CA Unpub Decisions

In August 2021, defendant Demond Charles Brackett was charged with resisting an executive officer (Pen. Code, § 69; statutory section citations that follow are found in the Penal Code), felony vandalism (§ 594, subd. (b)(1)), and making criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a)). It was further alleged defendant suffered a prior serious felony. (§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b).)
On September 8, 2021, defendant moved to relieve his current counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118. After holding a hearing, the court denied defendant’s request.
On September 15, 2021, defense counsel declared a doubt as to defendant’s mental competency (§ 1368) and the trial court suspended proceedings. The court appointed a psychologist to examine defendant.
On September 27, 2021, defendant filed an appeal solely from the September 8, 2021, order denying his Marsden motion.

Defendant John Martin Paynter appeals the trial court’s imposition of court fees and a restitution fine after denying his request for an ability to pay hearing. We affirm.

Appointed counsel for defendant James Byron Cleveland has asked this court to conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm the judgment.

Following a court trial, defendant Darnell William Randle was found guilty of second degree robbery and allegations of multiple prior serious felony convictions were found true. Defendant was sentenced to 15 years in state prison based on the upper term of five years for second degree robbery, doubled for a prior strike, plus five years for another prior conviction.
While defendant’s appeal was pending, Penal Code section 1170 was amended by Senate Bill No. 567 (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3) (Senate Bill No. 567). Both parties agree Senate Bill No. 567 applies retroactively to defendant’s case, but they disagree on whether remand is necessary. We decline to remand as the error in sentencing defendant under the prior version of the statute was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as we will explain. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

The trial court granted defendant Gagik Karapetyan’s petition for resentencing after an evidentiary hearing under Penal Code section 1170.95. The People appeal the decision, contending the trial court imposed on the prosecution the wrong burden of proof when it required the prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury at defendant’s trial actually relied on a now-valid theory of murder to find defendant guilty, rather than considering whether defendant could currently be convicted under a now-valid theory of murder. While this appeal was pending, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2), which clarified the applicable burden of proof in section 1170.95 hearings. Consistent with this legislation, and for the reasons explained below, we will reverse the order granting the petition and remand the case for further proceedings.

Russell Boston sued Dennis C. Lanni, alleging several torts. After Boston misused the discovery process and failed to comply with a court order, the superior court, acting through a court commissioner, granted Lanni’s motion for terminating sanctions and entered judgment against Boston. After the time for filing a notice of appeal had expired, Boston filed a notice of appeal from the judgment. Because the notice of appeal was untimely, we lack jurisdiction to consider Boston’s contentions of error. We will therefore dismiss the appeal.
Boston has chosen to represent himself, which he has a right to do. (See Gray v. Justice’s Court (1937) 18 Cal.App.2d 420, 423 [individuals may choose to represent themselves].) The court must treat self-represented litigants the same as represented litigants. (Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1210.)

Defendant, Manuel Ovidio Ramos-Munoz was employed at a hotel that was the site of an early morning kidnapping and sexual assault. The victim was a 22-year-old participant in a student work and travel program from Skopje, Macedonia who shared a room at the hotel with other students from Macedonia. She was sitting alone outside the hotel talking on the phone at about midnight when attacked at knifepoint by a man who forced her to accompany him downstairs and across the street, all the while kissing her, demanding that she commit sexual acts, hitting her, cutting her clothes off, attempting sexual intercourse and walking her back toward her hotel room, before she escaped, totally naked, to her hotel room. She suffered cuts, scratches and bruises.
Defendant along with three other male hotel employees were asked to provide saliva samples. Defendant did so.

Robert Lopez, Jr., appeals from the denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. Lopez’s appointed counsel filed a brief asking this court to proceed under People v. Serrano (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 496.
A jury convicted Lopez of second degree murder with a true finding that Lopez personally used a knife during the commission of the crime. At trial, Lopez did not dispute that he stabbed and killed the victim in an altercation over a bicycle. Lopez testified in his own defense, stating that his bicycle had been stolen, and two days later, he saw the victim riding his stolen bicycle. Lopez admitted that he took a knife and ran toward the victim, after which the two began to fight. Witnesses saw Lopez grab the victim and stab him in the neck. Lopez testified he accidentally stabbed the victim. Lopez was sentenced to 15 years to life, plus one year for the weapon enhancement.

Alexus S. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to comply with its duty under state law implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) to inquire of unspecified extended family members whether her child, King, may be an Indian child. (See § 224.2.) We agree with DCFS that any such failure was not prejudicial and, on that basis, affirm the court’s order.

Richard E. White appeals from postjudgment orders (1) denying his motion to modify conditions of postrelease community supervision (PRCS), and (2) revoking PRCS. We affirm.

Appellants Maria S. (mother) and Felipe S. (father) appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights over their children, April (born 2011), Ariel (born 2016), and Adan (born 2017) and freeing the children for adoption. Both parents contend the orders must be reversed because (1) the beneficial parent-child exception to terminating parental rights applies, (2) legal guardianship should have been considered as an alternative, and (3) a proper inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; ICWA) was not undertaken.
We affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

In 2019, appellant Alvaro Alexis Vasquez filed a motion to vacate his 2005 conviction for robbery, as he was currently facing deportation proceedings due to the conviction. He claimed he did not understand the adverse immigration consequences of pleading no contest in 2005 because he was not a “fluent English speaker” and did not have a Spanish interpreter present at the hearings. The trial court denied the motion without prejudice.
In 2020, appellant filed his second motion to vacate the 2005 conviction. He claimed to have new evidence in support of his motion. After argument, the trial court found appellant’s new evidence was insufficient, and denied the second motion with prejudice. Appellant appeals from the order denying his second motion.
We find appellant’s arguments unavailing and affirm the trial court’s order.

Peterson S. appeals from an order recommitting him for treatment to the Department of State Hospitals as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). (Pen. Code, § 2962 et seq.) He was diagnosed with schizophrenia. His commitment offense was felony assault with a deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm. (§ 245, subd. (a)(1).)
Appellant’s sole contention is that his waiver of a jury trial was invalid because the trial court failed to properly advise him of his right to a jury trial. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that appellant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial. Accordingly, we affirm.

Gary K. (father) appeals from a judgment of the juvenile court asserting jurisdiction over his two children, Nicole K. (born December 2008) and Matthew K. (born December 2015) pursuant to section 360 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. Specifically, father argues that substantial evidence does not support the court’s decision to sustain the petition filed pursuant to section 300 and that substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s order removing the children from father’s custody.
We find the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and removal order are supported by substantial evidence, and we affirm.