CA Unpub Decisions

In a case arising from the failed purchase of a commercial building, the prospective buyer, Neman Real Estate Investments, LLC, appeals from a summary judgment in favor of respondents Frederick Oken, Stanford Oken, and Ruth Dawson, as trustees of three trusts that own the property. We conclude that as a matter of law there is no enforceable purchase agreement that satisfies the statute of frauds, and no basis for finding part performance, estoppel, or fraud. We also find no error or abuse of discretion in the postjudgment order awarding attorney fees to respondents. The judgment and order are affirmed.

Appellant Stanislav Maximov appeals from a judgment awarding child support, spousal support, and attorney’s fees to respondent Lidia Maximova. Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it calculated support by: (1) treating reinvested stock proceeds as income for temporary support; and (2) weighing impermissible factors in setting permanent spousal support. He also contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded attorney’s fees to respondent. The judgment is affirmed.

Anthony married Andrea on March 28, 2005. On February 29, 2016, a stipulated judgment for dissolution of marriage was entered.
On February 2, 2016, Anthony filed a request to modify both child and spousal support “due to a material change in circumstances,” namely, the sale of the marital residence, which terminated his BAH, along with “a hardship deduction due to a new child from a new relationship.” His leave and earnings statement for pay period covering December 1 to December 31, 2015, shows a payment of BAH benefits but no corresponding deduction. However, his leave and earnings statement for pay period covering January 1 to January 31, 2016, shows a payment of BAH benefits and a corresponding deduction for the same amount. Andrea opposed the request for modification.

In this indemnity action, plaintiff Marin Schools Insurance Authority (MSIA) appeals the trial court’s orders granting summary judgment to defendant Schools Excess Liability Fund (SELF) and awarding fees. We affirm the summary judgment order but reverse the fee award.

This is the fourth appeal in a case that puts Jarndyce v. Jarndyce in the shade. And, as was true with the interminable Dickensian lawsuit, the legal fees must be voracious but the issues are dwindling.
The original combatants were Sherry Lund, plaintiff, and Dominique Merrick, defendant. Sherry Lund’s lawsuit against Merrick was dismissed pursuant to Merrick’s anti-SLAPP motion. Since then Merrick has been trying to collect the legal fees awarded to her as a prevailing defendant. This effort has drawn Sherry’s husband, William Lund, into the fray, because William has some money coming to him from the settlement of a Los Angeles Superior Court case involving a trust. After three tries, Merrick finally received an assignment order from the Orange County Superior Court allowing her to collect her fee award of approximately $130,000 from William’s trust payments on the ground that the money is community property. Both William and Sherry have appealed from this order.

Appellant, Chad Langworthy, filed various union grievances and claims against his employer, respondent United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS), regarding what Langworthy considered unfair labor treatment. Langworthy filed the claims with the National Labor Relations Board, the California Labor Commissioner, and the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (Department). These grievances and claims were unsuccessful. Following an investigation, the Department issued Langworthy a right-to-sue notice on his claim for race and age discrimination, harassment, and retaliation.
Thereafter, Langworthy filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Langworthy did not disclose his potential claim against UPS as an asset of the bankruptcy estate. A few months later, the bankruptcy court discharged Langworthy’s debt and closed the case.

Defendants and appellants Eugene H. Twarowski, III, and Twarowski Pacific, LLC (TP LLC) appeal from the entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff and respondent Sherrie Kramer and her husband, Philip Kramer. Defendants contend the court abused its discretion in entering the judgment, which defendants describe as a default judgment against both of them. We conclude the appeal by TP LLC must be dismissed, and we affirm the judgment against Mr. Twarowski.

Christopher M. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s June 8, 2016, findings and order maintaining dependency jurisdiction (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 364, subd. (c)) over his son, Sebastian M. (Sebastian, born Dec. 2007). He contends that substantial evidence fails to support any need for ongoing dependency jurisdiction in this matter. Father also challenges the juvenile court’s June 29, 2016, order granting E.J. (mother) and Sebastian a restraining order against him.
We affirm.

Appellant Marcus B. (father) challenges the juvenile court’s order removing his daughter, L.B. (the minor), from his custody. Father’s sole contention is that the court erred by ordering the minor’s removal under Welfare & Institutions Code section 361, subdivision (c), because she did not reside with father (who was then incarcerated) at the time the Department of Children and Family Services (department) filed its petition. (See In re Dakota J. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 619, 629-630 (Dakota J.) [removal order reversed where child did not reside with parent for five years prior to department’s involvement].) The department contends the appeal should be dismissed because father’s notice of appeal is defective and, in any event, father forfeited the right to challenge the removal order by failing to object to the removal order or otherwise contest the disposition below. We agree with the department on both points and dismiss the appeal.

The San Luis Obispo District Attorney filed an amended juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, former subd. (a)) alleging that appellant J.D. committed the felony offense of making criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422, subd. (a)) and the misdemeanor offense of altering the appearance of an imitation firearm (id. § 20150). Appellant admitted the misdemeanor charge. The felony charge was dismissed, but the parties agreed that it could be considered as true for purposes of the disposition hearing.
Appellant was declared a ward of the juvenile court and placed on probation. On appeal, he contends that two of his probation terms are unconstitutional. Specifically, he contests Term 22, which requires that he “[s]ubmit to search of any electronic devices used to store or transmit information that you own, possess, or control, at any time, with or without probable cause, by probation or law enforcement; to include . . . ‘password[s] for purpose of identifying posse

Defendant and appellant S.N. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order denying his motion to remove the social worker for bias, denying his Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition requesting that K.P. (mother) provide the passports of F.N. and H.N. (the children) to the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the Department) and restrain mother from leaving the country, and denying his request for a stay of the order allowing mother to travel with the children out of the country. Rejecting father’s contentions, we affirm.

Appointed counsel for former minor D.S. asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) D.S. was advised of her right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days elapsed and we received no communication from D.S. We find no arguable issues on appeal.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)
On October 18, 2016, the Juvenile Delinquency Department of the superior court filed a notice of a Welfare and Institutions Code section 786 hearing to consider sealing the records in three of D.S.’s section 602 cases.

Mother and Jose E. (father) have two daughters, Al. M. (born in 2001) and Ar. M. (born in 2004). Between 2009 and 2012, the Department of Children and Family Services (department) received five referrals regarding the girls, all of which were deemed unfounded. At some point the parents divorced, and the girls were living primarily with mother and visiting with father. It is undisputed that the girls did not get along well, particularly when left home alone while mother was at work.
In January 2014, the department received a sixth referral. Based on mother’s admission that she had hit the girls with a belt, the department provided the girls with counseling services and supervised the family for one year under a voluntary family maintenance contract.

Lindsey C. (father) appeals from jurisdictional findings and a dispositional order removing his daughter, Aaliyah C. (Aaliyah, born Sept. 2011) from his custody and placing her with Renee M. (mother). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subds. (a), (b) & (j).) He contends that insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings of physical abuse and substance abuse.
We affirm.