CA Unpub Decisions

R.E. (Father) appeals an order terminating his reunification services to his four children, A.E.-1, R.E., A.E.-2, and J.C. (collectively, Minors) at the six-month review hearing. He challenges the order on the grounds that the reunification services he was offered were not tailored to his mental health needs and cognitive disabilities; that the services were inadequate under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.), section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 794), and related state law; that Minors were not all part of the same sibling group; and that the proceedings did not meet the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; see also Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.). We shall affirm the order.

In this quiet title action, defendant Donald J. Selvey appeals from a summary judgment in favor of plaintiff Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLM). His opening brief purports to raise arguments under twelve separate headings. As labeled, they are: (1) the trial court erroneously exempted FHLM from complying with Code of Civil Procedure sections 437c, 761.020, 1161a and 2077, (2) the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because there are material disputed facts, (3) the trial court’s findings do not support the judgment, (4) the trial court erroneously admitted evidence over objection, (5) the trial court erroneously changed the legal description of the subject property without a court hearing, (6) the trial court misapplied the law regarding res judicata, (7) the trial court erroneously ordered title quieted to parcel number 018-630-031 in addition to parcel number 018-630-032, (8) the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court’s findings or t

Not long after Victor Duarte bought an insurance policy from Pacific Specialty Insurance Company (Pacific) to cover a rental property he owned, he was sued by his tenants. When Pacific refused to defend him against the tenants’ claims, Duarte sued Pacific, seeking, among other things, a declaration that Pacific was required to defend him in the tenant suit. The trial court granted Pacific’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that Pacific was entitled to rescind the policy because Duarte “made material misrepresentations and/or concealed material facts” when he applied for the policy and that rescission rendered the policy unenforceable from the outset, and therefore Duarte never had any coverage and was not entitled to any benefits from the policy. The “misrepresentations” at issue here concern Duarte’s responses of “no” to questions 4 and 9 in the insurance application. Question 4 is, at best, ambiguous: “Has damage remained unrepaired from previous claim and

Plaintiffs William Carter (Carter) and Carter Industrial Automation, Inc. (CIA) appeal from an order granting a motion to strike brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute) by defendants Sessions & Kimball, LLP, Michael C. Robinson (Robinson), Natascha Chevalier and Michael Chevalier, and dismissing plaintiffs complaint in its entirety. Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in granting the motion with respect to their malicious prosecution cause of action because they produced sufficient evidence to demonstrate a probability of success. We disagree and affirm the order.

Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Sergeant Bradley Brody appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court denied his petition for writ of mandate and writ of administrative mandamus. Brody’s petition challenged the Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission’s decision to suspend him for 30 days, without back pay, for his conduct during a meeting with fellow officers. Brody argues the trial court erred in ruling that the statute of limitations in the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq.) did not bar the Commission’s disciplinary action. We affirm.

Appointed counsel for defendant Bertrand Thompson has asked this court to review the record to determine whether there exist any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted Ammen Shinti of assault with intent to commit forcible rape or forcible oral copulation in the course of a burglary and three sexual assault offenses and found true multiple special allegations. On appeal Shinti contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by cross-examining Shinti on details of his prior rape conviction in a manner that insinuated facts about that offense that were not in evidence. Shinti also contends the prosecutor compounded the misconduct in closing argument by referring to facts not in evidence, misstating the law and accusing defense counsel of misleading the jury. We affirm.

Jesus Diaz Ornelas appeals from a judgment after a jury convicted him of a single count of possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf., §§ 11378). The court placed Ornelas on three years’ probation. Ornelas claims no evidence was introduced to demonstrate he had dominion or control over the bedroom in which a large quantity of methamphetamine was found. He also argues the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte a police officer’s testimony was to be weighed and judged by the same standards that apply to other witnesses. We find no error, and affirm the judgment.

A jury found defendant Demond Williams guilty of the felony offense of inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant or child’s parent (Pen. Code, § 237.5 ), and the misdemeanor offense of false imprisonment (§§ 236, 237, subd. (a)). The court sentenced defendant to a three-year probationary term on condition that he serve 270 days in jail with credit for time served of 215 days. On appeal, defendant challenges the judgment on one ground, that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the jury to consider evidence of prior acts of domestic violence between defendant and the victim. We affirm.

On July 29, 2014, defendant Carlos Vasquez was charged with assault with a deadly weapon, a knife (count 1).
On April 1, 2015, the complaint was amended to add count 2, assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury. Defendant pled no contest to count 2 in return for an agreement to dismiss count 1 and a promise of no immediate state prison time; his maximum exposure was four years in state prison. The parties agreed that although defendant was presumptively ineligible for probation due to prior felony convictions, the trial court could make an unusual case finding. The parties stipulated to the factual basis for the plea, taken from the police report, that on July 28, 2014, in Yuba County, defendant assaulted the victim with force likely to cause great bodily injury.

The trial court below accepted the parties’ stipulation to the truth of a prior conviction allegation, which had the direct consequence of subjecting defendant to greater punishment, without advising her of her trial rights, or eliciting her waiver of those rights, or informing her of the penal consequences of the stipulation. The trial court’s acceptance of an unwarned stipulation to the truth of such a prior conviction allegation violated In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857 (Yurko) and, under the totality of the circumstances here, requires that the stipulation be set aside.

Over a six-week period in the fall of 2013, defendant Richard Somerville committed a series of robberies and attempted robberies in which he displayed a revolver and took cash, cell phones, and personal possessions from more than a dozen individuals. He discharged his revolver more than once, and one victim suffered a significant injury when a bullet struck his mouth.

Defendant and appellant Oscar Lee Snow appeals from his conviction after pleading guilty to grand theft and recording a fraudulent instrument, for which he received a sentence of two years eight months. We affirm.

Appellant Harry Smith cut M.A’s neck with a knife, causing a serious injury. During his jury trial on attempted murder and assault charges, appellant testified that the injury was inflicted accidentally and was justified in any event because he was trying to prevent M.A. from pimping out a teenage girl. A jury acquitted appellant of attempted murder and the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter, but convicted him of assault with a deadly weapon with an enhancement for the personal infliction of great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, §§ 187/664, 245, subd. (a)(1), 12022.7, subd. (a).) The court sentenced appellant to prison for 16 years after the jury returned true findings on prior conviction and prior prison term allegations in a bifurcated trial. (§ 667, subd. (a), 667.5, subd. (b), 1170.12.)