CA Unpub Decisions

The law firm that represented the losing defendants at trial obtained a lien on specific client property to secure payment of accrued, but unpaid, legal fees. Plaintiffs/judgment creditors, unable to satisfy the judgment, sued the law firm to set aside the lien, alleging actual and constructive fraud. The trial court granted the law firm’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm.

Petitioner T.P. (wife) sought a writ of review (certiorari) following a judgment of contempt entered against her for failure to comply with family court visitation and custody orders. At the direction of the California Supreme Court, we consider five specific questions concerning the timeliness of wife’s application for relief in this court and whether her claims are meritorious. We conclude the petition is timely and the contempt judgment must be annulled.

Plaintiff Michael Packard appeals: 1) a judgment in favor of defendant Dolores Macias in his personal injury action, and 2) the order denying his motion for a new trial. We conclude, among other things, that substantial evidence supports the jury finding that Macias’s negligence was not a “substantial factor in causing harm to [Packard].” We affirm.

Appellant Thaddius Landel Williams, Jr., pled no contest to felony vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (a)). On appeal, Williams contends two of the conditions of his probation are unconstitutionally vague. We find partial merit to this contention and modify the judgment accordingly. In all other respects, we affirm.

Appellant Ronnie Lee White pled no contest to receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)) and was placed on probation. After he violated his probation, the court sentenced him to a three-year local term that included one year on mandatory supervised release with certain terms and conditions. On appeal, White contends the condition of his mandatory release requiring him to obey the lawful directives of his probation officer is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We affirm.

Chad Tadao Stukey appeals from an order revoking mandatory supervision and sentencing him to Ventura County jail for 1,042 days. Appointed counsel filed an opening brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, setting forth the facts of the case and requesting that we review the entire record. Counsel raised no issues. Appellant personally filed four handwritten supplemental briefs. After reviewing the entire record and appellant’s written contentions, we have not found any arguable issue. Accordingly, we affirm.

Convicted by jury of multiple counts of sexual assault involving three victims, plus one count each of kidnapping and second degree robbery, and sentenced to a total state prison term of 53 years, defendant Will Smith, Jr., challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence for the robbery conviction. We affirm.

A jury found Paul Holmes Seyer guilty of arson and misdemeanor resisting arrest. Appellate counsel could not identify any arguable issues in this appeal. After completing our own thorough review of the record, we agree there are no arguable issues. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Appellant Dale Petty was convicted of attempted premeditated murder and aggravated assault for stabbing a fellow homeless man during a dispute over a bicycle. On appeal, he contends his attorney was ineffective for failing to object to an officer’s testimony regarding the victim’s veracity. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted Rosman Ortega of the first degree murder of Jesus Enriquez (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1) and attempted murder of Jesus's sister, Isabel
(§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); count 2). It found true allegations as to both counts that Ortega was a principal and that at least one principal used a firearm, causing great bodily injury or death to a person (§12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)), and Ortega intentionally and personally discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury or death to a person
(§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). It also found true that Ortega committed count 1 for the benefit of, or in association with a criminal street gang with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang members (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and that he committed count 2 in a willful, deliberate, and premeditated manner (§ 189).

A jury convicted defendant Bao Thai Nguyen of two counts of second degree commercial burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460; counts 1, 11), four counts of second degree robbery (§§ 211 & 212.5, subd. (c); counts 2-4, 12), five counts of kidnapping to commit robbery (§ 209, subd. (b)(1); counts 5-7, 13 & 15), and nine counts of false imprisonment (§§ 236 & 237, subd. (a); counts 8-10, 16-21). The jury also found true allegations defendant personally used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (b) while committing counts 2 through 7 and 12, 13, and 15 and within the meaning section 12022.5, subdivision (a) during the commission of counts 1, 8 through 11, and 16 through 21.

Barron M. McNulty appeals from an April 2016 judgment granting his March 2016 petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (a). Although the trial court granted McNulty's petition and resentenced him, the court sentenced McNulty to the same aggregate term as his previous sentence. While McNulty's appeal from the April 2016 judgment was pending, we directed the parties to file supplemental briefing concerning whether the trial court had jurisdiction to rule on McNulty's March 2016 petition for resentencing given that, at the time the court granted the petition, McNulty's appeal of a prior petition for resentencing (§ 1170.18, subd. (a)) was pending in this court (People v. McNulty (June 6, 2016, D068554) [nonpub. opn.]).

Defendant Raymond Anthony McLaughlin appeals after a jury convicted him of first degree murder. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced defendant to a prison term of 25 years to life.

In these consolidated appeals, Paul Russell Johnson appeals from the trial court's December 23, 2016 judgment finding him to be incompetent to stand trial and authorizing the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication. (Pen. Code, §§ 1368-1370.) We conclude that Johnson's appeals are moot because he has subsequently been found mentally competent to stand trial, and we accordingly dismiss the appeals.