CA Unpub Decisions

Following his conviction for committing a lewd act on a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code § 288, subd. (a)), defendant was ordered to stay away from the victim. The no-contact order imposed by the court did not state that it was for a limited duration. Defendant argues that the court erred, because section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1) provides that a no-contact order may only be imposed for a period of up to 10 years.

An information charged defendant Sherbly Wayne Gordon III with assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2); count 11) and vandalism causing damage of less than $400 (§ 594, subd. (b)(2)(A); count 12). As to count 11, the information further alleged defendant personally used a firearm (i.e., a revolver) and committed this offense for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang, with the intent to promote, further, and assist in criminal conduct by gang members (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). As to count 12, it was further alleged defendant committed this offense, punishable as either a felony or misdemeanor, also for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang, and also with the intent to promote, further, and assist in criminal conduct by gang members (§ 186.22, subd. (d)).

Appellant Primitivo Garcia pled to four violations of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a) and eight violations of section 288.7. Garcia moved to set aside his plea pursuant to section 1018; the motion was denied. The trial court imposed an aggregate, indeterminate sentence of 190 years to life in prison. Garcia filed a notice of appeal stating the appeal was based upon the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea that do not affect the validity of the plea. Appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We affirm.

In 2014, defendant Jaime Ricardo Flores raped two young women and attempted to rape a third woman. On each occasion, he used a weapon and handcuffed or tied up the woman in his car to facilitate his assault. The women were vulnerable because they worked as prostitutes.

Ralph Johnathan Elze pled no contest to two counts of commercial burglary in 2013. The electorate passed Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, in 2014 (hereafter Proposition 47 or the Act). Elze filed a petition seeking to have his convictions reduced to misdemeanors pursuant to the provisions of the Act. The trial court denied the petition finding Elze was not eligible for resentencing. We affirm the order denying the petition.

A jury convicted Craig Lee Chapman of assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2) [count 1]), brandishing a firearm in a rude or threatening manner (§ 417, subd. (a)(1) [count 2]), and domestic violence battery (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)). Chapman contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct on self-defense concerning the brandishing offense, and he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the assault and spousal battery convictions. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm.

Defendant Skyler Ramond Brown pleaded no contest to numerous counts. On appeal, he challenges a $25 fee included in the abstract of judgment, arguing the trial court never imposed that fee. The People concede error. The People separately contend defendant’s custody credit must be corrected. Both contentions have merit. We order the abstract of judgment amended and otherwise affirm.

Jose Luis Alvarado appeals the judgment following conviction by jury of unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle, a felony. (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a).) The jury found true allegations of a strike prior (Pen. Code, § 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)) and three prior convictions which qualified for prior prison term enhancements under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b).
Appellant went to a car sales lot in Oxnard. He began looking at a Nissan pickup truck parked on the far side of the lot. The pickup’s engine was running because employees at the lot were rearranging the vehicles. Appellant got into the pickup and drove away. He was arrested after an employee alerted law enforcement.

After reunification services were terminated, D.C. (Mother) filed a petition for modification pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 alleging changed circumstances. She requested that her minor children, N.C. and J.C., be placed with her and that she receive family maintenance services. The juvenile court denied Mother's petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. At the selection and implementation hearing (§ 366.26), after it found that the beneficial parental relationship exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) did not apply, the court terminated Mother's parental rights and ordered a permanent plan of adoption. Mother appeals the court's denial of her section 388 petition without an evidentiary hearing and its determination that the beneficial parental relationship exception to terminating parental rights did not apply.

In August 2016, the juvenile court conducted a contested hearing at which it denied modification petitions filed by appellants Tiffany I. (mother) and Aaron O. (father) (collectively, the parents) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 concerning their daughters, now five-year-old Madeline and one-year-old Emma, and terminated appellants’ parental rights pursuant to section 366.26. Mother contends the juvenile court’s order denying her section 388 petition was error and must be reversed along with its order terminating her parental rights. Father joins mother’s opening brief only to establish that a reversal of the order terminating her parental rights requires reversal of the same order as to him. We affirm.

A.C. appeals the juvenile court’s order that terminated her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) She contends that termination was premature because it occurred before the court resolved her children’s status under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; see also § 224 et seq. [incorporating ICWA’s requirements into state law].) We affirm.

Hector H. appeals from a juvenile court disposition order committing him to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). He contends the court abused its discretion in committing him to the DJJ without adequate consideration of reasonable alternatives and without making necessary findings about his special educational needs under California Rules of Court, rule 5.651(b)(2), and seeks remand to allow for further assessment of his educational needs. Hector further contends the court erred in ordering restitution because he did not cause the victim's loss. We conclude the disposition order was not an abuse of the juvenile court's discretion and the restitution order was proper. We therefore affirm both orders.

The court readjudged appellant Angel R. a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) after it sustained allegations charging him with second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211/count 1) and a principal armed with a firearm enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). On appeal, appellant contends the court abused its discretion when it committed him to the New Horizons Program (NHP). We affirm.

15-year-old A.M. (appellant) appeals from the juvenile court’s order placing him on probation after finding he was in possession of a weapon (a knife) in a school zone (Pen. Code, § 626.10, subd. (a) ). He contends the corpus delecti of the offense was not established because there was insufficient evidence aside from his extrajudicial admission to support the finding that he had committed the offense. We reject the contention and affirm the judgment.