CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Michael Scott Shore seeks to set aside a judgment confirming an arbitration award issued by Judge Aviva K. Bobb (Ret.) on the ground that Judge Bobb failed to disclose she and Respondents’ attorney, Marc L. Sallus, were members of the Los Angeles Lawyers Philharmonic Group together. We affirm the judgment.

Following an adjudication hearing, the juvenile court made true findings on a petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The court found that Jeffrey G. (the Minor) unlawfully resisted arrest (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)) and unlawfully disturbed a public school (Ed. Code, § 32210). The Minor was placed on probation.
The Minor appeals contending first there was insufficient evidence to support the true finding on the Education Code violation. His second argument is that the police officer did not have probable cause to arrest the Minor for such violation and therefore he could not have resisted arrest. Following our review of the record, we are satisfied there is substantial evidence to support the true finding that the Minor unlawfully disturbed a public school. We also are satisfied the police officer had probable cause to arrest the Minor and thus his actions in resisting arrest constitute a violation of Penal Code section 148. We will affirm the ju

In February 2009, a jury found defendant Jonathan Hampton guilty of second degree murder, (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189) and the conviction was upheld on appeal. Following the denial of his state and federal habeas corpus petitions, defendant filed a new habeas corpus petition in state court, arguing for the first time that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request an instruction on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter (CALCRIM No. 570) as a lesser included offense to murder. The trial court requested further briefing on several issues, including whether the trial judge had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 570, and the standard of prejudice that should be applied to an erroneous failure to instruct on a lesser included offense. Following the parties’ submissions, the trial court granted defendant’s habeas corpus petition, concluding the trial judge erred in failing to sua sponte instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 570, and the error

Appellants El-Hani Services, Inc. and its owner, Rafik El-Hani (together, El-Hani) licensed and operated certain delivery routes from respondent FedEx Ground Package System, Inc. (FedEx). El-Hani alleges that at a meeting with FedEx managers in 2008, he was told that his contract would be terminated unless he transferred his routes to one of his drivers, and that FedEx orally guaranteed payment for the routes. After FedEx and the driver failed to pay El-Hani, he brought breach of contract and related claims against them both. FedEx moved for summary judgment and the trial court granted the motion, finding that the breach of contract claim was barred by the statute of frauds and was based on an alleged promise too uncertain to be enforceable. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

After acquiring the litigation claims of a former biotech company called MicroIslet, Inc. (MicroIslet), Diabetes Research Restitution, LLC (DRR) sued several individuals who were formerly associated with MicroIslet. In its operative complaint, DRR alleged a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against a group of former MicroIslet directors and officers and a claim for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty against several of the company's former creditors. Both claims were based on allegations that the officers and directors pursued a wrongful takeover scheme, eschewing available equity financing in favor of onerous debt financing that would result in a recapitalization plan giving the debt holders control of MicroIslet.

Cross-complainant Kathleen Leonard appeals from a judgment entered in favor of cross-defendant Retailer’s Credit Association (RCA) after the trial court granted RCA’s special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute (strategic lawsuits against public participation). On appeal, Leonard contends the trial court erred in granting the motion, because it was not filed within 60 days of the filing of the operative first amended cross-complaint (FACC). Leonard also argues the motion should not have been granted because RCA cannot establish that her causes of action arise from protected activity, and Leonard can show a probability of success on the merits. Finally, Leonard argues that the trial court erred in denying her request for attorney’s fees and costs. Finding no error, we affirm.

