CA Unpub Decisions

The marriage of Andrew E. Stevens and Ildiko Cseto Stevens was dissolved pursuant to a 2009 stipulated judgment. At the time of dissolution, Andrew and Ildiko had a 10-year-old child, Armand. In the stipulated judgment, Ildiko represented and warranted that she would not seek child support and agreed to “non-modifiable” spousal support. As partial consideration for the child support and spousal support provisions, the stipulated judgment awarded Ildiko rental properties that Andrew had claimed were his separate property.
Several years later, Ildiko filed a motion for modification of Andrew’s child support obligation. She also requested that the court impose a lien on Andrew’s estate as security for that obligation, and order Andrew to pay for Armand’s medical expenses for an unspecified period of time, deposit into an escrow or trust account the proceeds of a judgment Andrew obtained in litigation with a third party, and periodically confirm that he is paying the prem

Appellant Julie Ann Osborn challenged certain provisions in a marital settlement agreement (MSA) she had entered into with her former spouse Miles Musalman, including provisions (1) giving Musalman a $16,500 credit against child support, and (2) diverting child support funds to a trust account earmarked for their children's college and automobile expenses. (In re Marriage of Osborn (May 29, 2015, No. D065329) [nonpub. opn.].) After the family court affirmed those provisions, Osborn appealed and this court reversed and remanded for the family court to enter a new order on child support that eliminated the credit, and did not employ a trust account unless the court made detailed factual findings to support the need for a trust. (Id. at p. 11.)

APPEAL from postjudgment orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Albert T. Harutunian III, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.

In a petition for writ of mandate, J.S. (Father) challenges the juvenile court’s order bypassing reunification services and setting the matter for a permanency plan hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 361.5, subd. (b)(11), 366.26.) We deny the petition.

INTRODUCTION
Kaleb L., born in 2008, has a history of severe emotional issues. When Kaleb was in second grade, his school contacted the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) after Kaleb’s parents, Ronald L. (father) and Tara M. (mother), failed to obtain appropriate mental health services for Kaleb. The court below found that Kaleb was a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b).
Father appeals, arguing that although Kaleb suffered from emotional problems, there was no evidence that he suffered, or was at substantial risk of suffering, serious physical harm. We agree and reverse. Because the court found that parents’ efforts to help Kaleb had not been sufficient to meet his needs, we remand the case to permit DCFS to consider filing a new petition alleging that jurisdiction may be asserted under section 300, subdivision (c) or any other basis it deems appropriate.

J.J. challenges a disposition order removing him from his mother’s home and detaining him in juvenile hall pending a court-approved out-of-home placement. Following entry of this order, J.J. was placed in a court approved program. When the program closed, J.J. was returned to his mother’s home.
His counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, requesting that we conduct an independent review of the record. Minor was informed of his right to file a supplemental brief and did not do so. Having independently reviewed the record, we conclude there are no issues that require further briefing and shall affirm the order.

This action pits a mother and daughter against each other in litigation involving the probate estate of the family’s matriarch, Edith Lorraine Zuiderweg (Edith). Edith was married to Peter Zuiderweg (Peter), who predeceased her. They had two children, Jack Zuiderweg (Jack) and Lorraine Janet Zuiderweg-Andrews (Janet), who is the mother in this mother/daughter litigation. Janet has two children, Glen Andrews (Glen) and Lori Gill (Lori), the daughter in this litigation.

Soon after filing this harassment action against their landlord, plaintiffs were granted an order to preserve evidence, requiring the landlord to allow plaintiffs’ experts to inspect cameras maintained on the property. After the landlord’s attorney ignored the preservation order and plaintiffs’ repeated requests for compliance, the trial court awarded terminating sanctions and eventually entered a default judgment against defendant Paul Kraaijvanger on the basis of the sanctions. Kraaijvanger filed a motion to vacate the judgment under the mandatory relief provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 473, accompanied by a declaration in which his attorney detailed her unjustified disregard for the preservation order. The trial court refused to grant mandatory relief from the default, concluding such relief is unavailable when the default is not entered by the court clerk. We reverse the ruling and vacate the default judgment.

This appeal involves a health care clinic’s special motion to strike a defamation cause of action asserted by a physician who had been employed by the clinic. The trial court denied the motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute and the clinic appealed.
This lawsuit began when the health care clinic sued the physician for breach of contract because he resigned before completing his two-year term of employment. The physician cross-complained, alleging defamation based on statements in an email from the clinic’s chief executive officer to other management personnel. The email stated the chief executive officer would report the physician to the Medical Board of California for patient abandonment if he resigned.

An information charged defendant James Lewis Wesley with second degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) and felony vandalism (§ 594, subd. (b)(1)). The information alleged a prior strike conviction (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)). Defendant pleaded no contest to both counts and admitted the prior strike allegation. Before sentencing, defendant filed a Romero motion to dismiss the prior strike conviction. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the Romero motion and sentenced defendant to 32 months in prison.

On November 9, 2015, a jury found defendant and appellant Joseph B. Trigeros guilty of possession of stolen property under Penal Code section 496, subdivision (a); being a felon in possession of a firearm under Penal Code section 29800, subdivision (a); and being a felon in possession of ammunition under Penal Code section 30305, subdivision (a). On December 10, 2015, the trial court found true that defendant was previously convicted of two strike priors. On January 29, 2016, the trial court sentenced defendant concurrently on all three counts, for a total of eight years in prison. On January 29, 2016, defendant filed his notice of appeal.

Appellant Hector Delacerda rollerbladed into the Ace Motors car dealership around 1:30 one day, clad only in shorts. He said “Miguel” had sent him to pick up a car. Told no one at the dealership was expecting to release a car to a “Miguel,” appellant rollerbladed around the dealership for awhile, then got into an Audi A5 convertible and turned the key.
Hearing the engine turn over in the A5, Carlos Medina Rojas ran to the car and told appellant he could not test drive it. Appellant said he wanted to drive the car to the bank and Medina Rojas refused permission to take the car off the lot. Appellant removed one of his rollerblades to release the brake, put the car into reverse, and accelerated 8-10 feet before colliding with another car.

Defendant Meghan Anne Zato appeals a judgment convicting her of assault with a deadly weapon, hit-and-run and driving under the influence, and sentencing her to seven years in prison. She contends (1) the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of duress with respect to the assault and hit-and-run charges, (2) her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the prosecutor’s improper attacks on her character, and (3) the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by disparaging defense counsel and by misstating the relevant legal principles. Defendant also contends that the sentence imposed on the driving under the influence counts must be stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654. We agree the judgment must be modified to stay the sentence imposed on the driving under the influence counts, but affirm the judgment in all other respects.

Following a jury trial, defendant Douglas Austin Wroe was convicted of possession of child pornography with a prior conviction for possessing child pornography. Defendant admitted a prior prison term allegation and the trial court sentenced him to a five-year state prison term.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting statements he made to an officer without Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694] warnings. Finding that defendant was not in custody when he made the statements, we affirm.