CA Unpub Decisions

Appointed counsel for defendant Jimmie Lee Jones, Sr., asked this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Jeremiah James Johnson (appellant) appeals, contending the trial court erred in failing to conduct the hearing required by People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, in response to his requests to replace defense counsel, prior to his competency trial. We conditionally reverse and remand for a Marsden hearing, but we reject appellant’s contention he is entitled to a new competency trial regardless of the outcome of the hearing.

Defendant Sabas Iniguez worked for a group of drug distributors who, in turn, worked for the Sinaloa drug cartel. After the police seized 13 pounds of methamphetamine from defendant’s group, the supplier began demanding payment for the drugs and threatening them and their families. They took care of the problem by kidnapping and killing the supplier and two of his men (or attempting to kill — one of the men survived). Defendant participated in these crimes by acting as a lookout.

“On November 4, 2014, the voters enacted Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (hereafter Proposition 47), which went into effect the next day. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (a).)” (People v. Rivera (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1089.) Proposition 47 created a resentencing provision, codified at Penal Code section 1170.18, which provides that a person currently serving a sentence for certain designated felonies may petition for recall of the sentence to reduce felonies to misdemeanors. Defendant Marvin Glenn Hollis appeals from an order denying his petition to reduce a conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor.

At around midnight on September 16, 2015, Redding Police Officer Nolan Guiducci was patrolling in the Win-River Casino parking lot when he saw a blue 1994 Honda Accord. Officer Guiducci ran the license plate number on his computer and learned the car was reported stolen. After waiting in the parking lot for about two hours, he saw the Honda drive away. Officer Guiducci and another officer in a different patrol car pursued the Honda and conducted a vehicle stop. Defendant Daniel Raye Greene was the driver. No keys were found in the Honda, and the owner reported that there were no keys in the car when it was taken.

Appellant Kerry Conrad Binger was charged with conspiring to provide legal services and interfering with an attorney-client relationship (Pen. Code, § 182, subd. (a)(5)), entering the grounds of a jail without authority (§ 4571), bringing drugs into a jail (§ 4573), grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a)), and engaging in the unauthorized practice of law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6126, subd. (a)). A prior federal conviction for bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)) was alleged as a prior “strike.” (§§ 667, 1170.12.) Two prior convictions for petty theft (§ 666) and evading a peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)) were alleged as prior prison terms. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).)

Defendant William Bazan appeals from the judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of unlawfully taking a vehicle. The jury also found he had suffered three prior convictions and served one prior prison term within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5. (All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.) Bazan argues the trial court erred by denying his request to strike his prior strike convictions under section 1385 and People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero).
We affirm the judgment of conviction, but remand with directions that the trial court hold a hearing to reconsider and clarify the record regarding Bazan’s request to strike his prior strike convictions for purposes of sentencing.

Joshua A., the father of minor J.A., appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order removing J.A. from the custody of his parents. The court sustained four jurisdictional findings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300: three against Joshua—physical abuse under subdivision (a); substance abuse under subdivision (b); and verbal abuse under subdivision (b)—and one against Alice B. (mother) under subdivision (b), for leaving J.A. in Joshua’s custody despite knowing about Joshua’s issues with alcohol abuse and domestic violence.

Plaintiff and appellant Hang Jun Lee (Plaintiff) appeals a judgment dismissing his first amended complaint following an order sustaining the demurrer of defendant and respondent Helen Park (Park) without leave to amend.
The trial court properly determined the complaint on its face discloses the action is time-barred. Therefore, the judgment of dismissal is affirmed.

K.S. was the foster parent and prospective adoptive parent to E.G., born in 2011 with drugs in his system and developmental delays. In 2016, with adoption the approved permanent plan and an approved home study, K.S. received into her home a four-month old infant; one week after placement, that infant was hospitalized in cardiac arrest, with a depressed skull fracture and subdural hemorrhaging from an acute, non-accidental trauma. As a result, E.G. was removed from the home of K.S., he was placed in a relative home, and K.S.’s application for de facto parent standing was denied. K.S. objected to the removal of E.G. from her home, but, after a contested hearing, the court found that it would not be in his best interests to return to her home. K.S. appealed the removal, but later filed a petition captioned as a petition for writ of habeas corpus.

T.H. (mother) appealed from the juvenile court’s order issued at a transfer-in hearing, accepting jurisdiction of the juvenile dependency case as to her now two-year-old son, N.H., from Madera County. After reviewing the juvenile court record, mother’s court-appointed counsel filed a “no issue” brief pursuant to In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835. We granted mother leave to file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error exists. (Id. at p. 844.) Mother filed a letter but failed to show good cause. Consequently, we dismiss the appeal.

Father A.W. appeals from a juvenile court order terminating parental rights for his two children, M.W. and B.W. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a)(5), father joins and adopts by reference the arguments made by mother C.R. in her separate appeal of the same order. Mother argued the juvenile court erred in failing to find the beneficial parental relationship exception applied to her. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) In In re M.W. (May 17, 2017, C083276) [nonpub. opn.], this court addressed mother’s contention and concluded it lacked merit.

Appellant R.L. (father) is the father of L.L. (the child). The sole issue on appeal is father’s contention that the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) failed to comply with the inquiry and notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). DPSS concedes, and we agree. We remand the case for the limited purpose of directing the juvenile court to order DPSS to comply with ICWA. In all other respects, we affirm.

Emily E. (mother) and Carlos G. (father) appeal from the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights for their child, Julian G. (the minor). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26; unless otherwise set forth, statutory section citations that follow are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Mother and father each contend the San Joaquin County Human Services Agency (Agency) failed to comply with the inquiry and notice procedures of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) Mother also contends the juvenile court erred in (a) denying mother’s section 388 modification petition without a hearing, and (b) failing to find the beneficial parental relationship exception applied. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Agreeing with the claim of ICWA error only, we reverse and remand for proper inquiry and notice.