CA Unpub Decisions

A minor whom we will call B.G. reported to Andrea Cardosa that she had been the victim of a sexual offense by a male. Cardosa, in turn, reported B.G.’s allegation to the local child welfare agency. The agency concluded that the allegation was unfounded.
Later, Cardosa herself pleaded guilty to a sexual offense against B.G..
In this proceeding, Cardosa seeks the confidential official records regarding B.G.’s allegation against the male. In her view, these would tend to exonerate her by showing that B.G is not credible.
We will hold that the trial court properly denied Cardosa’s request for the records.

Plaintiff Adel Abu-Ghazaleh (Abu-Ghazaleh) appeals from the trial court’s sustaining of a demurrer by defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) to plaintiffs’ breach of contract cause of action. Abu-Ghazaleh contends the trial court wrongly decided that they did not allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action. We conclude plaintiffs’ cause of action was time-barred and affirm on this basis.

Appellant Bryant David Steward appeals from a judgment on a jury verdict finding him guilty of possession of a weapon by an inmate in violation of Penal Code section 4502, with a prior strike allegation under section 1170.12. He contends, first, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney withdrew a motion to suppress statements he made at a disciplinary hearing concerning the same incident for which he was prosecuted at the trial. He also argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by referring to specific facts relating to his underlying offense. We find no merit in either contention and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Dalton Jack Rivas pleaded no contest to misdemeanor corporal injury on a present or former cohabitant. (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a).) The trial court placed defendant on probation and ultimately ordered him to pay a total of $19,506 in restitution: $2,100 to the victim and $17,406 to the victim’s health plan.
Defendant now contends there is insufficient evidence to support the restitution award to the victim’s health plan. We conclude the restitution amount is supported by sufficient evidence but the restitution award must be directed to the victim and not the health plan.
We will modify the restitution order to award $19,506 in restitution to the victim and affirm the order as modified.

A jury convicted defendant Donald Virgil Dement of four counts of lewd or lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14, in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a) — two counts involving Doe 1, and two counts involving Doe 2.
As to Doe 1, Dement argues that the record does not contain substantial evidence that he touched Doe 1 with the requisite intent to arouse, appeal to or gratify his or Doe 1's lust, passions or sexual desires. As to Doe 2, Dement acknowledges that the record contains substantial evidence that he inappropriately touched her, but argues that the record does not contain substantial evidence to support convictions of two separate completed crimes. Because Dement did not meet his burden of establishing reversible error as to either conviction, we affirm the judgment in its entirety.

A jury convicted Mearl Kofi Badu of pimping (Pen. Code, § 266h, subd. (a)) and pandering by encouraging (§ 266i, subd. (a)(2)). The trial court also found true a prior conviction that qualified as a strike under sections 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) and 1170.12. The court granted Badu's request to strike his prior strike, then sentenced him to four years in prison for pimping and stayed the sentence imposed on the pandering charge under section 654. Badu appealed the judgment, and appointed appellate counsel filed a brief setting forth the evidence in the trial court, presenting no argument for reversal and asking this court to review the record for error as mandated by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.

Appellant, Robert Manuel Herrera, and respondent, Monica Ventura, were involved in a motor vehicle collision. At the time of the accident, Herrera carried insurance on his vehicle.
Ventura filed a complaint for personal injuries against Herrera alleging that, while she was stopped at an intersection, Herrera “rear ended” her vehicle. Representing himself, Herrera filed an answer denying Ventura’s allegations.
Ventura’s attorney filed a case management statement that he served on David Hirshik, an attorney who was presumably representing Herrera through Herrera’s insurance carrier. The case management conference order notes Hirshik appeared on behalf of Herrera. The order set a date for the next case management conference and directed Herrera to sign a substitution of attorney.

