CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Oscar Gerald Machado was convicted in 1998 of second degree burglary of a vehicle and first degree burglary of a residence. Because defendant previously had been convicted of two counts of armed robbery, the trial court sentenced him under the “Three Strikes” law on both counts.
Following passage of Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, defendant petitioned to recall his sentence. The trial court issued an order to show cause as to the vehicle burglary count, but denied the petition as to the residential burglary count, finding it was ineligible for resentencing under Proposition 36. Citing the “full resentencing rule,” defendant nonetheless requested that, should the trial court recall his sentence on the vehicle burglary, that it reconsider his sentence on the residential burglary as well and dismiss the prior strikes pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero).

Plaintiff brought an action against his former employer under the Private Attorneys Generals Act (PAGA) (Lab. Code, § 2699) for violation of section 226, subdivision (a)(9). Plaintiff was employed by a private contractor on a United States military base. The trial court concluded that plaintiff’s action was barred by the federal enclave rule. (U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 17.) The court granted defendant judgment on the pleadings. We affirm.

This breach of contract action involves an unconsummated purchase and sale of nine hotels. The parties, defendant, cross-complainant and appellant KS Development, LLC (Buyer), and plaintiffs, cross-defendants and respondents BRE Atlas Property Owner LLC, BRE SSP Property Owner LLC, BRE SH Brisbane Owner LLC, BRE Newton Hotels Property Owner LLC, BRE SSP Thousand Oaks LLC, and BRE Polygon Property Owner LLC (collectively Seller), each contended the other party breached the purchase and sale agreement, and each claimed entitlement to a $9 million deposit held in escrow.
The trial court found that Buyer breached the purchase and sale agreement and that Seller was entitled to the $9 million deposit as liquidated damages. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings, and we therefore affirm the judgment.

Fox Television Stations, LLC (Fox), William Melugin, Daniel Leighton, and Kris Knutsen (collectively, the Fox defendants) and Michael Houston appeal from orders denying their special motions to strike (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16; anti-SLAPP statute) the complaint filed by Dr. Jay W. Calvert, a nationally recognized plastic surgeon, and Jay Calvert, M.D., Professional Corporation (the professional corporation) (collectively, the Calvert plaintiffs). This case arises from the Fox defendants broadcasting and publishing news reports about a civil lawsuit filed against Dr. Calvert by his former patient Natalie West alleging insurance fraud and medical battery. The reports included statements by Houston that Dr. Calvert had similarly committed acts of insurance fraud in treating him. In response, the Calvert plaintiffs sued the Fox defendants and Houston for defamation.

As Antonio V. put up Christmas decorations in front of his home with his two children, Hector Santana, a man Antonio did not know, approached him to ask for money for college. After Antonio gave Santana $5 from his pocket, Santana asked for a glass of water. As Antonio emerged from his home with the water, Santana held a gun. Fearful for his children, Antonio attempted to tackle Santana, and Santana shot Antonio. Antonio fell, and while he remained on the ground, kneeling, Santana shot at him again.
A jury convicted Santana of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664), found true the allegation that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated (§ 664, subd. (a)), and found true three firearm enhancement allegations that Santana used a firearm, discharged a firearm, and discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d)).

Carlos Perez Cardona appeals from the trial court’s order denying his motion under Penal Code section 1473.7 to vacate his 2005 conviction of corporal injury to a spouse, cohabitant, or child’s parent. Cardona, who faces mandatory deportation to Mexico, contends he did not meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of his guilty plea because his attorney did not explain that his plea would result in his deportation from the United States. Cardona also asserts his attorney failed to negotiate an immigration-safe disposition that would have allowed him to avoid deportation. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Jose Barragan (defendant) appeals from the summary denial of his petition for vacatur and resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95. He contends that the trial court erred in failing to appoint counsel and entertain briefing, and in ruling that the petition was barred as a successive petition or a motion for reconsideration of defendant’s prior petition. Defendant also contends that in his petition he made a prima facie showing that he falls within the provisions of section 1170.95 and that the jury’s true finding in his murder trial pursuant to section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17) did not bar relief as a matter of law.
We agree that the trial court erred in summarily denying the petition without appointing counsel and entertaining briefing, and that the petition should not have been barred as a successive petition or motion for reconsideration. However, we find the errors to be harmless.

