CA Unpub Decisions

Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, defendant Jeremy Adam Bowman pleaded no contest to driving in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property while fleeing from a pursuing police officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2) and admitted a prior strike for robbery. As part of the plea agreement, defendant entered into a Cruz waiver, meaning that if he failed to appear for sentencing the trial court could sentence him to an increased term. It was agreed that defendant would remain free from custody pending sentencing and, if he appeared for sentencing as scheduled, the strike admission would be stricken. Defendant complied with the Cruz waiver and the trial court sentenced him to the upper term of three years in state prison.

We appointed counsel to represent Michael Steven Benefico on appeal. Counsel filed a brief that set forth the facts of the case. Counsel did not argue against his client but advised the court he found no issues to argue on his behalf. Counsel filed a brief following the procedures outlined in People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). The court in Wende explained a Wende brief is one that sets forth a summary of proceedings and facts but raises no specific issues. Under these circumstances, the court must conduct an independent review of the entire record.

Oscar Rodolfo Barrascout appeals an order denying his recent post-judgment motion to vacate restitution orders (Pen. Code, § 1202.4) issued after his 1990 conviction for first degree murder (§§ 187,189).
We appointed counsel to represent him on this appeal. After examination of the record, his counsel filed an opening brief requesting the court to make an independent review under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.

Marquitta Wilson fraudulently obtained checks from her employer made out to various friends and family members. Ricky Marvin Allison cashed a series of these unauthorized checks and now appeals from a judgment convicting him of conspiracy (count 1) and grand theft (count 2) based on his conduct. Allison contends his conspiracy conviction should be reversed because he was charged with a broad conspiracy involving Wilson and numerous others, but the evidence established a more limited conspiracy only with Wilson. He maintains he was prejudiced by the admission of evidence relating to the other conspiracies.

Defendant and appellant Charles Edward Allen (defendant) appeals from his conviction of assault with intent to commit rape, criminal threats, and attempting to dissuade a witness. He contends that the trial court erred in denying his motions to allow his investigator to examine the crime scene, in excluding demonstrative and impeachment evidence, in admitting evidence of his uncharged violence toward the victim, and in affirming the jail administration’s decision to terminate his pro. per. library privileges. Defendant further contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his Romero motion to dismiss his prior strikes ; and that his sentence was cruel and unusual in violation of the Eight Amendment. Defendant also requests that we review the sealed transcript of the in camera hearing on his Pitchess motion.

William Albino appeals from a judgment following entry of his negotiated plea of no contest to one count of attempted murder with a great bodily injury enhancement. Albino’s appointed appellate counsel filed an opening brief raising no issues. After independently examining the record, we affirm.

Defendant Raul Aguilar appeals from the judgment entered following a bench trial that resulted in his conviction on two counts of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459; counts 1 and 2), one count of making a criminal threat (§ 422, subd. (a); count 3), and one count of assault likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 11) with true findings as to several gang, firearm use, and prior prison term enhancement allegations (§§186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C), 12022, subd. (a)(1), 667.5, subd. (b)). On appeal, defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to establish that he committed two burglaries. The People concede error, and we agree. Consequently, we reverse the judgment in part and remand for resentencing. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

In this juvenile dependency case, defendant and appellant Christian G. (Father) appeals the juvenile court’s October 28, 2016 order requiring Father to attend parenting classes and individual therapy. Father argues substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s order. We disagree and affirm.

Appellant L.P. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s order asserting jurisdiction over her two children, “Kal” and “Kas,” as well as the dispositional order that followed, contending the court failed to comply with the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq., ICWA). Respondent does not contest the appeal. We have reviewed the file and found that Mother notified the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) and the court of possible Indian heritage through her maternal grandmother and specified a tribe. There is no evidence that notices were sent. Nor is there evidence that DCFS attempted to contact the grandmother or Mother’s mother to obtain additional information about the alleged Indian heritage. Accordingly, we conditionally affirm, and remand for ICWA compliance.

In this juvenile dependency case, defendant and appellant H.F. (Father) challenges the juvenile court’s September 1, 2016 dispositional order denying Father custody of his son Jordan S. Father also argues the juvenile court failed to ensure Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 United States Code section 1902 (ICWA) notice procedures were followed. We conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s dispositional order, but nonetheless remand to the juvenile court so that proper ICWA notice may be made.

C.H. appeals the juvenile court’s postjudgment order denying his request to seal his record. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 786.) We vacate the order and remand the matter to the court below.
In September 2015, C.H. admitted an allegation that he committed first degree burglary. (Pen. Code, § 459.) The juvenile court ordered him suitably placed in an out-of-state group home. It terminated C.H.’s home-on-probation placement, but the terms and conditions of probation remained in effect.

In this juvenile dependency case, newborn Baby Boy M. (baby) was removed from the custody of his mother, Danielle M. (mother). Mother was not offered reunification services. At a subsequent Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court found baby was likely to be adopted and entered an order terminating parental rights. Mother appeals, arguing the juvenile court erred in terminating her parental rights because there is insufficient evidence to support the finding that baby is likely to be adopted. We affirm.

This case is about the validity of a regulation governing a circumstance the Board of Parole Hearings (the board) can consider when determining whether a person convicted of a crime punishable with an indeterminate life sentence is unsuitable for parole: California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 2402, subdivision (c)(6) (hereafter, section 2402(c)(6)). Section 2402(c)(6) provides that an inmate’s “serious misconduct in prison or jail” can tend to show his or her unsuitability for parole.

Petitioner and appellant Michelle Ghent Howard appeals from an order granting the motion of respondent Terrence Howard to set aside spousal support provisions of a dissolution judgment and marital settlement agreement on the ground of duress pursuant to Family Code section 2122, subdivision (c). Terrence claimed that Michelle blackmailed him in a call he recorded in September 2011, and threatened to publicly release private recordings of a sensitive, intimate and sexual nature that would be embarrassing and could damage his career. As a result, Terrence claims he agreed, under duress, to a marital settlement agreement in September 2012 that obligated him to pay spousal support far in excess of what he would otherwise have been required to pay based on the parties’ year–long marriage.