CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Charles Anthony Mackbee along with a codefendant was convicted in a jury trial of one count of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), with findings the murder was committed during a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), and that a principal was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1).) The trial court sentenced defendant to life without the possibility of parole on the murder count, plus an additional year for the firearm allegation.

Leon Bellissimo appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion to set aside the default and default judgment for $56,499.04 entered against him personally in favor of Dale Martin, Lana Smith and Lonnie Martin, the owners of real property leased by Bellissimo and/or the company he owned and operated, Burbank Kawasaki, Inc. Bellissimo contends on appeal, as he did in the trial court, that he did not have actual notice of the lawsuit in time to defend the action and that relief from default was therefore warranted under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5 (section 473.5). The trial court in denying Bellissimo’s motion focused solely on the adequacy of substituted service of the summons and complaint at Bellissimo’s business address and failed to consider his contention regarding the lack of actual notice. We reverse.

Dr. Jeannette Martello filed this action against the California Department of Managed Health Care and its director, Shelley (Michelle) Rouillard, (collectively, the Department) and the Medical Board of California and its director, Kimberly Kirchmeyer, (collectively, the Board) in a long-running dispute over Martello’s practice of balance billing patients. After the trial court sustained demurrers by the Department and the Board without leave to amend, Martello appealed. We reverse the trial court’s order sustaining the Board’s demurrer to Martello’s cause of action for discriminatory enforcement, and otherwise affirm.

Appellant Vsevolod “Seva” Okhrimovski (Seva) and respondent Dina Ohkrimovskaya (Dina), have been engaged in dissolution proceedings since 2008. Seva and Dina reached a comprehensive marital separation agreement in early 2009. However, they did not inform the trial court of their agreement until late 2012, when Seva filed a motion to enter the spousal support provisions of the agreement and set aside the rest due to his intervening personal bankruptcy. The trial court denied the motion and his request for a statement of decision, and Seva appealed. We affirmed in full and remanded the matter for further proceedings.
After remittitur, Dina filed a request for entry of judgment based on the parties’ 2009 marital settlement agreement. Seva responded with a request to enter judgment in accordance with the judgment he obtained in his bankruptcy case. He also sought to modify spousal support. The trial court granted Dina’s request and denied both of Seva’s. Seva appeals, and

Appellant Bonnie Jane Franke appeals from a postjudgment order denying a request to modify spousal support. Bonnie contends the family law court erred by finding it did not have jurisdiction to modify spousal support, and the error was prejudicial because she demonstrated a material change in circumstances. We conclude that the family law court had jurisdiction to modify the support order, and the error was not harmless. The evidence showed that the parties stipulated to a modification of spousal support when Bonnie was suffering from a temporary disability, with the expectation that she would return to work and become self-supporting. Bonnie has now alleged that she became permanently disabled, and the parties’ failed expectations constitute a change of circumstances. Therefore, we reverse and remand to allow the family law court to exercise its discretion.

Arden and Bonnie Kirkpatrick (the Kickpatricks) sued Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo), for wrongful foreclosure, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violation of Business & Professions Code section 17200 pertaining to a loan on their residential property. The trial court sustained Wells Fargo’s demurrer to the Kickpatricks’ third amended complaint without leave to amend. The Kirkpatricks appeal contending the court erred by sustaining the demurrer on the grounds they did not sufficiently allege their causes of action for wrongful foreclosure and violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Kirkpatricks also claim the court erred by accepting the truth of Wells Fargo’s foreclosure documents on judicial notice and by denying them the right to further amend their pleading. Finding no errors, we affirm the judgment.

Eduardo A. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating his reunification services as to his five children at the six-month review hearing. We affirm the court’s order.
Father and Amy L. (mother) are the parents of five children: daughters Y.A., A.A. and Alaina A., born in May 2007, February 2009, and August 2014, respectively; and sons Eduardo A., Jr. and Martin A., born in April 2011 and December 2012, respectively.

Tabitha B. was declared a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) after the juvenile court sustained allegations she committed battery on a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (b)), a misdemeanor. On appeal, Tabitha maintains the court’s jurisdictional findings are unsupported by substantial evidence. We disagree and affirm.

Appellant R.E., mother of minor S.E., appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights and freeing the minor for adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395.) She contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that the minor was adoptable. Disagreeing, we affirm.

Jesus F. (father) appeals the juvenile court’s orders denying his petition for modification under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 and terminating his parental rights to his now two-year-old son, Mason F. Father argues the juvenile court improperly denied his section 388 petition, which sought to reverse the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings based on the opinions of two belatedly discovered experts. Since the opinions were based on evidence available at the time of the jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court was not required to grant a hearing. (In re H.S. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 103 (H.S.).) Accordingly, we affirm.

A.C. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court's order denying his motion to dismiss the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency's (the Agency) petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), on behalf of his minor son, I.C., and the court's jurisdictional order sustaining the petition. Father contends there was no substantial evidence to support these orders. I.C.'s mother, Al.C. (Mother) is not a party to this appeal. The Agency maintains the court's rulings were appropriate and supported by the record. We agree and affirm the orders.

Emily M. appeals from the juvenile court’s order denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition. She sought removal from her mother Laura M.’s custody and placement in foster care just before her 18th birthday so that she would be eligible for federal funding as a nonminor dependent (§ 11400, subd. (v)(1)) under the California Fostering Connections to Success Act. (Assem. Bill No. 12 (2009-2010 Reg. Sess. (AB 12); Assem. Bill No. 212 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) (AB 212).) Emily contends the evidence she presented at the hearing on her section 388 petition demonstrated a risk of detriment if she remained in mother’s care and therefore compelled her removal (§ 361, subd. (c)). Her opening brief also asserts the court erred by denying her alternative request for continued dependency status under section 303. For the reasons expressed below, we dismiss the appeal as moot.

G.G. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order issued during a post-permanency plan review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.3) that denied his request to allow his sons, Brandon G. and Pablo G. (collectively the boys), to visit him in Mexico. On appeal, father contends (1) the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied his visitation request, and (2) the failure to inquire into whether the boys’ mother, Maria Erika G. (mother), has any Indian heritage, as required for purposes of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 et seq.), requires remand. Finding no merit to father’s contentions, we affirm.

The juvenile court terminated appellant Brenda R.'s reunification services with her daughter A.S. because Brenda had not successfully reunified within the 18-month period allowed by Welfare & Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (a)(3). The record suggests the failure to reunify was related to the fact that during the first 13 months of A.S.'s out of home placement, Brenda was incarcerated in a federal correctional facility and was thereafter in a halfway house and not likely to be able to secure suitable housing for herself and A.S. in the time permitted by the statute.