Glen Quintrell Love appeals an order denying his petition for resentencing (§ 1170.95) of his first degree murder conviction. In 1999, he was convicted of second degree robbery (§ 211) and first degree murder with a robbery-murder special circumstance finding (§§ 187, 189, 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)).
In 2019, Love filed a petition for resentencing. The trial court issued an order to show cause on his section 1170.95 petition and held an evidentiary hearing. It found Love was not entitled to resentencing because he was “a major participant and acted with reckless indifference” to human life. After we affirmed the order denying his petition, Love filed a petition for rehearing. We granted the petition to consider the impact of recently passed Senate Bill No. 775 (2021 Reg. Sess.) that amended the section 1170.95 hearing procedure. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.)

On November 15, 2019, Cifuentes ran a red light at an intersection and struck a sedan carrying three passengers: Anthony J., Daniela Z., and their three-month old son. Anthony and Daniela were injured and taken to the hospital, and their car suffered major damage. Cifuentes left the scene. He was found in a nearby creek with red eyes and smelling of alcohol. At the police station, Cifuentes took two breathalyzer tests. The tests indicated he had a 0.16 blood alcohol content and had been driving while impaired. In addition, he was driving without a valid license, as his had been suspended in May 2017 for driving with an excessive blood alcohol content.
Days after the collision, Anthony reported to the investigating detective that he broke his foot in the accident and suffered from severe muscle plain in his lower back. He needed crutches to walk.

Plaintiffs Twell and Vasie Phillips, represented by an experienced attorney, obtained a default judgment of over half a million dollars against their self-represented former landlords, defendants Chang and Yen Wang. We requested supplemental briefing on what we believe are the principal issues to be decided on defendants’ appeal: (1) Is the default judgment void because rendered in excess of the trial court’s jurisdiction, and (2) if so, did the trial court err in denying Chang’s motion to set aside the default judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d)? Answering both questions in the affirmative, we reverse the trial court’s decision denying the motion for relief and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Defendant Eduardo Delavega was charged with murder and various enhancements, including three firearm enhancements under Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), and (d). The jury convicted Delavega of second degree murder and found true the subdivision (d) enhancement, but the verdict form did not reference the subdivision (b) and (c) enhancements. At sentencing, Delavega asked the trial court to exercise its discretion under Senate Bill No. 620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 620) to strike the subdivision (d) enhancement, which carries a term of 25 years to life. The court declined to do so, and it sentenced Delavega to a total term of 40 years to life in prison. On appeal, he argues that the court erred because it refused to strike the subdivision (d) enhancement on the premise that it could only impose or strike that enhancement, not strike that enhancement and impose a lesser enhancement under subdivision (b) or (c).

D.B. (Father) is the presumed parent of minor child O.B., born in 2015. The trial court sustained a petition filed by the Santa Cruz County Human Services Department (the Department), alleging that O.B. came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(2). At the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, the court placed O.B. with the Department and ordered supervised visitation for both D.B. and O.B.’s mother, N.B. (Mother).
On appeal Father contends the trial court erred in removing O.B. from Mother, claiming there is not substantial evidence to support the disposition order and that the trial court violated his due process rights at the hearing. Father also claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Concluding that the trial court did not err, and that Father has failed to show prejudice resulting from any ineffective assistance of counsel, we will affirm the trial court’s orders.

Defendant Mohammad Khaliqi was convicted by a jury of assault with intent to commit a sex crime during a first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 220, subd. (b)), assault with intent to commit a sex crime (§ 220, subd. (a)), forcible lewd act on a child under 14 (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)), first degree burglary (§ 460, subd. (a)) with a nonaccomplice present (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21)), and false imprisonment by violence (§ 237, subd. (a)). The jury also found true that the forcible lewd act count had been committed during a first degree burglary with the intent to commit a forcible lewd act (§ 667.61, subd. (d)(4)). The court imposed a term of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for the forcible lewd act count consecutive to a determinate upper term of six years for the section 220, subdivision (a) count. Terms for the remaining counts were imposed but stayed under section 654.

Appellant and defendant Jose Sacramento Cornejo pleaded no contest pursuant to a negotiated disposition and was placed on probation. He violated probation, admitted the violation, was reinstated, and then filed the instant notice of appeal. On appeal, his appellate counsel has filed a brief that summarizes the facts with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks this court to independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We affirm.