CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Antwaine Devon Butler is appealing from the denial of his post-judgment motion for modification of sentence. After the notice of appeal was filed, the superior court clerk was unable to locate defendant’s moving papers. The trial court then explained its ruling in a certified settled statement. At the request of defense counsel, the record on appeal has been augmented to include that settled statement.
Defense counsel filed a Wende brief that raised no potentially arguable issues. Concerned by the omission of his moving papers from the record on appeal, defendant submitted a separate request to treat the appeal as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (See In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 826–827 [where record on appeal is insufficient to rule on appellant’s claim, appellant may seek habeas relief by alleging facts, which, if true, would entitle appellant to relief].) We decline to do so. Because the certified settled statement provides a sufficient record

Defendant William Joseph Baumer appeals an order of the trial court in which the court denied Baumer's petition for recall of his sentence, filed pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.126, as enacted by Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Proposition 36), in November 2012 by California voters. Baumer sought a recall of his sentence and resentencing on four counts. As to two of the counts, the trial court determined that although the offenses for which he was sentenced were eligible for resentencing under Proposition 36, Baumer nevertheless remained an unreasonable risk of danger to the public safety and was therefore not entitled to recall of his sentence on those counts. As to the other two counts, the trial court determined that Baumer was not eligible for recall of his sentence on these counts because he was armed with a deadly weapon during the commission of those offenses.

In this case appellant Jorge Alberto Agramont appeals from a judgment which includes an award of $365,000 in noneconomic restitution to the victim of a child molestation offense. Appellant contends the award of restitution for psychological damage was not supported by the evidence and that the amount selected by the court is excessive and "shocks the conscience." We will find the trial court's decision was rational, based upon a reasoned assessment of the facts and was well within the court's discretion. Therefore, we will affirm the judgment.

This is an appeal from judgment after J.W. (minor) admitted to the juvenile court the allegation of a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition that he committed felony robbery. Pursuant to the juvenile court’s order, minor was continued as a ward of the court and committed to the Challenge Program, a locked juvenile program, for a maximum term of confinement of five years, 8 months. The court also granted minor 92 days of total credits and ordered him to, among other things, pay a $100 restitution fine.
After minor filed a timely notice of appeal, appellate counsel was appointed to represent him. Appointed counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (People v. Wende), in which she raises no issue for appeal and asks this court for an independent review of the record. (See also People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 124 (People v. Kelly).) Counsel attests that minor was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief in a timely mann

This is the second appeal filed in this dependency case by appellant Veronica R., mother of dependent minors Emma O. and V.F. For the reasons that follow, the appeal is dismissed as moot.
In the previous appeal, No. B276006, we affirmed the jurisdictional and dispositional orders as to both children. While that appeal was pending, the juvenile court granted mother custody of both children, and, on October 31, 2016, terminated jurisdiction. The juvenile court issued a brief stay of the termination order while custody orders were being prepared. ~(CT 124)~ Once they were prepared, the court lifted its stay on November 23, 2016.

Cynthia M. (mother) is the mother of Cindy A. (born April 2016); Cindy’s presumed father is Leroy A. (father) and is not a party on appeal. Cindy was removed from mother and father (collectively, parents) shortly after her birth and became a dependent of the juvenile court due to parents’ ongoing, untreated mental health and substance abuse problems. Mother now appeals from the court’s October 11, 2016, order terminating her parental rights over Cindy under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.
On appeal, mother contends the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders must be reversed because she received inadequate notice of the continued jurisdiction/disposition hearing held on May 24, 2016. Neither parent attended the hearing at which the juvenile court found ordering reunification services was not appropriate under the bypass provision of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and set a section 366.26 hearing based on parents’ failure to reunify wi

Plaintiff sued his former employer and two of its personnel after they declined to offer him an employment contract for the next school year. Plaintiff alleged causes of action for violation of his civil and statutory rights, asserting defendants’ decision not to rehire him was made in retaliation for reports he made to Child Protective Services (CPS) and a district police officer, which were based on information he received from a student. All but one of plaintiff’s causes of action were disposed of by demurrer or motion for nonsuit. The remaining cause of action resulted in a jury verdict in favor of the former employer. Plaintiff challenges the rulings on the demurrer and motions for nonsuit, as well as the jury verdict. We affirm.

