CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Steven Eric Davis was charged with a single count of pandering by procurement. (Pen. Code, § 266i, subd. (a)(1)). The case was tried, however, on the theory that Davis committed pandering by encouragement (id., subd. (a)(2)), and the trial court instructed the jury on that theory. The verdict form, which was tied to the charge and never was conformed to the proof and instructions, states that the jury found Davis guilty of pandering by procurement. Davis did not object to the variance or the verdict form.
On appeal, Davis contends the evidence was insufficient to support his pandering conviction and the trial court committed prejudicial error in declining to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted pandering. Evaluating these claims under the rubric of pandering by encouragement, we conclude that substantial evidence supports Davis’s pandering conviction and that any error in the court’s failure to instruct on attempted pandering was harmless

Norbert Manalisay Cruz appeals after a jury convicted him on two counts of sexual acts with a child 10 years of age or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (a)), four counts of oral copulation or sexual penetration of a child 10 years of age or younger (id., subd. (b)), and one count of aggravated sexual assault upon a child under the age of 14 (§ 269, subd. (a)(5)). The trial court sentenced him to a total of 125 years to life in state prison. Appellant contends the court erred in excluding evidence offered to impeach the victim. We affirm.

From the passenger seat of a moving car, defendant Raymond Carrillo fired three gunshots into the rear window of another vehicle carrying four people. No one was injured in the shooting, and defendant was subsequently convicted by jury of one count of the attempted murder of Edgar Robledo (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187, subd. (a)) (count 1) and one count of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246) (count 2). The jury found true the special allegation that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate and premeditated (§ 189), the gang enhancement attached to counts 1 and 2 (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)), and the enhancements for personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c), (count 1) and § 12022.5, subd. (a), (count 2)). The jury also found true that defendant suffered a prior conviction for violation of section 186.22, subdivision (a), a serious and/or violent felony within the meaning of the Three Strikes law. (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d).)
On cou

Dario C. (father) filed a petition for extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) challenging an order of the dependency court denying him family reunification services with his daughter Selina and setting a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. We deny the petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At the time the detention report was filed in this matter (Oct. 31, 2016), Erica G. (mother) had eight previous dependency referrals and two open cases. She had three children, the younger two (Stephen and Selina) with Father. Selina was born in October 2016, and her older brother Stephen was born in April 2015.
Prior dependency court proceeding
The day after Stephen’s birth in April 2015, allegations of general neglect and caretaker absence were substantiated. Both mother and Stephen tested positive for amphetamines. Father, who had a lengthy criminal record, was absent due to incarceration. A section 300 petition was sustained as to S

On February 26, 2015, J.L., then age 14, was charged with two felony counts of making criminal threats. (Pen. Code, § 422, subd. (a).) It was further alleged that he committed the offenses for the benefit of, at the direction of and in association with a criminal street gang and that in committing the offenses, he used a deadly weapon, a knife, causing the offenses to become serious felonies. (Pen. Code, § 1192.7, subds. (c)(28) and (c)(24).)
J.L. admitted the offenses and special allegation. The juvenile court declared J.L. to be a person described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and sustained the petition. The court declared the maximum period of confinement to be 14 years, and ordered suitable placement.
On November 1, 2016, when J.L. was age 15, the People filed a petition in juvenile court alleging a violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a), driving or taking a vehicle without the owner’s consent.

S.S. is the mother of three children—E.S., A.S., and T.S.—born in 2007, 2010, and 2012. After a second referral to CFS involving injuries to the youngest child, T.S., the children were placed with their father, D.S., who was seeking custody of the children through family law court.
Mother’s boyfriend, D.O., claimed T.S. had been injured by a neighbor’s child hitting her with a Barbie doll while mother was at work. The forensic expert’s opinion was that T.S.’s injuries resulted from physical abuse. After the six-month review hearing, the juvenile dependency court found mother had failed to benefit from services and awarded sole physical custody to father. Mother now challenges the jurisdiction and disposition orders along with the later custody orders made by the juvenile dependency court.

