CA Unpub Decisions

J.D. (Mother) appeals from a juvenile court order and final judgment terminating dependency jurisdiction over her children, C.D. and S.D. (the children), granting Mother and the children’s father, R.D. (Father) joint legal custody, but granting Father physical custody. Mother contends the juvenile court erred in denying her request for a contested hearing regarding the custody order. We shall affirm the order and final judgment.

The trial court imposed a five-year restraining order against appellant Tamir E. Sukkary pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (the Act; Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.) based on its finding that Tamir had physically and mentally abused his wife, respondent Rania D. Sukkary. On appeal, Tamir contends (1) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting expert testimony; (2) counsel for Rania improperly referenced propensity evidence to prove abuse; (3); the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof to Tamir; (4) the trial court did not properly weigh the evidence; and (5) the trial court’s factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence because Rania’s testimony was inherently improbable and incredible. We disagree and shall affirm the judgment.

Appellant Yehezkel Hezi Kashanian appeals from a judgment of dismissal after the trial court sustained without leave to amend a demurrer to the first amended complaint filed by respondent IndyMac Venture, LLC (IndyMac). After the nonjudicial foreclosure of his home, Kashanian sued IndyMac for damages, alleging it lacked authority to foreclose because the assignment through which it purportedly became the beneficiary of the deed of trust was void. The trial court, citing Jenkins v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 497, 514-515, sustained IndyMac’s demurrer principally on the ground that Kashanian lacked standing to challenge an invalid assignment. Several months later, in Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919 (Yvanova), our Supreme Court held that a homeowner has standing to challenge an assignment that is allegedly void, even though the homeowner was in default on the loan and was not a party to the assignment.

Daniel O. (Father), the noncustodial parent of J.O. (DOB 8/2003) and D.O. (DOB 12/2009) (collectively, the children), who resides in Mexico, appeals the November 14, 2016 Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.21, subdivision (f) orders of the juvenile court (1) declining to place the children with him at that time, and (2) determining he had been provided reasonable reunification services. As substantial evidence supports the orders, we affirm.

Ju.K. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition orders made after the juvenile court adjudged her daughter J.K. (born in 1999) a dependent under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. Mother contends that the evidence did not support the jurisdictional findings. As we explain, we conclude the appeal has been rendered moot by the juvenile court’s termination of jurisdiction, and therefore dismiss the appeal.

J.D. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s termination of her parental rights to her son following a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing (.26 hearing). Mother contends the court erred by failing to apply the beneficial relationship exception to termination of parental rights (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)).
We disagree and affirm.

After denial of his motion to suppress evidence against him, Gabriel W. admitted a misdemeanor violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a), unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. Gabriel was made a ward of the court and placed on probation in his parents’ home.
Assigned counsel submitted a Wende brief, certifying an inability to identify any issues for appellate review. Counsel also submitted a declaration confirming Gabriel was advised of his right to personally file a supplemental brief raising any points which he wishes to call to the court’s attention. No supplemental brief has been submitted. As required, we have independently reviewed the record. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 109–110.) We find no arguable issues and therefore affirm.

J.L. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition orders made after the juvenile court adjudged his son E.L. (born in 2011) a dependent under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. The sustained petition alleged: (1) E.L.’s mother, T.W., abused drugs; (2) that the parents had a history of domestic violence; and (3) that Father had a history of substance abuse that interfered with his ability to care for E.L. and placed the minor at risk of harm. Although Father contends this court should reverse the jurisdiction findings involving his substance abuse, he does not challenge the other jurisdictional findings. Because Father’s contentions, even if accepted, would not justify a reversal of the court’s jurisdiction order or the grant of any other effective relief, we decline to address them and dismiss the appeal.

