CA Unpub Decisions

On March 3, 2005, defendant and appellant Jorge A. Millan Rodriguez (defendant) pled guilty to unlawful intercourse by a person over 21 under Penal Code section 261.5, subdivision (d). Defendant, as a person over 21, admitted to having sex with a person under the age of 16. The trial court sentenced defendant to probation for 36 months, to be served on consecutive weekends in the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department’s Weekender Program.
On December 16, 2016, defendant filed a petition for dismissal under Penal Code section 1203.4, and a petition for a reduction of his felony conviction to a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b). As mitigation, defendant provided in his petition that he married the victim and had two children with her. Moreover, defendant noted that both violations of probation occurred because he was in the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and was deported so he was unable to meet his probation officer or check in for h

Toy guns have been around for decades. Some look like real guns and many replicas are hard to spot. But here the jury convicted defendant Marcello Quezada of two offenses and three enhancements finding he used a real gun, not a fake, replica, toy, or imitation gun. The jury found defendant guilty of second degree robbery (Pen. Code §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)) and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). As to the robbery count, the jury found true enhancements that defendant personally used a firearm during the commission of the offense (§§ 12022.53, subd. (b), 12022.5, subd. (a)) and that defendant was armed with a firearm during the commission of the offense (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). The court found true four alleged prison priors and sentenced defendant to 14 years in state prison. Defendant appeals the judgment.

In 2004, Martel James Porter pleaded guilty to three counts of residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459). Also found true was one serious felony prior conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and two strike priors (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)). Porter was sentenced to a determinate term of 18 years four months in prison. At that time the court awarded presentence credits of 247 days.
In 2016 an error in the calculation of custody credits was discovered. Thereafter, the court issued an order amending the award of credits to 321 days. An amended minute order was prepared.

A jury acquitted defendant and appellant Manuel Murillo (defendant) of attempted murder and failed to reach a verdict on charges of assault with a firearm and mayhem. The People retried defendant on the latter two charges, and he was found guilty of both offenses. We consider whether Murillo’s convictions must be reversed because the trial court denied his request to select the attorney he retained to represent him during the first trial as his court-appointed attorney for the second trial. We also consider whether there was substantial evidence on which the jury could have appropriately relied to find defendant was the person who shot the victim.

A jury convicted Benjamin Kuahuia of commercial robbery and other offenses. This court affirmed his convictions and sentence in an unpublished opinion. (People v. Kuahuia (Feb. 28, 2017, G051802 [nonpub. opn.].) Kuahuia now appeals from the postjudgment order requiring him to pay victim restitution. (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f); all statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless noted.) Because the record is unclear whether the trial court awarded victim Susan W. restitution in excess of her economic losses, we reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

pursuant to a warrant, and officers found a large amount of marijuana, oxycodone and hydrocodone pills, and indicia of sales activities. The affidavit filed in support of the warrant consisted of both a nonconfidential section, and a confidential section that was sealed by the court that issued the warrant. After the search, defendant was arrested and a complaint was filed that charged him with 10 felony counts based on the possession, sale, and transportation of the narcotics. Defendant’s maximum exposure was approximately 14 years.

Defendant Dante Foster appeals from the denial of his suppression motion. He contends no valid reason supported the traffic stop that led to the discovery of contraband. He reasons neither the officer’s estimate of his speed, nor his signaled lane change across three lanes, supported the stop. We affirm the judgment and order a correction to the abstract of judgment.

Appellant was sentenced to 30 years to life in prison for sexually abusing his children. On appeal, he contends the prosecution failed to give sufficient notice it intended to introduce the children’s pretrial statements into evidence. He also argues the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by impugning his attorney’s character in front of the jury. Finding these claims unmeritorious, we affirm the judgment.

A jury found Fernando Ambrizalcantar (Alcantar) guilty of possession of methamphetamine for sale. He contends there was insufficient evidence he intended to sell the methamphetamine, despite expert opinion to the contrary. We agree and reverse. As we will explain, no reported California case has affirmed such a conviction, based solely on possession of a small quantity consistent with two or three days of personal use.

Anthony R. (father) appeals from the judgment entered at a jurisdictional hearing declaring his daughter, Penelope R., a dependent of the court and removing her from her parents’ custody pursuant to Welfare & Institutions Code section 361, subdivision (c). Father argues that the juvenile court erred in failing to require compliance with the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.), and by citing the incorrect statute when denying father, a previously non-custodial parent, custody of Penelope. We find no reversible error, therefore we affirm the judgment.

The entry of a stipulated judgment of dissolution did not end litigation between Steven Stupp and Annemarie Schilders. Amid highly contested postjudgment proceedings, Stupp filed a motion seeking to compel discovery responses relevant to Schilders’s pending request to have Stupp pay her attorneys’ fees. Two court days before the scheduled hearing on Stupp’s motion to compel, Schilders filed an ex parte application asking the family court to continue the hearing; to modify child and spousal support; and to order Stupp to pay additional attorneys’ fees and costs. The court denied the application in its entirety and reserved jurisdiction on Stupp’s request for sanctions related to the application. Schilders does not challenge the family court’s denial of her request for a continuance, but she contends that the family court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on her ex parte requests, by denying the requests, and by reserving jurisdiction over Stupp’s request

Defendant and appellant Daniel Hulse appeals a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) issued in this pending dissolution action, as requested by his wife, Rachael Hulse, the respondent here. Daniel argues the trial court abused its discretion by granting a DVRO where there was no support for a finding of a past act or acts of abuse. He contends the family court granted the DVRO solely because he violated a previous court order by accepting brief contact from his children, which, Daniel argues, does not constitute abuse nor justify granting a restraining order under the Domestic Violence Protection Act (DVPA). (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.) Daniel also contends the family court abused its discretion by issuing the DVRO for the maximum term allowed. Finally, Daniel claims that Rachael sought the DVRO to gain a tactical advantage in the custody dispute for their three minor children.

S.D. (the minor) admitted she committed petty theft and vandalism. The juvenile court placed her on probation, and among other terms and conditions imposed a general search condition over her objection. The minor contends on appeal that the search condition was unconstitutionally overbroad. The Attorney General disagrees but nevertheless asks us to modify the condition at issue.
As we will explain, this general search condition is standard and appears proper. We decline to modify or remand for reasons we explain. We shall affirm.

Hector R. appeals from a juvenile court order declaring his daughter, Isabela R., a dependent of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b). Hector argues that substantial evidence does not support two of the court’s four jurisdiction findings and that the court abused its discretion by denying Hector’s request for informal supervision under section 360, subdivision (b). Because Hector does not challenge the other two bases for the court’s jurisdiction, and the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying informal supervision, we affirm.