CA Unpub Decisions

Mayra E. Aldrete appeals from an order determining title to a share of real property under Probate Code section 850. The court concluded that the disputed share was an asset of Victoria Lucero’s estate based on a 2002 deed from Filogonio Lucero to Andrew Hermosillo and a subsequent quitclaim from Andrew to Victoria’s estate in 2020. Mayra argues that reliance on the 2002 deed and the subsequent quitclaim at trial was a material variance from the allegations of Lucero Hermosillo’s petition, requiring reversal. According to Mayra, the petition alleged that Victoria’s estate owned the disputed share based exclusively on a “1999 Agreement”—a claim Mayra argues is barred by the statute of frauds. Even if the court could properly consider the 2002 deed, Mayra contends that the deed from Filogonio to Andrew was ineffective because it does not sufficiently describe the property to be transferred. Lastly, Mayra asserts there is no evidence of a quitclaim by Andrew to Victoria’s

This appeal arises from the trial court’s order granting the renewed motion of respondents Ninus Malan and American Lending and Holdings, LLC (American Lending) to disqualify Douglas Jaffe as counsel for appellants Marvin, Matthew, and Sarah Razuki; Sunrise Property Investments, LLC; Super 5 Consulting Group, LLC; Goldn Bloom Ventures, Inc.; and Alternative Health Cooperative, Inc. (together, Appellants).
This is one of several lawsuits involving former business partners Malan and Salam Razuki. In this one, Razuki sued Malan over disputes arising from a complex real estate investment partnership. Malan and several business entities, including American Lending, filed a cross-complaint against Razuki and several of his relatives and affiliated entities, including Appellants.

A lender sued to foreclose on a property over which Wafa Katto and Ninus Malan disputed each other’s ownership interest and entitlement to collect rents. Katto and Malan filed cross-complaints against each other seeking (among other things) to quiet title and obtain an accounting of the other’s finances. Malan moved to disqualify Katto’s trial counsel, Douglas Jaffe, on the basis Jaffe had previously represented Malan (individually and through a company Malan claimed to own) in several prior lawsuits and acquired confidential information about Malan’s finances and litigation philosophy. The trial court granted Malan’s motion.
Katto contends the trial court erred by granting Malan’s disqualification motion because there is not a substantial relationship between the matters in which Jaffe previously represented Malan and the present action. We disagree.

This dispute arises from a development and license agreement between Viasat, Inc. and Acacia Communications, Inc. that initially led to a productive business relationship, but ultimately led to litigation and these appeals. Viasat agreed to provide one intellectual property (IP) component for Acacia’s communication products, and to license another, in exchange for a fixed fee and royalties on the licensed component (the Agreement). The parties also agreed to protect each other’s confidential information, and to cap Agreement-related damages of either party to the aggregate amount paid by Acacia under the Agreement (except for confidentiality breaches). Acacia developed, sold, and paid royalties on two products, Everest and K2, ultimately paying Viasat a total of $12.8 million. Acacia then developed and sold three later-generation products that were backwards compatible with Everest, but did not pay royalties on them.

Mother appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights and freeing the minor A.H. for adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) She contends the juvenile court erred in: (1) failing to conduct the assessment required by In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.), and (2) failing to make any findings on the applicability of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). We disagree for the reasons explained herein and will affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

Defendant Aaron Robert Pennell appeals the trial court’s denial of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (CDCR) recommendation to consider recalling defendant’s sentence and resentencing him. Agreeing with the parties that recent statutory changes warrant reconsideration, we reverse and remand.

C.D. (mother) and I.D. (father), parents of the minor, appeal from the juvenile court’s disposition order removing the minor from their custody and placing the minor outside the home. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 300, 395.) Finding no merit in mother and father’s contentions, we will affirm the juvenile court’s order.

Defendant Adam Cornejo appeals from the trial court’s order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. Defendant argues he was convicted of murder and attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine based on the language in the trial court’s jury instruction on implied malice and was thus eligible for relief under the statute. In supplemental briefing, defendant further contends that the passage of Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 775) requires reversal and remand for a hearing on whether he stated a prima facie case under amended section 1170.95, subdivision (c). We will affirm the trial court’s order.

Defendant Garrison J. Nichols pled no contest to one count of committing a lewd or lascivious act on a child under 14. The trial court denied probation and sentenced defendant to the upper term of eight years in state prison. On appeal, defendant asserted the court abused its discretion in denying his request for probation and sentencing him to the upper term.
We previously filed an opinion addressing and rejecting defendant’s contentions and affirming the judgment. Subsequently, the California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the matter back to us with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in light of Penal Code sections 1170 and 1170.1, as amended by Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3) (Senate Bill 567). (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.528(d).) We vacated our decision and both parties filed supplemental briefs following the transfer. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(b).)

Defendant Darin Gavin Best, represented by retained counsel, Mandeep Sidhu, pleaded no contest to robbery in the second degree and grand theft for a stipulated sentence of five years eight months. Defendant failed to appear for sentencing. After numerous continuances, a civil attorney appeared seeking to substitute in as counsel and to move to withdraw defendant’s plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied substitution but granted another continuance. At the next appearance, Sidhu stated defendant wanted to move to withdraw his plea based on Sidhu’s ineffective assistance of counsel. The court questioned defendant personally about the grounds for the motion to withdraw the plea. The trial court ultimately denied defendant’s request to substitute counsel and imposed the stipulated sentence.

Plaintiff Ottist Flournoy filed a putative class action against his former employer, defendant CJS Solutions Group, LLC, doing business as The HCI Group (HCI), alleging numerous wage and hour claims. While the lawsuit was pending, HCI offered plaintiff a new position of employment, which plaintiff accepted. As part of the hiring process, plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement, which purported to refer all past, present, and future individual claims to arbitration, and waived his right to have any dispute heard or arbitrated on a class basis.
HCI then filed a motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff’s individual claims and to strike his class claims pursuant to the class action waiver. The trial court granted HCI’s petition to compel plaintiff’s individual claims to arbitration but found the class action waiver was unenforceable and thus declined to strike the class action claims.

On Christmas Day, defendant Esteban Anthony Campos beat his girlfriend. The next day defendant beat his girlfriend again, trapped her in the garage of their home, and threatened her life. On the first offense, a jury found defendant guilty of false imprisonment by violence (Pen. Code, § 236 – count 2) and misdemeanor simple assault (§ 240), as a lesser included offense of corporal injury to a dating partner (§ 273.5 – count 1). On the second offense, a jury found defendant guilty of one count of corporal injury to a dating partner (§ 273.5 – count 3), making criminal threats (§ 422 – count 5), and false imprisonment by violence (§ 236 – count 6). On count 1, the jury found defendant guilty of several lesser offenses, which we will discuss further below. The trial court entered a verdict and subsequently imposed a sentence only on the simple assault conviction for count 1.

The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant City of Auburn on a complaint by plaintiff Connie Fishbaugh for employment discrimination and retaliation and failure to correct discrimination. Fishbaugh is transgender. Fishbaugh, a former law enforcement officer in Florida, applied for a reserve officer position with the Auburn Police Department (the Department). Fishbaugh alleged that she was encouraged to apply, but when she disclosed her gender identity, the attitude towards her turned negative, leading her to be disqualified from consideration.
We will affirm the judgment.

Defendant Kevin Frank Lemmon appeals from the trial court’s order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. Defendant contends the trial court incorrectly weighed the facts using the wrong legal standard when it denied his petition at the prima facie stage and asserts his eligibility for resentencing was not precluded by the jury’s robbery-murder and burglary-murder special circumstance findings from his trial. We will affirm the trial court’s order.