carjacking and second degree robbery. We modify the judgment to strike one of two prior serious felony enhancements and to stay the sentence for robbery under Penal Code section 654. As modified, we affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Larry Pena pled guilty to several charges in four separate cases, including two counts of unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and three counts of grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a)). The initial plea agreements in two of the cases (Superior Court of Riverside County, Nos. RIF1401736 and SWF1500028) were modified by the parties at sentencing. On appeal, defendant claims the sentence imposed in RIF1401736 violated his rights to due process because it differed from the previously-agreed-upon sentence in the initial plea agreement. Additionally, he contends this matter should be remanded for resentencing on his Vehicle Code section 10851 convictions. (Pen. Code, § 1170.18, Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Proposition 47).) We reject his contentions and affirm.

Henry Lugo (defendant) appeals from the judgment adjudicating him to be a sexually violent predator (SVP) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 6600 et. seq. (the SVP Act or SVPA). Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial. Defendant asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct when he questioned one of the prosecution’s expert witnesses about the effect of a sustained petition and also when he asked that expert if the defense expert witness had made any unethical statements in his report. We find no misconduct by the prosecutor, and no prejudice from the erroneously admitted evidence of the conditions of defendant’s confinement. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a mistrial. We affirm the judgment.

After his motion to suppress evidence was denied, defendant Kim E. Jordan pleaded no contest to unlawful possession of a controlled substance for sale and unlawful transportation of a controlled substance for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11378, 11379, subd. (a).) The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on formal probation for five years with various terms and conditions, including that defendant serve five years in jail with a recommendation of the sheriff’s work project.

Appellant David Allen Jones pled no contest to one count of violating Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a), and one count of violating Penal Code section 496d, subdivision (a). He also admitted having a prior strike conviction and serving three prior prison terms. The trial court informed Jones prior to accepting his plea that the indicated sentence would be six years, not the 11 years maximum. At sentencing, the trial court imposed the indicated sentence of six years. Jones appealed and appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We affirm.

Defendant Adolph Lee Hardwick appeals from a second-strike sentence imposed after a jury convicted him of abducting Mayra Zevallos at gunpoint, forcing her to drive him around aimlessly, and threatening to kill her. On appeal, defendant contends that the court failed to instruct the jury on the semiautomatic firearm element of assault with a semiautomatic firearm; that there is insufficient evidence of the asportation required for carjacking; that his carjacking conviction is unauthorized because it is a lesser-included offense of kidnap for carjacking; that his conviction for possessing a firearm as an ex-felon should have been stayed under section 654; and that his sentence is cruel and/or unusual punishment.
We conclude the court’s instructional error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and modify count 1 to the lesser-included offense of assault with a firearm. The People concede, and we agree, that carjacking is a lesser-included offense of kidnap for carjacking; we th

Defendant Justice Gaddis contends (1) there was insufficient evidence to support imposing a gang enhancement on his conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm and (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him to the upper prison term for assault with a firearm and a consecutive upper term for a firearm enhancement. We disagree with defendant’s contentions and, except to order the abstract of judgment be corrected, we affirm the judgment.

Defendant Dallas Wayne Finley appeals following his plea of no contest to possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378). Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in imposing an electronic search condition, because it is unreasonable and unconstitutionally overbroad.

Defendant Dallas Wayne Finley appeals following his plea of no contest to possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378). Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in imposing an electronic search condition, because it is unreasonable and unconstitutionally overbroad.