CA Unpub Decisions

Appointed counsel for defendant Ryan Alexander Jeffrey asks this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)

In this action for personal injuries allegedly sustained by exposure to mold in an office building, Regina Schueneman appeals after the trial court granted summary judgment to the defense on statute of limitations grounds. Resolving the statute of limitations issue in this case turns on whether sinusitis and/or other illnesses Schueneman suffered from the mold exposure in 2011 are "separate and distinct" and "qualitatively different" from a lung disorder—allergic pulmonary aspergillosis—her physician first definitively diagnosed in November 2014. (See Pooshs v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 788 (Pooshs).)

R.M. (mother) and L.O. (father) petition this court for extraordinary review of a juvenile court order setting a hearing to select a permanent plan for their four children, J.O., I.O., Li.O., and C.O., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Both parents contend the juvenile court erred by not making a finding regarding the applicability of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) before setting the section 366.26 hearing. Father also asserts he did not receive adequate notice of status review hearing dates under section 366.21, and mother claims the juvenile court erred in (1) finding return of her youngest child would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child and (2) failing to find a substantial probability the child would be returned to her within 18 months. Real party in interest Contra Costa County Children & Family Services Bureau (Bureau) contends the ICWA issue is rendered moot by a juvenile court order issued after peti

We affirm a probate court judgment declaring the meaning of certain terms of a living trust which set forth the distribution of a parcel of real property.

Defendant Patricia Weitl, as trustee for the Donald Pippo revocable trust, appeals a judgment entered in favor of plaintiffs Michael and Annie Purtill and Timothy and Elaine Snow on their complaint for, among other things, slander of title, malicious prosecution and conversion. On appeal, defendant contends there is insufficient evidence to support the judgment on plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution and slander of title claims. Defendant argues further the punitive damages awarded are either unsupported by substantial evidence or excessive. We agree with defendant that there is no substantial evidence to support the award of emotional distress damages to Timothy Snow and Elaine Snow on their claims for malicious prosecution so that that element of the judgment must be stricken, but we reject the remainder of defendant’s claims.

Defendant and appellant Grover Wilson Smith III appeals the imposition of increased restitution fines under Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (b), following revocation of a probationary term that was imposed after his no contest pleas to charges of felony child abuse and making criminal threats (§§ 273a, 422). As corrected by the trial court, the judgment is affirmed.

Defendant Ricky Rodriguez appeals the trial court’s judgment committing him to a state hospital for an indeterminate term following a court trial finding that he is a sexually violent predator (SVP) within the meaning of the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.) He contends he was prejudiced by voluminous case-specific hearsay evidence elicited from expert witnesses in violation of state hearsay law as recently articulated in People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez). In the event this court finds he forfeited this claim, he also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve this claim for appeal.
We conclude defendant was prejudiced by the erroneous admission of hearsay evidence and reverse the judgment.

Otis Rodriguez was convicted of selling marijuana. He argues now that there were two errors in the jury instructions. He also contends that the trial court imposed a fee in error and overcharged him on another fee. The People concede that one fee was imposed in error and should be stricken. On the other fee, however, the People claim there actually was a mistake in Rodriguez’s favor, which we should correct.
We reject Rodriguez’s claims of instructional error. We will order stricken the fee the parties agree was inapplicable. As to the other fee, we agree with the People. We have calculated the correct amount and will modify the judgment accordingly. The judgment will be affirmed as modified.

Thomas Ritchie appeals the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of one count of stalking (Pen. Code, § 646.9; count 4), two counts of criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a); counts 8–9), and three misdemeanor counts of disobeying a court order (§ 166, subd. (a)(4); counts 5–7). The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of two years eight months in state prison.
Appellant contends: (1) the convictions for stalking, criminal threats, and one count of disobeying a court order lack substantial evidentiary support; (2) the evidence established only one period of sustained fear sufficient to support one conviction for criminal threats; and (3) the trial court improperly instructed the jury that this case did not involve a life sentence, thereby advising the jury to discredit appellant’s testimony. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

Defendant appeals from a postjudgment order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus, including his request to recall his sentence under Penal Code section 1170.126. We conclude the order denying defendant’s petition is not appealable and dismiss the appeal.

Appellant Abel Perez, Jr., was convicted of attempted murder and other crimes for stabbing Miguel Delgado during a robbery. He contends the photographic lineup from which Delgado identified him was unduly suggestive, but we disagree and affirm the judgment.

Victor Mathieu appeals from his judgment of conviction of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b)) and possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), with true findings on a great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) and a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5). On appeal, Mathieu argues that the trial court prejudicially erred when it excluded evidence of an out-of-court statement made by Mathieu’s wife in which she admitted that she, and not Mathieu, committed the shooting at issue in this case. We affirm.

Victor Mathieu appeals from his judgment of conviction of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b)) and possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), with true findings on a great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) and a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5). On appeal, Mathieu argues that the trial court prejudicially erred when it excluded evidence of an out-of-court statement made by Mathieu’s wife in which she admitted that she, and not Mathieu, committed the shooting at issue in this case. We affirm.

Appellant Roberto Martinez contends the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to obtain a probation report before sentencing him following the revocation of his probation. Although, as respondent concedes, the failure to obtain a probation report was error, it is not reasonably probable appellant would have obtained a more favorable sentence had the court done so. We therefore affirm the judgment.