Eric Burgers appeals from a judgment in favor of Vincent Cardenas and his son, Christopher Anthony Cardenas (collectively referred to in the singular as Cardenas). Burgers contends the trial court erred in admitting and excluding certain evidence, refusing to modify Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instruction (CACI) No. 3903J, allowing a credit against the verdict for the amount paid by Cardenas’s insurer in response to a subrogation demand, and awarding costs to Cardenas. We conclude no error occurred and affirm the judgment.
Burgers requested this court take judicial notice of “[t]he California State Judicial Council Record of its business meeting held on December 11, 2015” and “[t]he new and revised California Judicial Council Jury Instruction 3903J relating to ‘property damage’ and the measure of such damages.” We deny the motion because these documents were not before the trial court. (See Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4

The Los Angeles Police Department’s (LAPD) Board of Rights found tenured LAPD Officer Marques Brown guilty of misconduct, and the chief of police terminated Brown. Brown petitioned the trial court for a writ of administrative mandate to set aside the Board’s decision. The trial court denied the writ. Brown appeals, arguing that insufficient evidence supported the Board’s decision. We affirm because Brown failed to furnish this court with the administrative record and has thus forfeited his claims of error on appeal.

Anthony Aulisio, Jr., appeals from the entry of judgment after a bench trial in which the trial court found in favor of Bill Bancroft and BLB Enterprises, doing business as Patrol One (Patrol One), on their malicious prosecution claim against Aulisio. In an underlying lawsuit, Aulisio sued Bancroft and Patrol One for conversion and related claims after the Jeep vehicle he owned through a revocable living trust was towed from outside his home in a condominium complex. A Patrol One employee wrote the parking ticket that resulted in the Jeep being towed for lack of current vehicle registration required by the homeowners’ association (HOA) parking rules. In the underlying lawsuit, Aulisio presented a police report and the testimony of a police officer who confirmed with the tow yard where Aulisio’s Jeep was taken that a moving permit was visible through the Jeep’s windshield on its dashboard. California law authorizes one-day moving permits issued by the Department of Motor Vehic

Appellant James Eugene Parker appeals from an order denying his petition to recall his sentence and for resentencing under Proposition 47, The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act. (Pen. Code, § 1170.18.) The order is affirmed.

Appointed counsel for defendant Tyrell Lamont Williams has filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.

Junior Valdez and Jaime Arturo Estrada appeal from judgments and sentences following their convictions for three counts of residential burglary. They contend the evidence was insufficient to support either their convictions or the jury’s finding that the offenses were gang related. Valdez separately contends that the gang expert impermissibly relied on testimonial hearsay, that the trial court abused its discretion in precluding him from presenting evidence to impeach the gang expert, and that there was instructional error. Finally, Valdez contends the trial court was unaware it lacked discretion to strike two of the gang enhancements. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the convictions of both appellants and as to Valdez, remand for resentencing.

Ernest Voight appeals from a judgment holding him liable, on a theory of quantum meruit, for the value of attorney services rendered to him by Andrew M. Stein and Jerry L. Steering.
Voight argues the trial court erred because (1) Stein and Steering’s retainer agreement is void as no fully executed copy was ever provided to him; (2) the attorneys’ billing records are inadequate to support the time they claim to have spent on his behalf, and at least one entry is fraudulent; (3) Stein and Steering abandoned him and the court’s Statement of Decision mischaracterizes the termination of the attorney-client relationship; (4) the retainer agreement did not authorize Stein and Steering to condition their representation of him on obtaining a continuance of his scheduled trial; and (5) Stein and Steering spent a portion of the funds he entrusted to them on unauthorized expenses. Voight also claims the trial court erred in its pretrial discovery rulings and by refusing to allow him to in

Appellant Paula Skerston’s current foray into the legal system began when she filed a complaint against “Law Office of Robert Newman, a Suspended Corporation” on February 19, 2015. This complaint accused respondent Robert Newman of false light invasion of privacy and infliction of emotional distress for replying to a review Skerston had posted on Yelp by stating, “In 2007, I obtained a restraining order for a client against Paula Skerston, who is an attorney: Ms. Skerston appealed the trial court’s ruling issuing a restraining order against her. Ms. Skerston lost the appeal. Read one of the court’s related rulings here,” followed by a link to a ruling. The link was to this court’s ruling of February 24, 2012. The complaint alleges, at length, that the 2007 restraining order was obtained by false statements.