CA Unpub Decisions

Jacqueline Thornborrow (Jackie) appeals from a judgment on reserved issues following the dissolution of her marriage with Frederick Thornborrow (Fred). The trial court found that Fred breached his fiduciary duty to Jackie by cashing in his 401k retirement plan without advising her beforehand, and awarded Jackie one-half of the penalties and additional taxes incurred as a result of the withdrawal of the 401k plan. The court further found that Jackie received one-half of the benefit of the proceeds of the 401k plan prior to the dissolution of the marriage, and declined to order any additional monetary award for Fred’s breach of duty. Jackie contends she is entitled to an award equal to one-half of the withdrawn funds as a penalty for Fred’s breach regardless whether she already benefited from the proceeds during the marriage.

Appellant Joseph Ippolito (Joseph) sought orders (1) modifying temporary child support, (2) terminating temporary spousal support, and (3) declaring an earlier attorney fee order in favor of respondent Lisa Ippolito (Lisa) was "intended to be attributed as a predisposition to [Lisa] of community assets." At the hearing on Joseph's application, the court (1) declared the prior $20,000 attorney fee order would be paid out of Joseph's half of the community assets, and (2) modified the child and spousal support orders. On appeal, Joseph asserts the trial court abused its discretion (1) by ordering the prior $20,000 attorney fee order be paid from his share of the community assets and (2) by denying his request to impute full-time employment income at $17 per hour to Lisa when entering the orders for the modified temporary child and spousal support awards.

Plaintiff, an attorney, was driving his car in downtown San Francisco when a door on defendants’ delivery truck opened, hitting plaintiff’s car on the driver’s side, damaging the front door and rearview mirror. The damage was $2,045.20.
Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging five causes of action, including a claim under Business and Professions Code section 17200, seeking among other things punitive damages. Defendants filed a demurrer and motion to strike, set by the court for hearing four months in the future. In the interim, defendants filed a Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer (998 offer) to allow judgment for $2,495.20. Plaintiff responded with his own 998 offer, for $2,669.69—an offer defendants accepted by letter.

Plaintiffs and appellants Valerie Kizer and Sharal Williams (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed this putative class action against their former employer, defendant and respondent Tristar Risk Management (Tristar), alleging Tristar failed to pay Plaintiffs and its other claims examiners overtime compensation because it misclassified them as exempt from California’s overtime laws.
After twice continuing the hearing for supplemental briefing and evidence, the trial court denied Plaintiffs’ class certification motion because they failed to present substantial evidence showing their claims were typical of the proposed class and common issues of law or fact predominated. The court found Tristar’s alleged misclassification of the proposed class members suitable for class treatment, but it denied the motion because misclassification does not give rise to liability on an overtime claim unless the employees first show they worked hours or days that required overtime compensation.

The Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) took A.S. into protective custody at birth in November 2015. Approximately one year later, the juvenile court denied a request by maternal relatives to change his placement from the foster parents’ home, where A.S. had resided since February 1, 2016, to the relatives’ residence in Colorado. The juvenile court found a change in placement was not in A.S.’s best interests. Our review discloses no basis to reverse the court’s order, and therefore we affirm.

M.G. (father) and E.G. (mother) are parents of now three-and-a-half year old W.G. (son) and 18-month-old P.G. (daughter). In separate juvenile dependency proceedings, (1) father appeals from the juvenile court’s June 1, 2016 order insofar as it terminates his parental rights with respect to W.G. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26 ) (Case No. A148567); and (2) father and mother appeal from the juvenile court’s August 23, 2016 order, which terminated their parental rights with respect to P.G. (§ 366.26) and denied mother’s section 388 modification petition (Case No. A149306). We find no merit to parents’ challenges to the June 1, 2016 and August 23, 2016 orders. Accordingly, we affirm.

Housing Rights Committee of San Francisco (HRC) filed this lawsuit against HomeAway, Inc. (HomeAway) on behalf of itself and a proposed class of San Francisco residents, challenging HomeAway’s operation of a “hosting platform” that can be used to arrange short-term apartment rentals in San Francisco. HRC sought damages and injunctive relief for violations of local ordinances restricting the rental of residential units for transient or tourist use; unlawful business practices in violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (the UCL); and creating a public and private nuisance. HRC also attempted to hold HomeAway liable as an aider and abettor for encouraging unnamed landlords to violate local ordinances, and for breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment. The trial court entered judgment in favor of HomeAway after sustaining a demurrer to HRC’s second amended complaint without leave to amend. We affirm.

