CA Unpub Decisions

S.F. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders denying her petition for modification pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 388. Mother argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her request for reinstatement of her reunification services because she met her burden of proving that circumstances had changed such that reunification with mother was in her children’s best interest. We affirm.

Plaintiffs Marakkalage Tharal D. Silva and Shirin Ramesha Silva (the Silvas) appeal from a judgment of dismissal entered as to defendants State of California, acting by and through the California Highway Patrol (CHP), and CHP Sergeant Richard Scott Langford (together, the CHP defendants), after the trial court sustained without leave to amend the CHP defendants’ demurrers to the Silvas’ first amended complaint. The Silvas asserted on behalf of their deceased son Danuka Neshantha Silva claims for negligence and wrongful death after Langford’s patrol car struck and killed Danuka while Langford was responding to an emergency call concerning an altercation on the freeway. The trial court found the claims against the CHP defendants were barred by investigative immunity conferred under Government Code section 821.6 (section 821.6).

Plaintiff Caitlin Schoensiegel sued her former employer, defendant and respondent Abbott Laboratories, Inc. (Abbott), alleging eight violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, Government Code section 12900 et seq. (the FEHA), and the California Family Rights Act (CFRA), which is contained in the FEHA, in this employment discrimination action. Schoensiegel also sued her supervisor, Kiyoko Robbins (Robbins), alleging harassment. Abbott terminated Schoensiegel after an investigation determined that she had breached Abbott’s code of conduct by falsifying her sales calls log. Schoensiegel, who suffers from a rare bone disease, asserts that she was terminated because of her disability and that Abbott’s explanation is pretextual.
Abbott and Robbins successfully moved the trial court for an order granting summary judgment, and Schoensiegel appeals from the judgment entered based on that order. Schoensiegel also appeals from an order awarding costs to Abbott and Robbins.

A.R. (mother) appeals from the orders terminating her parental rights with respect to her six children under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She contends the juvenile court erred by declining to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to termination of parental rights. Finding no error, we affirm.

Sammy Lee Morris appeals from a commitment order classifying him as a sexually violent predator and committing him to the State Department of State Hospitals (SDSH), under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (Act) (Welf. & Inst. Code § 6600 et seq.), for an indeterminate term. On appeal, Morris argues that his commitment cannot stand because there was insufficient evidence that he suffered from a severe mental disorder that predisposed him to commit sexual crimes. We affirm.

Plaintiff, cross-defendant, and appellant Rancho Carlton Properties, LLC, appeals from a portion of a judgment entered in favor of defendant, cross-complainant, and respondent Josh Radnor, as trustee of The Josh Radnor Trust, in this quiet title action. An express written easement allows Radnor to maintain certain improvements on Rancho Carlton’s property. On appeal, Rancho Carlton contends the trial court misinterpreted the scope of the easement and compounded the error by improperly imposing an equitable easement contrary to the terms of the deed.
We conclude the grant deed for Radnor’s property provides an easement over Rancho Carlton’s property for specific physical improvements, namely, a barbecue, a walkway, and a retaining wall. The deed conveys an exclusive right to use the area where the improvements are located as a necessary incident of the easement.

Natalie S. (mother) seeks review by extraordinary writ of the order of the juvenile court terminating reunification services for her now one-year-old son and setting a permanency planning hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She contends, among other things, that the order must be reversed because the court applied an incorrect legal standard at the sixth-month review hearing. We agree that the court’s application of the improper standard was prejudicial and, accordingly, we shall grant the petition and issue the writ.

S.E. (mother) appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her child, K.E. (minor). Mother asserts the court erred by declining to find the beneficial parent-child exception applicable. Mother further asserts the court denied her due process by refusing to grant a short continuance of the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing (.26 hearing). We disagree and affirm the order.

Craig K. appeals from orders denying his request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) protecting him from former girlfriend Tiffany H. and instead granting Tiffany’s petition for a DVRO protecting her from Craig. Craig contends the trial court erred when it (1) excluded evidence of events that predated the incident underlying Tiffany’s previous DVRO issued against him after a hearing; (2) failed to enforce his untimely subpoena for police reports; (3) declined to hear testimony from his witnesses; and (4) considered events that occurred while the prior DVRO was in effect. His contentions are meritless, so we affirm.

Can a driver who was uninjured in a motor vehicle collision recover damages from the driver and owner of the other vehicle for injuries he sustained when, more than a week after the collision, he “misstepped” out of the SUV he had rented while his car was in the shop for repairs? We conclude the answer is no, and will affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants.

On appeal from a judgment following a no contest plea to two weapons possession charges, Cean Garner contends the trial court erred when it denied his motions to (1) suppress evidence seized in a search incident to an unlawful arrest; and (2) dismiss a charge of possessing a large-capacity magazine as violative of the Second Amendment. We agree the trial court’s denial of the suppression motion was erroneous, and that the error requires reversal.

Defendant Roosevelt Vines Jr. shot and killed Mario Thomas at the site of a “memorial” to one of defendant’s friends who had been shot the preceding day. Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and attempting to dissuade a witness.
Defendant maintains the prosecutor committed misconduct during cross-examination and closing argument, and that his own counsel was ineffective in failing to object. He also claims no substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that the murder was premeditated and deliberate. Lastly, he asserts the court erred in imposing fines without determining his ability to pay. We affirm.

The juvenile court terminated dependency jurisdiction over three children of D.A. (father) and E.L. (mother) after about one year of family maintenance services and, as relevant here, awarded mother sole legal and physical custody of the youngest son, S.L. (minor). Jurisdiction was based on the children suffering serious emotional damage as a result of the conduct of both parents related to an acrimonious divorce and custody dispute. Father argues on appeal that the juvenile court erred by: terminating jurisdiction despite evidence that minor was in a fragile emotional state; not protecting minor’s right to attend and be heard at hearings; and not appointing separate counsel for the three children when a conflict of interest arose. He also contends minor’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Finding no prejudicial error, we will affirm the judgment.

M.A., a minor never previously before the juvenile court, admitted to robbing two people and carjacking another at gunpoint on separate occasions, as well as fleeing the scene of a collision after losing control of a stolen car. M.A. challenges the juvenile court’s order committing him to a county-run juvenile rehabilitation facility rather than his family’s custody at home, given the undisputed evidence of his exceptional qualities and the aberration his offenses represented. Because the court did not abuse its broad discretion in finding that M.A.’s need for rehabilitation and the severity of the offense warranted the placement, we affirm.