CA Unpub Decisions

Kwon contends that his customer agreement with E*TRADE, which contained a provision requiring arbitration of claims, was an illegal contract because E*TRADE failed to inform Kwon of federal laws and regulations pertaining to verification of a customer’s identity and violated his rights by sequestering the funds he deposited.

Appellant Nabil Abd Allah purports to appeal from what his notice of appeal and civil case information statement identify as a “judgment” entered after an order granting a summary judgment motion entered on April 3, 2017. The April 3, 2017, order is a minute order granting respondents MV Public Transportation, Inc., and MV Transportation, Inc.’s motion for summary adjudication on some but not all the complaint’s causes of action and on appellant’s request for punitive damages. No final judgment has been entered.

Appellant Joseph Boodaie (Boodaie) appeals from a postjudgment order ruling he is the owner of Osher and Osher, Inc. (Osher), and that respondents 26 Moorpark, LLC (Moorpark) and Kourosh Vosoghi (Vosoghi) (Respondents) have the right to levy on Osher’s stock certificates as his personal property. Boodaie was self-represented at the postjudgment hearing and remains so on appeal. His opening brief lacks a coherent factual statement, mandatory citations to the trial court record, and applicable legal arguments and authority. He also fails to provide an adequate record, omitting documents relevant to his contentions. We affirm the postjudgment order.

A jury convicted defendant Keerewan Rattanpan of nine counts of committing lewd acts upon a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd (a); counts 1 through 9), two counts of oral copulation of a minor under the age of 16 (§ 288a, subd. (b)(2); counts 10 & 12), and two counts of sexual penetration by a foreign object (§ 289, subd. (i); counts 11 & 13). As to counts 5 through 9, the jury found true the allegations of substantial sexual conduct with a child. (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(8).) The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate state prison term of 17 years 8 months as follows: on count 2 (§ 288, subd. (a), the principal term), the low term of three years; on counts 4 through 9 (§ 288, subd. (a)), consecutive terms of two years (one-third the midterm); on counts 10 and 12 (§ 288a, subd. (b)(2)), consecutive terms of eight months (one-third the midterm); and on counts 11 and 13 (§ 289, subd. (i)), consecutive terms of eight months (one-third the midterm). The court

Lynn Behrens Zimmerman appeals from a judgment after the trial court sustained without leave to amend Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s (Wells Fargo) demurrer to the first amended complaint. The first amended complaint alleged causes of action for the cancellation of instruments and declaratory relief regarding real property that was sold in a foreclosure sale.
Zimmerman contends that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, denying leave to file her second amended complaint, ruling that her opposition to the demurrer was untimely, and “dismissing all causes of action.” We affirm.

This appeal arises from a contract dispute between two Indian tribes: Yavapai-Apache Nation (YAN) and La Posta Band of Diegueno Mission Indians (La Posta). YAN is an Arizona-based tribe with about 2,400 members, and La Posta is a California-based tribe with about 15 adult members. In the parties' contract, La Posta promised to repay more than $23 million to YAN for funds borrowed to develop a casino that later proved unsuccessful. The parties waived sovereign immunity in their contract.

In three cases consolidated in the trial court, the Estuary Owners Association (EOA) and individual owners of condominiums built on the site of a former bulk fuel distribution terminal sued successive owners and developers of the property, as well as contractors involved in constructing the condominiums, over alleged contamination of the soil and groundwater at the site and improper construction of the condominiums. After appellants settled with various of the developers and other defendants, the trial court granted motions for summary adjudication and summary judgment in favor of Shell Oil Company (Shell), the original owner of the property, on the grounds that appellants’ causes of action against it for negligence and nuisance were barred by a 10-year statute of repose, and the negligence claims also were barred by a three-year statute of limitations and failed because Shell did not owe a duty of care to appellants.

The trial court denied the writ of mandate sought by Friends of Big Bear Valley (Friends). The trial court determined the petition was barred by the statute of limitations, i.e., Government Code section 66499.37, which provides a 90-day deadline for bringing an action to challenge an advisory agency’s decision concerning a subdivision. Friends contends the trial court erred because Government Code section 66499.37 is not applicable to its petition. We reverse in part and affirm in part.