Plaintiff and respondent Brett D. Gobar (Gobar) brought this fraudulent conveyance action against defendant and appellant David R. Gong, individually and as Trustee for Ray Trust No. 1 and OKG Trust #929. Other named defendants and appellants include Gong's related business entities RFG Oil, Inc., and Raygon 2124 LP (referred to collectively as Gong, see fn. 5, post). Gobar seeks to set aside as fraudulent numerous transfers of real property Gong allegedly made to prevent Gobar from collecting on an underlying money judgment he obtained in 2013 against Gong, in a prior action on a lease and guaranty.

The City of San Diego (the City), on its own behalf and also in its capacity as successor agency to the Redevelopment Agency of the City of San Diego, a former public entity that was dissolved at the direction of the Legislature, along with nearly 400 other redevelopment agencies, through a process we have previously characterized as the “Great Dissolution” (City of Pasadena v. Cohen (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1461, 1463), appeals from a judgment denying its petition for writ of mandate and dismissing causes of action for declaratory and injunctive relief (writ petition). The writ petition sought to compel the Department of Finance (the Department) to approve a certain line item in a recognized obligation payment schedule (ROPS). Specifically, the line item involved $690,000 in project management costs incurred by the City in connection with its management of the construction of a pedestrian bridge.

John Bral appeals from the entry of judgment in favor of Cannae Financial, LLC, (Cannae) after the trial court granted Cannae’s motion for summary judgment to enforce Bral’s personal guaranty on a commercial loan. Bral contends the court erred in denying his ex parte request for a continuance on the eve of the summary judgment hearing because an attorney at one of two firms representing him had been hospitalized for about 10 days. The sick attorney returned to work on reduced hours about two and one-half weeks (17 days) before the summary judgment opposition was due, and he and the other firm representing Bral each assumed the other would prepare the opposition, thereby allowing 10 more days to pass after the opposition was due before seeking a continuance. Bral also contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because Cannae did not meet its initial burden as the moving party to show it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Finding no merit in these conte

Plaintiff and appellant Cesar Andaya appeals the judgment against him on his contract claim against defendant and respondent, Jeffrey Maas. Andaya claimed Maas breached their agreement to take title to a piece of property Andaya owned, take out a mortgage on the property and invest the proceeds for the parties’ mutual benefit, return title to Andaya, and pay off the mortgage. According to Andaya, Maas stopped paying the mortgage and he, Andaya, lost the property in foreclosure.

A month after her 71st birthday, appellant shot and killed her mother, Gretchen DeStefano, who was 96 years old. Although appellant does not challenge the jury’s finding she murdered Gretchen in a deliberate and premeditated fashion, she contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on heat of passion as a potentially mitigating circumstance for her actions. She also contends the court’s instructions on voluntary intoxication were flawed, and the judgment must be modified to reflect the court stayed sentence on one of the firearm enhancements. We agree the judgment must be modified to reflect the stay. In all other respects, we affirm.

Defendant and appellant Rudolph Mendoza Jr., was upset that his girlfriend Hope Davis had moved out of their apartment and back in with her mother and stepfather. Defendant went to the stepfather’s house in an effort to get Davis and her children back. He left and returned with a handgun. Several of Davis’s friends were at the house. When they refused to get Davis and the children out of the house, defendant shot at them hitting one of the victims in the foot.
Defendant was convicted of three counts of premeditated and deliberate attempted murder, three counts of assault with a firearm and numerous weapon-use enhancements.

Jeffrey Ragene Line was convicted of committing sex offenses against three minor victims, C.G., Michael G., and Mercedes H. He was sentenced to 80 years to life in prison. He raises several claims of evidentiary error, argues that his sentence violates the federal Constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and seeks independent review of the trial court’s Pitchess inquiry and determination. We will affirm the judgment.