This is an appeal after the sustaining of a demurrer to a wrongful foreclosure action. In his opening brief, plaintiff Juan Lopez heavily stressed the theory that violations of the pooling and servicing agreements governing the relevant securitization trust meant that the foreclosing entity did not own the right to foreclose on his mortgage. Thus he argued the spring 2015 foreclosure of his house was invalid. (See Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 924, 937-938.)
At oral argument, however, Lopez formally abandoned the argument, which is not surprising given recent California appellate case law undermining his void securitization theory. (See Kalnoki v. First American Trustee Servicing Solutions, LLC (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 23; Mendoza v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 802; Yhudai v. IMPAC Funding Corp. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1252; Saterbak v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 808.)

This appeal, G053306 (the “306 appeal”) is derivative of the main event, (Lopez v. The Bank of New York Mellon (June 28, 2017, G052857) [nonpub. opn.]) (the 857 appeal). Our opinion in the 857 appeal is being filed concurrently with this opinion.
The 857 appeal arises out of a wrongful foreclosure action challenging the 2015 foreclosure of plaintiff Juan Lopez’s Garden Grove house, based on the theory that the foreclosing entity, The Bank of New York Mellon (Mellon), and by extension RTS Pacific, Inc. (RTS), the trustee who conducted the foreclosure sale on that entity’s behalf, did not have a valid assignment of Lopez’s obligation to repay the mortgage he took out in 2006. Thus, Lopez asserts, Mellon and RTS could not validly foreclose.

Appellant Konocti Unified School District (KUSD) appeals from the denial of its special motion to strike pursuant to California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16) in response to respondent Reed Leiferman’s (Leiferman) complaint alleging disability discrimination, failure to provide accommodation, and failure to engage in an interactive process related to his disability and termination from his teaching position. The trial court denied the motion, finding that although the first cause of action arose from protected activity, Leiferman had established a minimal likelihood of prevailing on the merits. The court found the second and third causes of actions did not arise from protected activity. We affirm the court’s denial of the motion to strike the second and third counts on the same ground relied on by the trial court. However, we reverse on the first count because the allegations of that claim arose out of protected activities, and Leiferman cannot show a like

V.C. was declared a dependent of the juvenile court following her mother’s physical altercation with her landlord, and her father’s failure to provide V.C. with support. After 18 months of services, J.C. (mother), was unable to reunify with V.C. Mother petitions for extraordinary relief to vacate an order entered at a status review hearing finding reasonable services had been provided to mother, terminating reunification services, and scheduling a permanency planning hearing under Welfare & Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother contends the court erred in determining: (1) there was a substantial risk of detriment to V.C. if she were returned to mother’s care; and (2) she was not provided reasonable reunification services in Mandarin Chinese, her native language. We disagree and deny the petition.

David C. admitted a misdemeanor battery on a juvenile hall correctional counselor. At a contested restitution hearing, the counselor testified that he lost private construction work due to an injury he incurred in the incident. David was ordered to pay $23,100 in restitution. David challenges the restitution order on the grounds that he was denied the benefits of a limit on restitution in Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6, subdivision (k) (section 730.6(k)) in violation of his equal protection rights; the order violated restrictions on mandatory restitution in section 730.6; the order was not supported by substantial evidence; and he received ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the order. We order the restitution order modified to correct a $1,000 error and otherwise affirm.

Appellant D.W. was declared a ward of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, based on a finding that he and another youth had committed a second degree robbery. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c).) He contends: (1) the judgment must be reversed because the record does not contain substantial evidence he took the property in question by means of force or fear; (2) the trial court erroneously considered evidence of an incriminating hearsay statement made by his nontestifying codefendant in violation of his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution; and (3) the juvenile court erroneously considered evidence that his codefendant was carrying a replica handgun in his pocket at the time of their arrest. We affirm.

Plaintiff Richard Ewald, through counsel, timely appealed from a judgment following a successful defense motion for summary judgment.
Ewald’s counsel fails to articulate the standard of review on appeal, in and of itself a potentially fatal omission. “ ‘Arguments should be tailored according to the applicable standard of appellate review.’ [Citation.] Failure to acknowledge the proper scope of review is a concession of a lack of merit.” (Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems, Inc. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456, 465.) More importantly, Ewald’s counsel fails to provide any legal authority to support her arguments. We repeatedly have held that the failure to provide legal authorities to support arguments forfeits contentions of error. (See In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408; Akins v. State of California (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1, 50; In re Marriage of Nichols (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 661, 672-673, fn. 3.)