Following a collision between a vehicle and a pedestrian in a marked crosswalk, the injured pedestrian, plaintiff Isabel Ramos (Mrs. Ramos), sued the driver of the vehicle, defendant Lankwan Pong (Mrs. Pong), for negligence. Due to a pretrial stipulation that Mrs. Pong was negligent, the only issue for the jury to decide was damages. The jury returned a negligence verdict of $16,800, which fell short of the statutory offer to compromise made by Mrs. Pong under Code of Civil Procedure section 998. After awarding Mrs. Pong her costs and expert witness fees, the trial court entered a net judgment for Mrs. Ramos in the amount of $876.85.

Defendant Pascual Becerril Vilchis pleaded no contest to three counts of forcible lewd or lascivious acts on a child in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (b)(1). The trial court sentenced defendant to 28 years in prison and orally ordered that he not have visitation with the victim. However, the abstract of judgment states: “No contact w/victim or family.” On appeal, defendant contends, and the People concede, that the abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the trial court’s oral pronouncement. For the reasons discussed below, we shall direct the clerk of the superior court to modify the judgment to reflect the court’s orally pronounced judgment and to correct another minor error our review of the record revealed. As modified, we affirm.

Defendant Orlando Acosta Valdovinos was charged with attempted murder of a peace officer (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664 [count 1]); assault of a peace officer with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (d)(1) [count 2]); and criminal threats against his spouse (§ 422 [count 3]). The information further alleged: in connection with counts 1 and 2, he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm and proximately caused great bodily injury to the victim (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)); in connection with count 1, he knew or reasonably should have known the victim was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his duties (§ 664, subd. (e)); and, in connection with count 3, he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The jury found defendant guilty as charged and found true all special allegations. The trial court imposed life with the possibility of parole after seven years, plus 25 years to life for firearm discharge resulting in great bodily injury, on count 1; and three years,

Deondre A. Smith appeals from the judgment entered following this court’s remand for retrial of prior strike and prior serious felony enhancement allegations (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (a)-(j), 1170.12) attendant to a conviction of second degree robbery (§ 211). On retrial, the trial court found the allegations to be true and resentenced appellant to 11 years in state prison. Appellant contends that the subject true findings must once again be reversed for insufficient evidence. We shall order the judgment amended to reflect the imposition and staying of a prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b), hereinafter § 667.5(b)). Otherwise, we affirm.

In 1979, Alma Zuniga was stabbed, raped and shot to death then buried in a shallow grave. Her assailant remained unknown until 2012, when police received information that caused the “cold case” to be reopened and DNA specimens examined. John Clark Russell was identified as the perpetrator through a DNA match. He appeals after a jury convicted him of first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189). The jury also found true allegations that (1) appellant personally used a firearm and a dangerous and deadly weapon in committing the offense (§§ 12022, subd. (b), 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)); and (2) the murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated and was committed during the commission of a kidnapping (§ 190.2, former subd. (c)(3)(ii), now subd. (a)(17)(B)) and rape (id., former subd. (c)(3)(iii), now. subd. (a)(17)(C)). The trial court sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole plus three years. The court also ordered him to pay, among other things, a $10,000 rest

A jury convicted defendant Arturo Garcia Rojas of four counts of oral copulation or sexual penetration with a child 10 years of age or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (b)) and one count of forcible lewd or lascivious conduct with a child under the age of 14 years (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court sentenced defendant to a prison term of 60 years to life, consecutive to eight years. On appeal, defendant challenges the admission of the prosecution’s DNA expert’s testimony on confrontation clause and hearsay grounds. He also contends one of his convictions is not supported by substantial evidence and requests that the abstract of judgment be altered to correctly reflect his custody and conduct credits. We conclude the trial court prejudicially admitted hearsay evidence requiring reversal of defendant’s convictions. The People shall have the option to retry defendant on all counts, as we reject his sufficiency of the evidence claim.