Appellant R.B. (mother) challenges the juvenile court’s dispositional order removing eight-year-old S.H. (the child) from her custody. Mother makes two contentions. First, she claims that the court erred in postponing until after the dispositional hearing a decision as to whether the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) applied. Second, mother asserts that, by going forward with disposition without an ICWA finding, the court impliedly and erroneously found that respondent Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services (the Department) had complied with the ICWA’s notice provisions. Mother claims that the ICWA notices sent to the tribes by the Department were inadequate because the notices did not contain the maternal grandmother’s place of birth, even though the Department had access to this information. The Department argues that mother’s contentions are moot because the juvenile court subsequently made a finding “that the [ICWA] does not apply.” The De

On October 27, 2016, the San Bernardino County District Attorney filed a petition to declare defendant and appellant K.W. (minor; a male, born March 1999) a ward of the court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §602, subd. (a).) The petition charged minor with one felony count of assault with a deadly weapon under Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1).
Also on October 27, 2016, a probation report was filed with the court. The report indicated that minor was already under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 dependency jurisdiction.
A probation report filed November 9, 2016, recommended that a Welfare and Institutions Code section 241.1 assessment, regarding the appropriateness of dual jurisdictional status, should be conducted.

When the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction over M.D. and D.D., it entered an exit order granting their mother, A.D. (mother), two hours of monitored visitation two times per month. Mother challenges that order on appeal, contending the juvenile court erred by failing to award her six hours of visitation per week. We affirm. The visitation order was well within the court’s discretion.

Mother appeals the visitation orders of the juvenile court as to her minor children, G.M., born in 2003, and N.G., born in 2006. Mother contends the trial court abused its discretion in issuing these visitation orders, as they delegate too much discretion to the minors and their legal guardians. We agree and reverse the visitation orders and remand for further proceedings on those orders.

Plaintiff Christian Gulbransen is a person with developmental disabilities and autism who has received services from Real Party in Interest Far Northern Regional Center (FNRC) since 1995. FNRC is a nonprofit corporation established pursuant to the Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act, Welfare & Institutions Code section 4500 et seq., to “provide fixed points of contact in the community for persons with developmental disabilities and their families.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 4620, subd. (a).) Gulbransen, through his father as guardian ad litem, filed a petition for peremptory writ of administrative mandate to modify and/or enforce a series of administrative decisions about the services provided to him by FNRC. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) The challenged decisions were issued by defendant Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) of the California Department of General Services, but, as an impartial quasi-judicial tribunal, it was not a participant in the writ proceedi

J.M. (father) and M.F. (mother) broke up when their son C.M. (child) was 10 months old. The mother started dating another man, A.F. (stepfather), and eventually married him.
According to the mother, she encouraged the father to visit the child. Nevertheless, over a year and a half, there were only three visits – one in which the father merely said “Hi,” one at the insistence of the mother while she went to a grocery store, and one in which the father said that he “just couldn’t be a parent right now.” When the mother asked him, however, to consent to allow the stepfather to adopt the child, he became “irate” and “threatened to take her to court.” He followed through on this threat by filing a paternity petition.
The mother and the stepfather (parents) then filed the present proceeding to free the child from the father’s custody and control based on abandonment. The mother testified at trial; the father did not. The trial court ruled that, because the fathe

A.A. (Mother) challenges the juvenile court’s order regarding her son Joshua A., terminating her reunification services and scheduling a permanent placement hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 (hereafter permanency
hearing).1 In her writ petition, Mother argues the court erred in refusing to extend
reunification services to the 18-month review date and in determining the services provided to Mother were reasonable. Finding these contentions meritless, we deny the writ petition.

Defendant and appellant Jay David Peppler (defendant) appeals from the judgment entered after he was found in violation of his probation. He contends that two of his prior convictions should not have been used to enhance his sentence, because they were eligible for reduction to misdemeanors under Proposition 47. He asks that this court declare the two prior convictions to be misdemeanors, and to modify his sentence accordingly, or in the alternative, to reverse the judgment due to ineffective assistance of counsel. As we do not have authority to grant Proposition 47 relief in the first instance, and the record on appeal does not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we affirm the judgment.