CA Unpub Decisions

Appellants JD&T Enterprises, Inc. (JD&T), Diane Sharp, Jeanette Nunez Bunn and Rick Nunez appeal from a default judgment for over $2.8 million in favor of respondent Elite Destinations, Ltd. (Elite). Appellants contend that the judgment is void because at the time it was entered Elite’s charter had been revoked in its home state of Nevada, and because Elite was not qualified to do business in California. We disagree. The brief revocation of Elite’s charter in Nevada is not a reason to void the judgment, and there is substantial evidence in the record that Elite operates in California through a fulfillment company qualified to do business in this state.

Plaintiffs and appellants Armen Boladian (Boladian), Bridgeport Music, Inc. (Bridgeport), and Westbound Records, Inc. (Westbound) (sometimes collectively referred to as Boladian) appeal an order granting special motions to strike their malicious prosecution complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) The moving defendants, the respondents herein, are Jeffrey P. Thennisch (Thennisch) and The Dobrusin Law Firm, P.C., formerly known as Dobrusin & Thennisch (hereafter, Dobrusin or the Dobrusin firm) (collectively, the attorney defendants). The Boladian plaintiffs also appeal a subsequent order awarding attorney fees to Thennisch and Dobrusin pursuant to section 425.16.
Thennisch and Dobrusin also have appealed the attorney fee order, challenging the amount of fees they were awarded as inadequate.

Plaintiffs and appellants Armen Boladian (Boladian), Bridgeport Music, Inc. (Bridgeport), and Westbound Records, Inc. (Westbound) (sometimes collectively referred to as Boladian) appeal an order granting a special motion to strike their malicious prosecution complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) The moving defendants, the respondents herein, are the law firm of Stroock & Stroock & Lavan (Stroock) and Attorney Daniel A. Rozansky (Rozansky) (sometimes collectively referred to as Stroock).
We conclude that in opposing the special motion to strike, Boladian failed to meet his burden to make a prima facie showing that Stroock acted with malice. Therefore, the order granting the anti-SLAPP motion is affirmed.

Defendant and appellant Larry H. Clough (Clough) appeals an order denying his special motion to strike a malicious prosecution complaint filed by plaintiffs and respondents Armen Boladian (Boladian), Bridgeport Music, Inc. (Bridgeport), and Westbound Records, Inc. (Westbound) (sometimes collectively referred to as Boladian). ~(503, 511)~
The issues presented include whether the malicious prosecution complaint was filed timely, and whether plaintiffs met their burden to establish a reasonable probability of prevailing on each of the elements of their cause of action.

Defendant and appellant George Clinton (Clinton) appeals an order denying his special motion to strike a complaint against him for malicious prosecution and defamation. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) The complaint was brought by plaintiffs and respondents Armen Boladian (Boladian), Bridgeport Music, Inc. (Bridgeport), and Westbound Records, Inc. (Westbound) (sometimes collectively referred to as Boladian)
The essential issues presented relate to whether Boladian made a sufficient prima facie showing to withstand Clinton’s special motion to strike. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

The juvenile court removed D.H. (born in March 2015) and K.G. (born in February 2014) (collectively Minors) from petitioner, B.M., the prospective adoptive mother (PAM). The PAM has filed a petition for extraordinary writ in which she contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by removing Minors from her custody. The petition is denied.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of making criminal threats against two victims. Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct sua sponte on unanimity. Because defendant was engaged in a continuous course of conduct, the prosecution was not required to make an election of a discrete criminal act, and thus the court was not obligated to sua sponte give a unanimity instruction. We therefore affirm.

Defendant Alfred Lopez appeals from a judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of possession of a concealed dirk or dagger (Pen. Code, § 21310 – count one), destroying or concealing evidence (§ 135 – count two), resisting an officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1) – count three), and possession of drug paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364 – count four). The jury also found that defendant had served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced defendant to four years in county jail, which was comprised of a two-year term for dagger possession and two consecutive one-year enhancements for his prison priors. On appeal, defendant raises issues regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, jury instructions, ineffective assistance of counsel, and modification of the minute order and the abstract of judgment.

Carlos Luis Tamayo appeals from an order denying his petition for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon. (Pen. Code, § 4852.01; all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.) He argues the court abused its discretion and violated his constitutional right to equal protection under the law. We find no error and affirm.

Carlos Luis Tamayo appeals from an order denying his petition for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon. (Pen. Code, § 4852.01; all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.) He argues the court abused its discretion and violated his constitutional right to equal protection under the law. We find no error and affirm.

In August 2015, Tracy Ray Schmidt pleaded guilty to several offenses, including driving under the influence of alcohol with a prior conviction, and received probation on various terms and conditions, including completion of an 18-month alcohol program. Almost a year after the convictions, Schmidt had yet to complete the alcohol program. At a hearing in October 2016 to address Schmidt’s apparent request to modify the terms of his probation, the lower court declined to relieve him of the condition, but agreed to allow him to complete a program in Oklahoma, where he intended to move. Defendant appealed, and his appointed counsel filed a brief under the procedures outlined in People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738. Defendant did not file a supplemental brief. Our independent review of the record discloses no arguable issues. We affirm the order.

Defendant Irving Marcelo Reyes appeals after a jury convicted him of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, subd. (a), 187) and found true allegations that he committed the offense for the benefit of or in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)), personally inflicted great bodily injury (§§ 12022.7, subd. (a), 1203, subd. (e)(3)), and personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, which proximately caused great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The trial court found true an allegation that defendant had served a prior prison term. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).)

Jonathan F. Pereida appeals after a jury convicted him on two counts of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664.) The jury also found that the crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)), and that a principal personally used a firearm in committing the offenses (§ 12022.53, subds. (b) & (e)(1)). The trial court sentenced him to 25 years to life in state prison. Appellant contends that the victims’ identifications of him as the perpetrator should have been excluded and his convictions must be reversed for insufficient evidence. We affirm.

Alberto Mejia (defendant) stands convicted of two counts of second degree murder after he gunned down two men as they ran from him. Defendant appeals his convictions and the resulting 80-year sentence, arguing that (1) the conviction is tainted by an evidentiary error, and (2) the sentence is invalid because (a) the trial court erred in running the 40-year sentence for each count consecutively, and (b) the total 80-year sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Defendant also contends that he is entitled to an opportunity to make a record of evidence relevant to the youth offender parole hearing he will receive during his 25th year of incarceration. (Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (b)(3); People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 284 (Franklin).)