Plaintiff FilmOn.com (FilmOn) is an Internet-based entertainment media provider. Defendant DoubleVerify, Inc. (DoubleVerify) provides authentication services to online advertisers. FilmOn sued DoubleVerify for trade libel, slander, and other business-related torts, alleging DoubleVerify falsely classified FilmOn’s websites under the categories “Copyright Infringement-File Sharing” and “Adult Content” in confidential reports to certain clients that subsequently cancelled advertising agreements with FilmOn. DoubleVerify moved to strike the causes of action pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16), arguing its reports accurately addressed issues of widespread public interest—namely, the existence of adult content and copyright infringing material on publicly available websites, such as FilmOn. The trial court granted the motion.

More than one year after her brother, Terrence L. Fleming, died—Lois Zvolensky (Lois) petitioned the probate court to have title to real estate that was held in Fleming's name transferred to her under a real estate purchase contract. The court denied the petition on the ground it was time-barred under Code of Civil Procedure section 366.2.
Lois and her husband, Michael Zvolensky (collectively Petitioners), appeal, contending the one-year statute of limitations in section 366.2 does not apply because (1) a resulting trust arose; (2) Fleming did not breach the contract during his life; and (3) Petitioners suffered no damages until after Fleming died. For the first time in the reply brief, Petitioners also assert it is "unclear" whether section 366.2 applies to their petition, brought under Probate Code section 850. We reject these contentions and affirm.

Appellant Eretz Monterey Properties, LLC (Monterey), appeals from a judgment of dismissal after the trial court sustained a demurrer to the first amended complaint filed by respondents Longwood Management Corporation (Longwood), Monterey Care Center, Inc. (MCCI), JRB Enterprises (JRB), Friedman Living Trust, Karen Fugate (Fugate), Jacob Friedman (J. Friedman) and David Friedman (D. Friedman) (collectively, Respondents). Monterey also appeals from the trial court’s order granting Respondents’ motion to strike the deposition testimony excerpts and punitive damages allegations contained in the first amended complaint.

Citibank, N.A. (Citibank) filed a collection action against Karol U. MacDonald. She responded with a cross-complaint alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.; FDCPA) and the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Civ. Code, § 1788 et seq.; Rosenthal Act). Citibank moved to strike the cross-complaint pursuant to California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16). The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, Citibank first argues that the trial court correctly concluded that the cross-complaint arose from protected activity and that MacDonald failed to show a probability of prevailing on her claim that Citibank pursued its collection efforts under a name other than its true name. Second, Citibank claims the trial court erred in concluding that MacDonald showed a probability of prevailing on her claim that Citibank levied on her bank accounts without informing her of the lawsuit or the judgment. Third, Citibank co

This is an appeal following the trial court’s decision to sustain a demurrer to plaintiff C.C. Technology, L.P.’s (CCT) second amended complaint for national origin discrimination under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51.5; the Unruh Act) and unfair business practices (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200; the UCL) against defendants BBCN Bank (BBCN) and related entities. In sum, CCT, which is an entity owned by Vietnamese individuals or persons of Vietnamese origin, alleged that BBCN, a Korean-owned entity, discriminated based on national origin. The court ultimately sustained BBCN’s demurrer on the grounds that the statute of limitations had expired. As we shall explain, we reject CCT’s various arguments as to why its claims did not accrue or were not discovered until much later, and agree with the trial court that the statute of limitations bars this action.

Defendant and appellant Larry H. Clough (Clough) appeals an order denying his special motion to strike (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16) (anti-SLAPP motion) a malicious prosecution complaint filed by plaintiffs and respondents Armen Boladian (Boladian), Bridgeport Music, Inc. (Bridgeport), and Westbound Records, Inc. (Westbound) (sometimes collectively referred to as Boladian).
We conclude the trial court should have granted Clough’s special motion to strike as to Bridgeport because Bridgeport was not added as a defendant in the underlying action until after Clough substituted out of the case. Therefore, Bridgeport has no cause of action against Clough for malicious prosecution.
We also conclude the trial court should have granted Clough’s special motion to strike as to Boladian and Westbound because those parties failed to make a prima facie showing that Clough lacked probable cause to bring the underlying action against them.