CA Unpub Decisions

Jo Ortiz sued Omar Brito and Thrifty Payless, Inc. (collectively Thrifty), for false advertising. Thrifty answered the complaint and filed a vexatious litigant motion. The court granted the motion, declared Ortiz a vexatious litigant, and ordered her to post a bond of $10,000 within 30 days. The court also entered a prefiling order requiring Ortiz to obtain permission to file future lawsuits in propria persona. Ortiz was served with a notice of ruling on December 2, 2015. She failed to post a bond. In March 2016, Thrifty moved to dismiss based on the lack of a bond. Ortiz opposed solely on the ground the court lacked jurisdiction, making the following misguided argument: “For the court to have jurisdiction/power to act, the defendants must first be served with process: summons and complaint, and thereafter, appear legally.

Defendant and appellant K.S. (Mother) has five young daughters and an extensive history with the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS). Mother appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 and the summary denial of her section 388 petition as to her two youngest daughters: three-year-old V.H. and two-year-old Z.H.

Jose C. (father) appealed from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) as to his now 21-month-old daughter, Joselyn. After reviewing the juvenile court record, father’s court-appointed counsel informed this court she could find no arguable issues to raise on father’s behalf. This court granted father leave to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error exists. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844 (Phoenix H.).)
Father filed a letter but failed to address the termination findings or orders or set forth a good cause showing that any arguable issue of reversible error arose from the section 366.26 hearing. (Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 844.) Consequently, we dismiss the appeal.

The juvenile court found that F.P. (defendant), then 16 years old, had possessed methamphetamine, a felony. Pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18, the court later redesignated defendant’s felony to a misdemeanor, but denied defendant’s request that his DNA samples be expunged from the state’s DNA database. (All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.) Defendant, now 20 years old, appeals; we affirm.
Section 299, subdivision (f) specifically provides that, notwithstanding section 1170.18, a court shall not expunge DNA samples that were originally required to be given by a defendant. We conclude this statute means what it says, and agree with the other courts that have reached the same conclusion.

Defendant and appellant B.F. (minor) became upset and threatened to build a bomb and blow up his middle school. Minor was subsequently placed on informal probation pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 654.2. After minor successfully completed informal probation, the juvenile court dismissed the petition and sealed minor’s juvenile court records in accordance with sections 654 and 786. The juvenile court, however, denied minor’s request to seal his school records. Minor’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court abused its discretion in refusing to seal his school records pertaining to the dismissed petition. We find no abuse, and affirm the judgment.

W.G. (Mother) appeals a juvenile court judgment terminating her parental rights to her daughter Ana under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother contends the Alameda County Social Services Agency (the Agency) and the juvenile court failed to comply with inquiry and notice requirements under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). We agree inquiry was inadequate, so we conditionally reverse.

S.B. (father) is the father of A.B. (child). When the child was seven months old, she was with mother at a wellness checkup when mother passed out due to drug use. At that time, father was incarcerated on murder charges. The juvenile court found that it had dependency jurisdiction based on the mother’s substance abuse and father’s failure to protect and provide care and support for the child due to his incarceration. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subds. (b), (g). ) The court denied reunification services to father. He appeals, contending there was insufficient evidence to support the jurisdictional findings and denial of reunification services. We agree and reverse as to father only.

M.A. (mother) and C.Q., Sr. (father), parents of a minor daughter and son, appeal from the juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights and selecting adoption as the permanent plan. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Mother and father contend the juvenile court erred in determining that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption does not apply. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) We will affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

Clayton Boquet appeals a judgment following the court's ruling granting his former wife Dawn's motion for enforcement of a stipulation and order. Clayton contends the court erroneously (1) denied his request for a continuance; (2) found that Dawn was not previously given a warning under Family Code section 4330 and In re Marriage of Gavron (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 705 (Gavron); (3) considered their child's emancipation as a change in circumstance, and declined to find a change in Dawn's need for spousal support under section 4320; and (4) added implied terms into the marital settlement agreement and modified the parties' adjudicated property rights and obligations. We affirm.

Gino Aquino (Aquino) and Nadia Aquino (now Dickinson ) (Dickinson) resolved their dissolution action by way of a stipulated judgment. Within one year, Aquino moved to vacate and set it aside. (Fam. Code, § 2122, subd. (f). ) The trial court granted the motion only as to the one-time spousal support payment and waiver of all future spousal support. Both parties appealed. We reverse that portion of the order vacating and setting aside the spousal support provisions and otherwise affirm.

Dwight Kelly sued Sondra Mayer and Sharon Newby, individually and as trustees of the Wilton Kenneth Newby Trust (collectively, the Newby Trust defendants), for breach of contract and other related causes of action, and, in response, the Newby Trust defendants sued Kelly and his wife (collectively, the Kellys) alleging usury and various causes of action related to fraud. Following a jury trial, the court entered a judgment by which Kelly took nothing on the complaint and the Newby Trust defendants took nothing on the cross-complaint. Both parties filed a motion for attorney's fees and costs and the court granted both motions. Kelly argues the court erred by admitting prejudicial and irrelevant evidence, and the Newby Trust defendants argue the court erred by awarding the Kellys fees and by improperly reducing the amount of fees awarded to them.

Haci E. Karaaslan appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition for leave to file a personal injury lawsuit against Mesa Water District (the District) after the date for filing suit under the statute of limitations passed. Karaaslan’s complaint arose from an automobile accident involving a District vehicle and, after the accident, Karaaslan timely filed a claim with the District under Government Code section 911.2 (all undesignated statutory references are to this code) as a prerequisite to suing a public entity. The District sent Karaaslan a notice rejecting his claim, but included in its letter a statement suggesting the rejection was only a formality to enable the District’s insurance carrier to act on the claim. The insurer subsequently settled Karaaslan’s demand relating to property damage, but denied his ensuing demand for $28,000 in medical expenses and pain and suffering damages, relying on the expiration of the six-month statute of limitations (§ 945.6) to

Jean-Rene Basle, County Counsel, Kristina M. Robb Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
Petitioner J.V. (father) filed a petition for extraordinary writ pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, challenging the trial court’s jurisdictional finding as to his child, N.V. (the child) and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. We vacate the section 366.26 hearing; reverse the trial court’s finding that the child came within section 300, subdivision (b), with respect to father; and remand the matter to the trial court to conduct a new disposition hearing with father as a nonoffending parent.

In his first trial, a jury convicted Henry Rodriguez of two counts of murder and conspiracy to commit murder. This court reversed his convictions because his pretrial statements were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).
Before Rodriguez’s second trial, the defense subpoenaed Rodriguez’s housing records from the Orange County Sheriff’s Department (OCSD) before filing a motion to exclude the testimony of Michael Garrity, an inmate who was housed next to Rodriguez and who elicited a confession from him, because Garrity was a confidential informant (CI); Garrity did not testify at Rodriguez’s first trial. Judge Frank F. Fasel ordered some records be produced, and he later denied Rodriguez’s motion to exclude Garrity’s testimony. In Rodriguez’s second trial, Garrity testified, and a jury convicted him of the same offenses. This court affirmed his convictions.