CA Unpub Decisions

Natalie Nicole Ragsdale appeals from the denial of a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.18, which is part of the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Proposition 47). Enacted by voter initiative in November 2014, Proposition 47 reduced certain drug-related and property crimes from felonies to misdemeanors. Section 1170.18 provides a mechanism by which a person with a prior felony conviction for an offense that is now classified as a misdemeanor under statutes added or amended by Proposition 47 can petition to have their conviction designated as a misdemeanor and be resentenced accordingly. (§ 1170.18, subds. (a), (f).)
The trial court denied Ragsdale’s petition on grounds that her prior convictions, including those for second degree commercial burglary and vehicle taking, were not subject to the resentencing provisions of Proposition 47.

Ashley Jayleen Polston entered into a plea agreement in which she agreed to plead guilty (or no contest) to one count of child abuse and admit a great bodily injury enhancement. The maximum prison term to which she could have been sentenced was five years. Before sentencing, Polston moved to withdraw her plea. The trial court denied her motion and sentenced her to the agreed-upon term.
Polston appeals asserting numerous arguments in an attempt to convince this court she should be allowed to withdraw her plea. As we shall explain, we reject each of these arguments and affirm the judgment.
Appellate counsel has also filed a request to expand her appointment and obtain additional funds in an attempt to establish Polston is factually innocent. We deny this request because Polston pled guilty to the charge, and did so freely, voluntarily, and knowingly.

Defendant and appellant David Elliott Nicholas approached a woman getting into her car in a parking lot, put an object against her back, and took her car key. Defendant then pushed the victim to the ground as he attempted to get into her car before he was chased away by a bystander. Defendant had prior strike convictions for armed robbery and second degree murder.

On November 17, 18, and 19, 2009, defendant entered a Clearpath Federal Credit Union branch office with the intent to deposit or cash four checks he had written, knowing there were insufficient funds in his bank account to cover the check. The aggregate value of the four forged checks exceeded $950, but the checks individually were each less than $950. Defendant pled guilty to felony burglary (Pen. Code, § 459 ) and admitted one prior strike conviction (§ 667, subd. (e)(1)). After the passage of Proposition 47, defendant filed an application for reduction of his felony burglary conviction to misdemeanor shoplifting (application). The trial court summarily denied the application on the ground the stolen property exceeded $950.

Appointed counsel for defendant Colin Christopher Hauge asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Having reviewed the record, we discovered errors in the abstract of judgment involving the probation revocation fine, restitution fine, and parole revocation fine. We shall correct the abstract of judgment to conform to the oral pronouncement of judgment. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

A jury found Darren Edward Foster guilty of one count of willful infliction of corporal injury upon a spouse or cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)) and one count of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)). As to both counts, the jury also made true findings that Foster intended to cause great bodily injury. (§§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iii), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iii).) Foster admitted prior convictions, including two prior strikes (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, 668), and the trial court sentenced him to an indeterminate prison term of 25 years to life.

Ryan Mateo Barbosa appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence imposed after a jury found him guilty of first degree burglary and resisting an officer. He contends that the trial court erred in excluding as hearsay certain statements he made to the victim, and that the prosecutor committed misconduct by misleading the jury. We will affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted appellant of lewd act upon a child under 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)) as alleged in count 2 of the information. The jury was unable to reach a unanimous decision on the same charge in count 1. The trial court declared a mistrial on count 1 and ultimately dismissed the charge after sentencing on count 2. On count 2, the trial court denied probation and sentenced appellant to the low term of three years in the state prison.
Appellant’s sole contention in this appeal is that the trial court committed prejudicial error when it admitted expert testimony about Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS). Because we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its decision to admit the testimony, or otherwise commit error when admitting the testimony, we affirm the judgment.

The trial court dismissed Isiak Moyosore’s complaint against Usua Amanam. The court also entered a default judgment against Moyosore on Amanam’s cross-complaint. Several years later, Moyosore moved to aside the dismissal, and to vacate the default judgment. The court denied the motions.
Moyosore appeals in propria persona, raising various claims of error. We affirm.
Amanam owned real property in Fremont. In 2000, Amanam agreed to sell the property to Moyosore and they entered into at least one written purchase agreement. Moyosore made payments toward the purchase of the property and moved into the property. In 2008, Moyosore stopped making payments; in 2010, the property was sold in a foreclosure sale. Moyosore was evicted.

Plaintiffs and appellants Michael D. Kelley and Michelle R. Kelley purchased a used vehicle, not realizing that it had frame damage. They filed suit against defendants—Adams Service, Inc., doing business as J&M Auto Sales (J&M), and Wells Fargo Dealer Services, a division of Wells Fargo Bank Center, Inc. (Wells Fargo). The complaint asserted four causes of action for violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) (Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.); unfair competition law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.); and intentional and negligent misrepresentation. It is undisputed that, at the time of sale, J&M had provided plaintiffs with an AutoCheck Vehicle History Report, disclosing on pages 2 and 4 that the vehicle had frame damage. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. Based on our independent review, we affirm the judgment.

Leticia P. appeals the order terminating her parental rights in the dependency case of her minor son Victor A., Jr. (Victor). Leticia contends the evidence does not support the juvenile court's finding that Victor was likely to be adopted within a reasonable period of time. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) We disagree and affirm.

Appellant V.K. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She contends: (1) the juvenile court did not comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA); (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that the child was adoptable; (3) and the juvenile court erred in finding that the parent relationship exception did not apply. We reverse and remand for compliance with the ICWA.

Father appeals the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional order removing his then-eight-year-old daughter and then-three-year-old son from his custody and placing the children in foster care. Father argues that he posed no present threat of harm to the children, and that his drug abuse and domestic violence were too remote in time to support jurisdiction. Father contends the court erred in not placing the children with his suggested non-relative extended family member for placement. Father filed a separate appeal from an order issued at the six-month review hearing, arguing that the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) unjustifiably failed to evaluate his proposed caretaker for the children. We consolidated the two appeals and now affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

In May 2016, we affirmed a judgment declaring D.W. a ward of the court for his commission of three firearm offenses. In doing so, we rejected his argument that a search of his person was invalid under the Fourth Amendment because it did not properly fall within the exception to the warrant requirement for a search incident to an arrest. Our Supreme Court granted review and held the case pending its consideration and disposition of People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206 (Macabeo). Once it decided that case, the court transferred this one back to us for reconsideration in light of Macabeo. No party filed a supplemental brief within the time allowed following transfer from the Supreme Court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(b).) We now reverse.