CA Unpub Decisions

Tolbert attacked a woman, who had stopped working for him as a prostitute, and took her cell phone. He was charged in an amended information with one count each of pimping (Pen. Code, § 266h, subd. (a)), second degree robbery (id., § 211) and human trafficking (id., § 236.1, subd. (a)).
After the trial court granted Tolbert’s motion to dismiss the human trafficking count, Tolbert pleaded no contest to the remaining counts of pimping and robbery. As part of the negotiated plea, the prosecutor agreed not to file weapons charges arising from an incident that had occurred while Tolbert had been released on bail.

Defendant Daniel Sean O’Grady pleaded guilty to felony possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; count 1), misdemeanor possession of controlled substance paraphernalia (former Health & Saf. Code, § 11364.1, subdivision (a), now Health & Saf. Code § 11364, subd. (a); count 2), and misdemeanor possession of a designated controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11375, subd. (b)(2); count 3). Defendant also admitted three prior convictions for violations of Health & Safety Code section 11378, and one prior conviction for violation of Health & Safety Code section 11379, subdivision (a), resulting in true findings on enhancement allegations under Health & Safety Code section 11370.2, subdivision (c), and three prison prior enhancements under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b).

Defendant Joe Hernandez Navarette committed a series of armed robberies at various stores and restaurants in Salinas. A jury found him guilty on eight counts of second degree robbery and two counts of assault with a firearm. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 245, subd. (a)(2).) The jury also found Navarette personally used a firearm in the commission of each offense. He admitted two prior prison terms and a prior strike conviction. The trial court imposed a total term of 51 years in prison.
Navarette raises four claims on appeal. First, he contends the evidence was insufficient to support the two convictions for assault with a firearm. Second, he contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on brandishing a firearm as a lesser included offense of assault with a firearm. We find these claims without merit.

It is undisputed that defendant and appellant Jose Luis Munoz (defendant) shot and killed Willie Thornton (Thornton) early one morning outside defendant’s home. The issue at trial was why. Defendant presented evidence he killed Thornton in order to protect his mother and himself. A jury found otherwise and convicted defendant of first degree murder. We consider whether reversal is warranted because, among other alleged errors, the trial court abused its discretion in excluding expert testimony on “fight or flight” syndrome and the trial court gave no instruction on whether and how the jury could consider “antecedent threats” that defendant claimed influenced his decision to kill Thornton.

Defendant Joshua Daniel Mills appeals from the trial court’s order denying his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.126 on the ground that resentencing him posed an unreasonable danger to public safety. He contends the trial court applied an incorrect definition of the term “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety,” he had a constitutional right to a jury trial and the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard on the dangerousness determination, and, in the alternative, he had a right to a clear and convincing standard of proof on the dangerousness determination. We shall affirm.

On May 6, 2016, the trial court, after a two-day evidentiary hearing, denied appellant’s motion to dismiss the charges against him for violation of his speedy trial rights. On June 20, 2016, while awaiting a jury panel to begin jury selection in front of a different court, appellant pleaded no contest to three counts of attempted murder and various gun enhancements for an agreed-upon disposition of 34 years, 8 months. At his sentencing on August 30, 2016, appellant unsuccessfully sought to relieve his court-appointed counsel and, for the first time, indicated he wanted to appeal the adverse ruling on his speedy trial motion. The prosecutor did not formally object and the trial court, before it sentenced appellant, indicated it would sign the required certificate of probable cause. Appellant challenges the denial of his speedy trial motion in this appeal.

Defendant Andres L. Luna appeals an order denying his second petition to reduce his 2004 felony conviction for receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)) to a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47 (§ 1170.18, subd. (f)). The trial court denied defendant’s first petition on the erroneous basis that defendant was ineligible for relief due to his later conviction for vehicular manslaughter under section 192, subdivision (c)(1). We affirmed the trial court’s order without prejudice to defendant submitting a new petition on the alternative ground that defendant failed to allege or provide any evidence that the value of the stolen property did not exceed $950, as required to establish eligibility under section 1170.18.

