CA Unpub Decisions

After a jury found that Grandpa’s Jumps was actively negligent when it rented a defectively designed inflatable slide to a parochial school and installed it at the school fundraiser, the trial court ruled in favor of the Archdiocese of Los Angeles (Archdiocese) on a cross-complaint brought by Grandpa’s Jumps for contractual indemnity. Grandpa’s Jumps filed this timely appeal, and we affirm.

This is an appeal following the trial court’s decision to sustain a demurrer to plaintiff C.C. Technology, L.P.’s (CCT) second amended complaint for national origin discrimination under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51.5; the Unruh Act) and unfair business practices (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200; the UCL) against defendants BBCN Bank (BBCN) and related entities. In sum, CCT, which is an entity owned by Vietnamese individuals or persons of Vietnamese origin, alleged that BBCN, a Korean-owned entity, discriminated based on national origin. The court ultimately sustained BBCN’s demurrer on the grounds that the statute of limitations had expired. As we shall explain, we reject CCT’s various arguments as to why its claims did not accrue or were not discovered until much later, and agree with the trial court that the statute of limitations bars this action.

Tracy Starnes and her four children sued Ramsay Nucho, M.D., Darren Hodgins, M.D., and Surgical Multispecialties Medical Group, alleging a cause of action for the wrongful death of Michael Starnes from medical malpractice during surgery. Dr. Nucho, Dr. Hodgins, and their medical group filed a joint motion for summary judgment, with the doctors invoking the “Good Samaritan Law” (see Bus. & Prof., § 2396), and their group arguing that, absent liability on the doctors’ part, it could have no vicarious liability as their principal. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion. The Starnes family appeals; we affirm.

After a bench trial, defendant Vickie Regina Wright was convicted of making criminal threats directed to B.T. (Pen. Code, § 422; unless otherwise set forth, section references that follow are to the Penal Code; count 1), H.B. (§ 422; count 2), and A.W. (§ 422; count 3). The court also convicted defendant of disturbing the peace by using offensive language, a misdemeanor (§ 415, subd. (3); count 4) and resisting an officer, a misdemeanor (§ 148; count 5). The court sustained allegations of a strike prior (§ 1170.12) and a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)).

In 2013, appellant Julio Angel Torrez pled no contest to a felony count of possession of methamphetamine and admitted a prior juvenile adjudication for rape constituted a strike. On November 12, 2015, Torrez filed a petition to redesignate the possession of methamphetamine offense as a misdemeanor pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18. The superior court denied the petition on the basis Torrez was ineligible because of a prior disqualifying conviction within the meaning of section 1170.18, subdivision (i). Torrez appeals, contending a juvenile adjudication is not a disqualifying conviction.
In People v. Fernandez 11 Cal.App.5th 926 (Fernandez) and People v. Zamora
11 Cal.App.5th 728 (Zamora), this court concluded juvenile adjudications that satisfy the prerequisites of section 667, subdivision (d)(3) and are for an offense specified in section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv) render a defendant ineligible for section 1170.18 reclassification. Torrez’s juvenile adjudication f

Peter Raymond Musovich appeals from the order denying him resentencing pursuant to the provisions of Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (the Act). We affirm the order denying Musovich’s petition as he was ineligible for resentencing.

Appointed counsel for defendant Darlyne Danette Motaconrad asks this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.

On appeal from a judgment of conviction for indecent exposure and making criminal threats, defendant Jerry Leroy Monckton contends the trial court’s order requiring him to pay a portion of his defense costs must be reversed. He argues that the order was entered without notice or an opportunity to be heard and is contrary to the statutory presumption that a defendant who is sentenced to prison lacks the ability to pay defense costs. He also claims the evidence before the court was insufficient to support a finding that he had the ability to pay the costs of his defense. We agree with defendant and shall reverse the challenged order.

A jury convicted defendant Jconcepicon Hernandez Loera of continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14 years (Pen. Code, § 288.5, subd. (a); unless otherwise set forth, statutory references that follow are to the Penal Code), oral copulation of a child under 14 (§ 288a, subd. (c)(1)), and lewd and lascivious acts on a child under 14 who is more than 10 years younger than defendant (§ 288, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced defendant to 16 years in state prison.

Appellant James Cajias Gonzalez appeals following his jury trial conviction for felony hit-and-run driving (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (b)(2); count 1), misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a); count 2), and misdemeanor use or being under the influence of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (a); count 3). Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the misdemeanor drug charges (counts 2 & 3) from the felony hit-and-run charge (count 1), on the grounds that: (1) the charges were improperly joined under the statutory requirements of Penal Code section 954 (Section 954); and (2) even if joinder were proper under the statute, it resulted in gross unfairness amounting to a prejudicial denial of due process.

In this consolidated appeal, we consider defendant’s appeal from the trial court’s denial of various petitions related to the resentencing provisions of Propositions 36 and 47 filed by defendant Roberto Chaidez. Finding defendant’s claims already rejected by this court in a prior appeal of defendant or raising matters not cognizable on appeal, we shall affirm.

Defendant Silvia Cata appeals her conviction for elder abuse claiming there is insufficient evidence of neglect. She claims we should abandon the well-established deferential review for sufficiency of evidence and instead review de novo because the case was submitted to the trial court via documentary evidence. We disagree and shall affirm the judgment.

Defendant and petitioner Tyrell Ainsworth is before us for the second time. In 2012, he was convicted of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) with a special allegation that he personally and intentionally used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (d). He admitted the allegation that he had suffered one prior strike conviction, and was sentenced to a prison term of 25 years to life, doubled under the Three Strikes law, plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life under the gun use enhancement, for a total term of 75 years to life. He appealed, raising several grounds, including a claim that the matter must be remanded to the trial court because he was a minor at the time of the murder and the court did not consider the factors set forth in Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 (Miller) before imposing a 75 years to life sentence. We agreed, and remanded the matter “with directions [to the trial court] to reconsider its sentencing decision in

A jury found defendant David Acuna guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); unless otherwise set forth, statutory references that follow are to the Penal Code) and arson of an inhabited dwelling (§ 451, subd. (b)). The jury also found true the allegations that defendant personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon during the commission of the murder, i.e., a knife (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), and used a device designed to accelerate the fire or delay ignition (§ 451.1, subd. (a)(5)). The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 39 years to life.