CA Unpub Decisions

The district attorney appeals the trial court's order granting Kristopher Kirchner's petition for habeas corpus. The trial court correctly concluded the holdings of Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 (Miller) and People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354 (Gutierrez) apply retroactively in state collateral proceedings such as the one presented here and that the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires that when inmates, such as Kirchner, are serving life terms for crimes committed while they were juveniles, they must, except in the most extraordinary circumstances, be given an opportunity to seek parole. (See Montgomery v. Lousiana (2016) ___U.S.___ [136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599] (Montgomery).)

Defendant and appellant R.A. (Father) is the father of two sons: 12-year-old Kody (Kody), the child who is the subject of this appeal, and his five-year-old half-brother Ryan. The juvenile court sustained allegations that Kody was a child described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. The court found (1) Father’s failure to obtain medical care for Ryan demonstrated Kody’s health and safety was in jeopardy; and (2) Father failed to protect Kody when he repeatedly allowed Ryan’s mother to supervise both boys in violation of a juvenile court custody order—which in one instance resulted in Kody being struck in the head by a bicycle helmet the mother threw at him. We consider whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction.

S.M. appeals juvenile court orders terminating his parental rights to his four sons, D.M., S.V.M., A.M. and C.M. He contends that insufficient evidence supported the court's finding that under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to termination did not apply. We affirm.

The juvenile court found true allegations that minor D.G. engaged in first degree burglary, conspiracy to commit burglary, vandalism, and possession of vandalism tools. The juvenile court declared minor a ward of the court and placed him on probation.
Minor now contends there is insufficient evidence to support the true findings on the burglary and conspiracy allegations. We will affirm the judgment.

M.I. (mother) appeals from a visitation order of the juvenile court, which requires that her visits with B.T, then four years old, be supervised by a professional monitor paid for by mother, or a monitor approved by the child’s father. We affirm.

Gregory W. Hood has appealed from an order granting the anti-SLAPP motion of respondents Bradley Amster and CIC, Inc. (CIC). Hood sued Amster and CIC after Amster made a report to the Newport Beach Police Department (NBPD) about the removal of some fixtures from a house bought by CIC. The police subsequently identified Hood as the person who had removed the fixtures, and he was arrested. He was released on bond, and no charges were filed against him.

Urban school districts sometimes find themselves in the role of landlord with regard to school sites that no longer match the demographics of the school-age population. In this case, defendant San Diego Unified School District (District) and plaintiff Excelsior Academy, a state-certified nonpublic school for special needs students, negotiated for the lease of one of the District's former elementary school facilities. In 2013 the parties settled on a lease term of five years; Excelsior sought and was granted an option to extend the lease for an additional five-year period. The District insisted and the parties agreed on a mutual right to cancel the lease on three years' notice.

Plaintiff Kathleen S. Swigart and defendant Carl Bruno participated in an organized endurance horseback riding event in Perris, together with approximately 47 other riders. Somewhat less than two hours into the 50-mile course, seven riders, including Swigart and Bruno, were stopping together, single-file, on the trail. Swigart was in the lead and had dismounted at a required checkpoint along the course. Although the evidence is in dispute as to exactly what happened at this point, there is no dispute that Bruno's horse struck Swigart while she was standing on the ground, injuring her. Swigart sued Bruno, alleging causes of action for negligence, reckless or intentional misconduct, and having an animal with a dangerous propensity.

In 2008, father filed a petition for a voluntary declaration of paternity (Fam. Code, § 7574), joint legal custody, and visitation. Minor was then about three years old. Four years later, in October 2012, the court entered a judgment of paternity, ordered mother and father to share joint legal custody, and awarded father primary physical custody of minor.
During those four years, mother and father proved unable to informally resolve their differences time and again. In 2009, the court appointed a co-parenting therapist to help, but nothing changed.

Plaintiffs challenge San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control District’s (Air District) 2014 approval of permits authorizing the construction of an oily water sewer system (sewer system) for a rail-to-pipeline transfer terminal in Kern County. Plaintiffs contend Air District violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA; Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq. ) by concluding the proposed sewer system involved only ministerial actions, and was therefore exempt from environmental review. Plaintiffs argue approval of the permits was discretionary, not ministerial and, therefore, the CEQA exemption determination was wrong.

CHA La Mirada, LLC (CHA) appeals from the summary judgment entered against it in its action against Red Robin International, Inc. (Red Robin). CHA, the owner of a Holiday Inn hotel, formerly leased restaurant space to a tenant who operated a Red Robin restaurant franchise. When the tenant breached the lease, CHA notified Red Robin it intended to take over the franchise. Four days later, Red Robin terminated the franchise on the ground that the tenant had breached the franchise agreement by failing to operate the restaurant for five consecutive days.
After the tenant sued CHA for breach of the lease, CHA cross-complained against Red Robin for breach of the franchise agreement and related claims. Red Robin moved for summary judgment on the grounds that CHA had no rights under the franchise agreement and Red Robin did not wrongfully terminate the agreement. The trial court entered summary judgment for Red Robin.

Ardell Moore is an adjudicated sexually violent predator over whom the Department of State Hospitals (DSH) has custody pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.). Moore resides at a DSH facility in Coalinga, where he receives treatment for previously diagnosed mental disorders. He appeals from an order requiring him to submit to involuntary administration of psychotropic medication. However, the order in question was only valid for one year and expired on February 1, 2017. Accordingly, and for the following reasons, we dismiss the appeal as moot.

A jury convicted defendant Courtney Stephen Andrus of two counts: inflicting unjustifiable pain or mental suffering on a child, under circumstances likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)) and willfully inflicting injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon a child (§ 273d, subd (a)). On appeal, defendant contends insubstantial evidence supported both convictions.

After Lillian Alexander accepted a statutory offer to compromise (Code Civ. Proc., § 998) in the amount of $9,980 and judgment was entered, she moved for attorney fees. The superior court awarded her $93,270. Market Street Apartments, LLC (Market Street) appeals the attorney fee order, contending: (1) Alexander has not shown she prevailed on any cause of action authorizing an award of attorney fees; (2) the superior court erred in awarding attorney fees incurred after the statutory offer to compromise was made; (3) Alexander is not entitled to attorney fees that are attributable to time spent on her husband's claims; (4) section 1033, subdivision (b) prohibits the award of any attorney fees in this case; and (5) the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees without considering Alexander's lack of success and failure to make a demand.