CA Unpub Decisions

Deanna Jackson filed a timely notice of appeal challenging the validity of her admissions of probation violations in case Nos. BA259013 and BA280723, and her sentence or other matters occurring after the plea. She requested a certificate of probable cause on the ground that there were extenuating circumstances in her probation violations and so the sentence imposed by the court was too harsh; she asked that her probation be reinstated. The trial court denied the request.

David Scott Harrison appeals from postjudgment orders denying his motions to unseal and obtain unredacted copies of court records. He contends the court's orders violate the California Public Records Act (Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq.) and rules 2.550-2.551 of the California Rules of Court. We conclude these authorities do not apply to the records Harrison seeks and Harrison has not otherwise established the court erred in denying his motions. We, therefore, affirm the orders.

A jury found defendant Hilario Larry Guevara guilty of felony false imprisonment (Pen. Code, § 236; unless otherwise set forth, statutory references that follow are to the Penal Code) and misdemeanor resisting arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). Prior to sentencing, defendant made a Marsden motion (People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118) seeking substitute counsel to file a motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the motion and defendant appeals this ruling. We affirm.

In his third appeal related to a 15-year-old judgment for multiple counts of grand theft and perjury by declaration, Demetrius Eugene challenges the trial court’s restitution order. Following a review of the record Eugene’s appointed counsel identified no meritorious issues; our own independent review of the record and analysis of the contentions presented by Eugene in two lengthy supplemental briefs similarly identified no error. We affirm.

During an argument with the woman that he was dating at the time, defendant Alvin Davis punched her in the mouth about five times, loosening her teeth and splitting both her lips.
Defendant was charged with domestic violence (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)) with a prior conviction for domestic violence (id., subd. (f)(1)). In his first trial, the jury was unable to reach a verdict. In his second trial, the jury found him guilty as charged. He was sentenced to five years in prison, along with the usual fines, fees, and miscellaneous sentencing orders.

Defendant Maria Cuadra pleaded guilty to one count of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury after she threw a vase at a salon manager during a dispute over payment for a manicure. The trial court suspended imposition of the sentence and placed Cuadra on probation for three years. On appeal, she contends that the court erred by requiring her to pay two probation-related fees before her ability to pay was evaluated as required under section 1203.1b. We disagree and affirm.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Cuadra to pay, “but not as a condition of probation,” certain fees and assessments, including “$150 for preparation of a presentence report” and “[u]p to $50 per month for probation supervision.” Cuadra’s counsel below objected to both of these fees, stating that Cuadra was “the mother of two children” and had “no ability to pay.” The prosecutor offered that it was possible for the probation department to set up a payme

Armando Cruz appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court convicted him of inflicting corporal injury on an ex-girlfriend resulting in a traumatic condition (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)), assault with a stun gun or Taser (§ 244.5, subd. (b)), threatening a witness (§ 140, subd. (a)), and use of a stun gun by a felon (§ 22610, subd. (a)). In a bifurcated proceeding, appellant admitted a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (c)(1) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subds. (a)(1) & (c)(1)) and a prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Appellant was sentenced to seven years state prison and ordered to pay victim restitution (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)), a $1,050 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), a $1,050 parole restitution fine (§ 1202.45), a $120 court security fee (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)), and a $90 criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373).

Defendant and appellant Enrique Alejandro Barrera Colato (defendant) appeals from the judgment entered after he pled no contest to possession of marijuana for sale. Defendant makes several contentions relating to his right to counsel and his right to the effective assistance of counsel. He contends: that the trial court failed to conduct an inquiry required under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden); that the trial court improperly heard defendant’s pro. per. motion to withdraw his plea while he was represented by counsel; that defense counsel had a conflict of interest; and that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move to withdraw his no contest plea. We find no merit to any of defendant’s contentions, and thus affirm the judgment.

Appellant Lidelfonso Chaidez (also known as Lidelfonso Avendano) appeals from a judgment of conviction following a plea of no contest to charges of conspiracy to commit possession of cocaine for sale (count 1), and possession of over $100,000 in monetary proceeds from the sale of narcotics (count 2). The appeal, filed pursuant to Penal Code section 1237.5, challenges the constitutionality of the Hobbs procedure for sealing affidavits of probable cause for search warrants, as well as the denials of various pretrial motions. We find no basis for reversal, and affirm.

Lucero Carrera was charged with first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189; count 1; all further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated) and assault causing the death of a child (§ 273ab, subd.(a); count 2) in connection with the death of her two-month-old daughter, Kimberly.
Carrera entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. A jury found Carrera guilty of both charges and legally sane during the commission of the crimes. The court imposed indeterminate terms of 25 years to life on both counts, but stayed sentence on count 2 under section 654.

After serving time in prison for sex offenses against a child under the age of 14, defendant and appellant Gregory Cantrell was released on parole subject to various conditions, including that he not enter or loiter within 250 feet of the perimeter of places where children congregate, such as a daycare center. He was found to have violated that condition when he attended bible study at a church having a daycare center. Cantrell appeals, contending, among other things, that this and other parole conditions are unconstitutionally overbroad and vague and that his procedural due process rights were violated because he did not receive a timely arraignment and probable cause hearing. Although we reject his contentions, we modify some parole conditions. We affirm the order as modified.

This postconviction and sentencing appeal by Defendant Anthony Arron Allen concerns an in camera review of documents conducted by the trial court in conjunction with a Pitchess motion made by defendant pursuant to Evidence Code section 1043. Defendant requests that we independently review the documents reviewed by the trial court to determine whether it properly determined there was no disclosable information. Our independent review reveals no error, and we affirm the judgment.

After defendant and appellant, R.D. (Minor), successfully completed his program of supervision, the juvenile court dismissed the juvenile delinquency petition and ordered his records sealed. Minor’s counsel requested the court to additionally seal Minor’s middle school records. The court denied the request. On appeal, Minor contends the court erred in refusing to seal his middle school records. We affirm.

X.M. (mother) and S.G. (father) appeal from the judgment terminating their parental rights over their son, M.G. They contend the trial court erred by determining the parental benefit exception (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) did not apply, and argue the court should have chosen a plan less invasive of their rights than adoption. We affirm.