INTRODUCTION
Defendant Chad Christopher Leonard brutally punched, stabbed, choked, and threatened to kill his former girlfriend, Jane Doe (Doe). Several neighbors and defendant’s father intervened, saving Doe’s life. During the struggle, one of the neighbors, Steven, was stabbed five times.
Defendant appeals from judgment entered following jury convictions for attempted murder of Doe (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 188 ; count 1); infliction of corporal injury upon Doe (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 2); assault with a deadly weapon upon Steven (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 3); mayhem (§ 203; count 4); criminal threats (§ 422; count 5); and assault with a deadly weapon upon Doe (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 6).

Benny Hernandez was sleeping on the sidewalk when he was struck repeatedly with a metal pipe by a man he knew as “Nick.” Hernandez suffered lacerations to his head and pain in his upper torso and was transported to the hospital. Based on Hernandez’s description, police officers detained Keo in a nearby parking lot, where they also recovered a metal pipe.
After Keo was taken into custody, he was advised of his rights to remain silent, to the presence of an attorney and, if indigent, to appointed counsel (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694]). Keo agreed to be interviewed and told the officers he had beaten up Hernandez using the metal pipe found by police. At a field show-up at the hospital, Keo told Hernandez he was sorry and would make it up to him.
Keo testified at trial that he had acted in self-defense and did not understand what he was supposed to do when the officers asked him questions.

A jury convicted Renan Roman Haro of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a) ), and found that he personally discharged a firearm that caused death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). Haro admitted to a prior serious felony conviction that qualified as a strike (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (b)-(j), 1170.12, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced him to prison for a term of 80 years to life.
On appeal, Haro claims that three statements the prosecutor made in closing argument constituted prejudicial misconduct and that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object to the prosecutor’s comments. Haro makes an additional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on his attorney’s failure to request a limiting instruction on evidence of uncharged misbehavior by Haro that was introduced at trial. Haro’s claims lack merit. Therefore, we affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Rafael German (defendant) appeals from his conviction of second degree murder. He contends that substantial evidence did not support a finding of implied malice, and that the cause of the victim’s death was an unforeseeable intervening act. As we find no merit to either contention, we affirm the judgment.

In 1986, defendant Hildebrandt Flowers suffered a judgment of conviction following his entry of a guilty plea. Nearly two decades later, Flowers filed a motion to vacate the judgment and withdraw his plea on the ground the trial court failed to advise him of the immigration consequences of his plea, as required by Penal Code section 1016.5. The court denied his motion. We affirm.

This case turns on whether Deputy Gilbert Lozano detained Matthew Ellis or knew he was on parole before Ellis dropped a knife that ultimately led to his conviction for carrying a concealed dirk or dagger. The trial court concluded Deputy Lozano and Ellis engaged in a consensual encounter before Ellis dropped the knife “simultaneously” with his admission he was on parole. We conclude that Deputy Lozano detained Ellis without reasonable suspicion, and did not have advance knowledge Ellis was on parole, before Ellis dropped the knife. Therefore, because law enforcement obtained the knife as a result of an illegal detention, we reverse the judgment and remand to the trial court with directions to grant Ellis’s motion to suppress evidence of the knife.

Defendant John Digrazia pleaded guilty to resisting an executive officer in violation of Penal Code section 68, resisting an officer in violation of section 148, subdivision (a)(1), and disturbing the peace in violation of section 415, subdivision (2). Appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), setting forth the facts of the case and requesting we review the entire record. Pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), appointed counsel identified potential issues to assist us in our independent review. We provided Digrazia 30 days to file written argument on his own behalf; he did so.
We have examined the entire record, appointed counsel’s Wende/Anders brief, and Digrazia’s supplemental brief; we have found no reasonably arguable issue. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.) We therefore affirm.