Harbor House Café, Inc., (Harbor House) and Gary and Mindy Quick (the Quicks) appeal from an order denying their anti-SLAPP motion against a cross-complaint filed by Bertha Rodriguez. The basis of the cross-complaint was a settlement agreement between Rodriguez on the one hand and Harbor House and the Quicks on the other. Several months after finalizing the agreement, Harbor House filed a cross-complaint against Rodriguez. She fired back with her own cross-complaint, alleging that Harbor House’s pleading breached the releases incorporated into the agreement. Harbor House and the Quicks filed an anti-SLAPP motion, which the court denied, finding the settlement agreement ambiguous on the subject of releases.

In 2016, Patrick D. Williams was on parole for a conviction for a robbery that involved the battery of a female victim. Among his parole conditions were that he complete a batterers program, not engage in conduct prohibited by law, and immediately inform his parole agent of his arrest for any felony or misdemeanor. He was advised that prohibited conduct might cause his parole to be revoked with or without a criminal conviction.
On September 20, 2016, Williams was arguing with Lawala Hawkins outside their car when Los Angeles Police Officers arrived. The officers arrested Williams after Hawkins alleged he hit her.
After Hawkins reported Williams’s arrest to his parole agent, the Division of Adult Parole Operations of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (DAPO) filed a petition for revocation of his parole, alleging he violated the terms and conditions of parole when he (1) failed to inform DAPO of his criminal arrest; (2) engaged in criminal conduct; an

In 1996, a jury convicted Mark Williams of receiving stolen property. (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a).) He was sentenced to a prison term of 25 years to life under the former “Three Strikes” law. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, 1170.12.) The conviction was upheld on appeal, but his sentence was later reduced to six years under Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. (Pen. Code, § 1170.126.) Williams has completed his sentence.
On February 10, 2016, Williams filed a petition for recall and redesignation of his sentence pursuant to Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, which reduces certain nonserious and nonviolent crimes, such as low-level drug- and theft-related offenses, from felonies to misdemeanors. (People v. Contreras (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 868, 889-890.) Williams appeals from an order denying his petition.

Following remand from this court, the trial court ordered lifetime sex offender registration for defendant Sky Lance Volosin. On this appeal, defendant contends that order must be vacated because the order issued before jurisdiction had returned to the trial court. He also challenges the order as an abuse of discretion. The People concede the court lacked jurisdiction. We agree and will remand. Because the court lacked jurisdiction, we do not consider defendant’s second contention.

Defendant Casey Turner was 15 years old at the time of his charged offenses. He appeals from his conviction of one count of second degree murder and two counts of attempted murder, accompanied by sentence enhancements, for which he was sentenced to 84 years to life. In a previous published opinion, we affirmed the judgment, except that we modified his sentence to reflect that he would be entitled to a parole hearing after serving 25 years in prison (Turner I). We then granted Turner’s petition for rehearing. In our non-published published opinion in Turner II, we remanded the matter to the trial court in light of People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 283-284 (Franklin). Following our opinion in Turner II, we granted Turner’s second petition for rehearing, raising a claim under recently enacted Proposition 57.

Defendant Bernice Elizabeth Tinitali was convicted of second degree burglary, identity theft, and check fraud, after she attempted to use the identification of R. Hernandez and the checking account number of A. Phillips to open a debit account at Nordstrom.
Defendant argues her two convictions for identity theft against two separate victims involved only a single use of stolen identity and should have been charged as a single crime. She argues there was insufficient evidence she willfully attempted to use Phillips’ checking account number, since his name was not on the check used to open a Nordstrom account. She argues the standard instruction on identity theft did not sufficiently define the term “willfully.” She argues the relationship of one of the juror’s with Phillips violated her right to a fair trial. We find no merit to any of these contentions.

Defendant and appellant, Edgar Silva, beat his girlfriend to death in a “sadistic and savage” manner, as even he acknowledges on appeal. A jury convicted him of the first degree murder of Shirley Chanel Corrales and found the torture-murder special circumstance and deadly weapon allegations to be true. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189, 190.2, subd. (a)(18), 12022, subd. (b)(1).) The court sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole plus three years for the deadly weapon enhancements and a prior prison term enhancement. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).)