CA Unpub Decisions

This is an appeal in a juvenile criminal matter involving defendant/appellant I.F., who turned 18 years old in November of 2014 (hereinafter, defendant). Defendant challenges the juvenile court’s orders to deny his motion pursuant to former Welfare & Institutions Code section 781 to seal his juvenile records following the dismissal of his underlying wardship petition, and to grant the prosecution’s contingent motion for disclosure of certain of these records for impeachment purposes in his upcoming adult criminal trial. For reasons set forth below, we reverse the challenged orders and remand to the juvenile court to apply section 786, the statute governing the sealing of juvenile records enacted prior to the adjudication of defendant’s sealing petition, to this matter.

The juvenile court declared G.R. a ward of the court after finding he willfully injured his girlfriend by biting her on the face. G.R. contends the court erred when it admitted evidence that he spat on a witness during a prior physical altercation between him and his girlfriend. G.R. also contends the court erred in issuing a permanent restraining order against him at the detention hearing without advanced notice and an opportunity to be heard. We modify the restraining order to reflect that it is a temporary restraining order that expired 21 days after it was issued. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.

Evan M. (the father) appeals from a November 16, 2016 order terminating his parental rights. He argues the juvenile court should have applied the parent-child relationship exception pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the father failed to show his relationship with the child outweighed the benefits of adoption. In addition to challenging the parental relationship determination, the father contends the juvenile court erred by failing to place the child with the paternal great aunt pursuant to section 361.3. However, he does not have standing to challenge the relative placement preference issue after termination of his reunification services. We therefore affirm the order terminating parental rights.

Jasmin C. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition order, declaring her child, E.C., a dependent of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), and ordering the removal of the child from Mother’s care and custody. Mother argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding that E.C. was at a substantial risk of harm based on Mother’s history of substance abuse, and that removal of E.C. from Mother’s custody was the only reasonable means to protect the child from the risk of harm. We affirm.

Minor Chris G. (the minor) appeals from the judgment of wardship (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) entered following a determination that he was a minor in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29610), a felony. Pertinent here, the juvenile court’s determination followed the denial of the minor’s motion to suppress evidence (the firearm) obtained during a warrantless search of his backpack. Appellate counsel filed an opening brief in which he raised no issues (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436), and we requested briefing on the validity of the search.
The minor now contends the court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence under Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 24 (Terry), as the deputies had no reasonable basis to believe he was armed and, even if they did, plainly exceeded the scope of a Terry “stop and frisk” when they searched his backpack after removing it from his person. The People impliedly concede the search was not valid under Terry, and argue instead that

H.B. (Mother) is serving a four-year term for child endangerment (Pen. Code, § 273a). She petitions this court for extraordinary relief from dependency court orders terminating reunification services as to her three-year-old son L.W. (Minor) and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 to select a permanent plan for Minor. Mother’s sole argument is that the dependency court erred in finding that she received reasonable reunification services from the Del Norte County Department of Health and Human Services (Department). We deny the petition.

Plaintiff and appellant Ronald Ferguson purports in his notice of appeal to appeal from an order or judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(3)-(13). No such judgment or order was ever entered. The notice of appeal was filed before the entry of a judgment of dismissal. However, we treat this appeal as timely filed and deem it to be an appeal from the judgment of dismissal following orders granting defendant and respondent Bank of America’s (the Bank) motion to strike and sustaining its demurrer to the fourth amended complaint. Although the appellant’s opening brief is unclear on this point, it appears that he is primarily attempting to obtain review of the order sustaining the Bank’s demurrer to the first cause of action of the second amended complaint without leave to amend. The first cause of action is for breach of contract. We hold that he is entitled to review of that order, but that he has failed to state a cause of action. Accordingly, w

Blockage in a city sewer main resulted in raw sewage backing up into a dental office building owned by three dentists doing business as WGS Dental Complex (WGS). An inverse condemnation action (Cal. Const., art. I, § 19) against City of Oroville was filed by Timothy G. Wall, D.D.S., Sims W. Lowry, D.M.D., and William A. Gilbert, D.D.S., individually and doing business as WGS (real parties in interest), and by intervener The Dentist Insurance Company (TDIC). On the bifurcated issue of liability (Code Civ. Proc., § 1260.040, hereafter § 1260.040), the trial court found City liable despite its claim that the sole reason the sewage entered the building was WGS’s failure to install on its property a backwater valve mandated by city ordinance adopting the Uniform Plumbing Code.

Plaintiffs Ilidio Avila, Angelina Avila, Sonny Avila, Dominic Avila, and Jovina Avila brought an action against defendant City of San Jose (City) for, among other things, dangerous condition of public property after Ilidio was injured in a traffic accident. The trial court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of the City. On appeal, plaintiffs contend that there were triable issues of material fact regarding whether the intersection where the accident occurred constituted a dangerous condition of public property. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant Alias James McLaughlin tossed his crying infant daughter onto the floor. She died from the resulting injuries. A jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder and assault of a child younger than eight years old resulting in the child’s death. Defendant appeals his conviction contending the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior domestic violence against his girlfriend, the mother of his daughter. He contends: (1) the evidence was inadmissible on the issue of knowledge under Evidence Code section 1101; (2) the evidence was inadmissible under section 1109; and (3) section 1109 violates the due process clause.

Defendant Calvin Glass, Jr. appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after he pled guilty to one count of voluntary manslaughter and one count of attempted murder. With respect to the voluntary manslaughter count, Glass also admitted that in committing the crime, he personally used a firearm.
On appeal, Glass challenges the sentence that the trial court imposed. Glass argues that the trial court improperly relied on the same aggravating factors to impose an upper term sentence with respect to the voluntary manslaughter count and an upper term sentence on the firearm enhancement associated with the voluntary manslaughter count. According to Glass, the trial court's use of these factors for selecting the upper term sentences on both the substantive offense and the enhancement violated the dual use prohibition. We disagree with Glass's contention, and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant Jimmie Garrett came to the attention of law enforcement after his estranged wife reported an alleged domestic violence incident and informed officers that defendant was a convicted felon who grew marijuana and kept guns in his home. Officers later located multiple firearms and multiple marijuana grows after executing a search warrant at his property.
Based on the contraband found during the search, defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1), count 1; unless othewise set forth, statutory references that follow are to the Penal Code), possession of ammunition by a felon (§30305, subd. (a)(1), count 2), unlawfully cultivating marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11358, count 3), and possessing more than 28.5 grams of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, §11357, subd. (c)) as a lesser included offense to possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359, count 4).

“On November 4, 2014, the voters enacted Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (hereafter Proposition 47), which went into effect the next day. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (a).)” (People v. Rivera (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1089.) Proposition 47 created a resentencing provision, codified at Penal Code section 1170.18, which provides that a person currently serving a sentence for certain designated felonies may petition for recall of the sentence to reduce felonies to misdemeanors. Defendant Richard Joseph Escobedo appeals from an order denying his petition to reduce a conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor.

On appeal from his criminal conviction, defendant Andre Durouso raises two claims of sentencing error. First, he argues the trial court imposed a restitution fine in violation of his plea agreement. In our view the agreement affirmatively represented that a restitution fine would not be imposed, and the amount ordered was a significant deviation from the plea bargain, thus violating the agreement. The appropriate remedy is to reduce the fine to the statutory minimum.
Durouso also argues the trial court erred in calculating his presentence custody credits. We disagree with this contention and affirm the judgment as modified.