CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Mark Robert Smith appeals from an order denying his petition for a certificate of rehabilitation (Pen. Code, § 4852.01 et seq.) in connection with his 1997 conviction for committing a lewd and lascivious act on a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a)).
Defendant contends his statutory ineligibility for a certificate of rehabilitation denies him equal protection of the law. We find no equal protection violation and thus affirm the order of the trial court.

After the trial court revoked defendant Jeffrey Miguel Ruano’s probation, it placed into execution a previously imposed prison sentence of 16 years 8 months that had been the subject of a plea bargain. On appeal, defendant contends the court violated his plea bargain by placing the previously imposed prison sentence into execution after revoking his probation. He claims that the terms of his plea provided that his prison sentence would be permanently stayed if he completed a residential drug treatment program, irrespective of whether he complied with the other terms of his probation. He also urges that he is entitled to additional custody and conduct credits.
We agree that defendant is entitled to one extra day of custody credit and an extra 528 days of conduct credits. In all other respects, we shall affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant John Sterling Payton was charged by amended felony complaint with murder. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a), count 1.) The complaint also alleged that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury and death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), and that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (c). Additionally, the complaint alleged that defendant had served three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) and that he intentionally killed the victim for the purpose of preventing his testimony in a criminal proceeding (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(10)). Defendant entered a plea agreement and pled no contest to count 1 and admitted the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm allegation. Defense counsel stated for the record that he did not concur in the plea. However, along with the prosecutor, he stipulated that the police reports contained a factual basis for the plea.

A jury convicted Jessie Willard Jones of first degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 221; count 1), residential burglary (§§ 459, 460; count 2), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 3), assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 4), assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count 5), and false imprisonment (§§ 236, 237, subd. (a); count 7). The jury found true a special allegation that Jones personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon—a firearm—to commit the robbery, residential burglary, assault with a firearm, and false imprisonment. (§ 12022.5, subd. (a).) In a bifurcated bench trial, the court found true allegations that Jones served four prior prison terms (§§ 667.5, subd. (b), 668), that Jones was convicted of a serious felony (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 1192.7, subd. (c)), and he was convicted of a serious or violent felony within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.

Antwan Irby appeals from the judgment entered after his jury conviction of 14 counts of vandalism. Appellant’s appointed counsel filed a brief under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, and appellant filed no response to our letter. After examining the record, we invited the parties to brief the issue whether count 8 is supported by evidence, and they agreed it is not. We reverse appellant’s conviction on that count and affirm the judgment in all other respects.

The underlying offenses in this case occurred in 2006. A jury convicted appellant, Steven Gilbert Hernandez of three counts of assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2)); two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)); one count of discharge of a firearm at an inhabited vehicle (§ 246) and one count of burglary (§ 459). Also, found true were five prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and five prior serious/violent felony prior convictions (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)). Hernandez was sentenced to a total term of 190 years to life.
In July 2010, this Court affirmed the convictions but remanded the case for resentencing. (People v. Hernandez (July 19, 2010, D055334) [nonpub. opn.].) On remand, Hernandez was sentenced to a total term of 100 years to life, consecutive to a 15-year determinate term.

Martha Reyes’s car was stolen in the early morning hours on March 17, 2015. Law enforcement located the car a short time later and defendant David Hernandez, who was walking in the general area where the car was found, was arrested. Prior to his arrest, defendant provided Kern County Sheriff’s Deputy John McAdoo with a false name and birthdate.
Defendant was charged by amended information with violating Penal Code section 666.5 (prior conviction enhancement) (count 1); Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) (taking or driving stolen vehicle) (count 2); section 496d, subdivision (a) (receiving or possessing stolen vehicle) (count 3); and section 148.9, subdivision (a) (false representation or identification to peace officer) (count 4). The trial court bifurcated count 1; and the jury acquitted defendant of felony counts 2 and 3, and convicted him of count 4, a misdemeanor. The court denied probation, sentenced defendant to 90 days in county jail and imposed a $570 fee.

On November 7, 2011, a complaint charged defendant and appellant Jesse Marcelino Garcia with threatening a witness under Penal Code section 140, subdivision (a), a felony (count 1); making criminal threats under section 422, a serious felony (count 2); and misdemeanor cruelty to a child by inflicting injury under section 273a, subdivision (b) (count 3). The complaint also alleged that, as to counts 1 and 2, defendant suffered prior serious or violent felony convictions under section 1170, subdivision (h)(3); and suffered a prior conviction of a serious or violent felony or juvenile adjudication pursuant to sections 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d), and 667, subdivisions (b) through (i).

Following a suitability hearing under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, enacted by the voters as Proposition 36 (Pen. Code, § 1170.126), the trial court determined that the defendant, Larry Lee Cramer, posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety and denied his petition for resentencing. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to apply the narrower definition of “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” found in the more recently enacted Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act of 2014 (§ 1170.18). He also argues that, even if the Proposition 47 definition does not apply, the trial court’s unreasonable risk determination was an abuse of discretion. We disagree and affirm the order denying the petition.

This is an appeal pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We briefly recount the facts and proceedings in accordance with People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 123-124.
On March 23, 2016, defendant Richard Allen Cochran pleaded guilty to felony domestic violence (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)), violating a domestic relations court order (Pen. Code, § 273.6, subd. (a)), battery (Pen. Code, § 242), and petty theft (Pen. Code, § 484, subd. (a)). In exchange for defendant’s plea, the People agreed defendant would receive probation.

Defendant Michael Ray Babineaux appeals following his conviction for multiple offenses related to two robberies. He contends: (1) there was not substantial evidence to support one of his convictions for receiving stolen property; (2) his two felony convictions for receiving stolen property (counts thirteen and fourteen) must be reduced to misdemeanors as there was no evidence the value of the stolen property exceeded $950; (3) the imposition of three one-year enhancements for a single prior prison term enhancement was an unauthorized sentence; and (4) the restitution and parole revocation fines must be reduced from $280 to $240. The People properly concede that the receiving stolen property convictions must be reduced to misdemeanors and that the restitution and parole revocation fines must be reduced to $240. We will order counts thirteen and fourteen reduced to misdemeanors and order the trial court to correct the restitution and parole revocation fines. The matter is remanded t

Mother appeals from orders of the juvenile dependency court denying her petition for modification and terminating her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 395, subd. (a)(1).) The subjects of the appeal are two children, J.P., born in 2010, and E.M., born in 2014.
Mother has not shown changed circumstances supporting the children’s best interests. We affirm the dependency court’s orders.

Plaintiff Millenium Properties, Inc., is an investment firm that purchases options on residential properties for purposes of profiting from the resale of the properties. Gregory Falvo is plaintiff’s majority owner and sole officer and director, and is also a licensed real estate agent. Defendant Robert Earl Daniel Rose signed an agreement with plaintiff giving plaintiff an option to purchase defendant’s home for $777,777. Mr. Falvo and defendant also signed a “residential listing agreement” so that plaintiff could “provide additional exposure for the property” if plaintiff chose to do so.
When plaintiff obtained a purchase offer from a third party for $875,000, plaintiff sought to exercise its option, but defendant refused. Plaintiff sued defendant for breach of the option contract. At the court trial, defendant took the position that he did not understand what he had signed; he thought he was signing a “multiple listing”; the option agreement was “hidden amon

After an administrative hearing, the Board for Professional Engineers, Land Surveyors, and Geologists (the Board) took disciplinary action against Thomas H. Lutge, a civil and structural engineer. Lutge filed a petition for administrative mandamus to challenge the Board’s action, but the petition was filed late because Lutge’s lawyer mistakenly believed it was due in 120 days rather than 30 days. The trial court sustained the Board’s demurrer without leave to amend and entered judgment for the Board.
Lutge now contends (1) the 30-day limitation period of Government Code section 11523 is unconstitutionally short, and (2) his constitutional contention raises factual issues that could not be decided on demurrer. Finding no merit in defendant’s contentions, we will affirm the judgment.