CA Unpub Decisions

S.H. (mother) appeals from the January 7, 2022 order terminating parental rights to her minor child, A.M. (minor), pursuant to section 366.26. Counsel for mother, minor, and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) have filed a joint application and stipulation seeking a conditional affirmance and remand with directions to the Department and the juvenile court to ensure compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.).
Finding that the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8), are satisfied, we accept the stipulation, conditionally affirm the order terminating parental rights, and remand to the juvenile court to permit the parties to comply with the terms of their stipulation and to determine ICWA compliance.

Archie John Rucker, Jr., appeals from an order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. His appellate counsel filed a brief asking this court to proceed under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). We affirm.

Mother and father have three children. The eldest was born in 2012, the middle in 2013, and the youngest in 2015. Since the beginning of the dependency proceedings, the children lived with their paternal grandparents. During the course of the dependency proceedings, the juvenile court concluded that it had no reason to know the children were Indian children. Mother appeals from the order granting paternal grandparents’ legal guardianship over the children.
Mother argues that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to comply with state law (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2) implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; ICWA). Specifically, mother argues that the child welfare agency should have interviewed her extended family members about Indian ancestry.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Darrell Cornelius Porter of assault to commit a felony under Penal Code section 220, subdivision (a), simple assault under section 240, and of two counts of attempting to dissuade a witness under section 136.1, subdivision (a)(2). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found the allegation that Porter had a prior serious felony conviction for carjacking under Michigan law to be true and imposed second strike sentences to three counts, plus a consecutive five-year term as a prior serious felony enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a)(1).
On appeal, Porter contends that the evidence on which the prosecution relied was insufficient to support two separate convictions for attempting to dissuade a witness under section 136.1, subdivision (a)(2). Respondent does not disagree. We reverse the first conviction under section 136.1, subdivision (a)(2) and remand for resentencing.

Defendant and appellant Mario Alvarez appeals from his conviction on 16 charges, including three counts of forcible rape of a minor. Defendant was sentenced to prison for 150 years to life. Defendant contends the court erred by admitting testimony regarding child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS) and that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to oppose the admission of such evidence on all appropriate grounds and in failing to object to testimony by one of the investigating detectives.
We affirm.

In 2003, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Caesar Duncan of second-degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder. In 2019, Duncan filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. The trial court granted Duncan relief on the murder conviction, but concluded he was ineligible for relief as a matter of law on the conspiracy to commit murder conviction. On appeal, Duncan contends the trial court erred by denying him relief on the conspiracy to commit murder conviction, arguing the jury could have convicted him under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. We are not persuaded. On its face, section 1170.95 does not apply to convictions for conspiracy to commit murder. Moreover, Duncan’s conspiracy to commit murder conviction required a finding by the jury that he harbored the intent to kill, making him ineligible for relief under the statute. The order denying him relief on the conspiracy to commit murder conviction is therefore affirmed.

Appellant Dana Urick served as the trustee of her late mother’s trust. The trust agreement provided that, for a set period of time, Dana, her brother Willis, and her son Trentyn, would each receive annual interest payments from the trust, after which the remaining principal would be distributed to Phillips Academy Andover (Phillips Academy). The trust also contained a no contest clause. Dana subsequently petitioned to reform the trust to eliminate Willis and potentially Phillips Academy as beneficiaries. This reformation petition was drafted and filed by respondent attorney Kira Masteller of respondent Lewitt, Hackman, Shapiro, Marshall & Harlan (collectively, Lewitt Hackman) in 2016.
Willis contested the reformation petition and claimed Dana had triggered the no contest clause by filing it without probable cause. Dana retained new counsel in 2016 to defend against Willis’s claims.

Defendant and appellant Foothill Heights Care Center, LLC, appeals from an order denying a petition to compel arbitration in favor of plaintiff and respondent Lillian Jimenez in this employment discrimination action. The trial court found there was no objective manifestation of assent to the arbitration agreement under the circumstances of this case, because both parties knew Jimenez did not understand the document when she signed it; Foothill knew Jimenez had very limited understanding of English, her requests to obtain a translation were denied, and Foothill required her to sign the document by the end of her shift to keep her job. On appeal, Foothill contends: 1) although the company was aware Jimenez did not understand the contents of the arbitration agreement, Jimenez’s signature on the arbitration agreement was sufficient to constitute her objective manifestation of assent; and 2) her continued employment with Foothill also constituted acceptance of the arbitration agreement.

Eric Robinson, a police officer for the Compton School Police Department, filed two grievances with the Personnel Commission of the Compton Unified School District (the District) after the police chief selected another candidate for promotion to school police sergeant. When he still was not promoted after filing these grievances, Robinson filed a whistleblower lawsuit alleging retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 (section 1102.5). That statute prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for disclosing information concerning a violation of “state or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation . . . .” (§ 1102.5, subd. (b).)
We affirm summary judgment in favor of the District for two independent reasons. First, Robinson’s failure to file a government claim prior to filing his lawsuit bars the whistleblower claim before us.

Alexander Johnson appeals from the trial court’s November 16, 2020 order that: vacated a judgment entered on July 2, 2020 awarding Johnson $1,000 in statutory damages and $12,476.66 in attorney fees against Adir Restaurants Corp. (Adir) and retroactively assessing postjudgment interest, costs, and attorney fees from 2012—when the court first ordered Johnson was entitled to those damages and fees; denied Johnson’s memorandum of costs claiming postjudgment attorney fees; and ordered a new judgment to be entered in the amount of $13,476.66 alone, with no interest to accrue on that amount before the date of the new judgment’s entry. Finding Johnson has failed to demonstrate error, we affirm the order.

SLS Venice Holdings, LLC (SLS) contests the application of the City of Los Angeles’s (City) Rent Stabilization Ordinance (RSO) (L.A. Mun. Code, § 151.00 et seq.) to a four-unit apartment house in the City. SLS does not dispute that two of the four rental units were subject to the RSO because SLS acknowledges the RSO applies to any rental unit within a residential structure that was built before 1978. Instead, SLS’s challenge turns on whether the RSO applies to the two units that were added to the two undisputed RSO units to create the four-unit apartment house. The agency charged with administering the RSO, the Los Angeles Housing and Community Investment Department (HCID), determined the RSO applies to the entire apartment house. SLS filed a traditional and administrative petition for writ of mandate contending the HCID should exempt the two added units as new construction as the agency had in prior years.

Defendant Jenny Marchick appeals from an order awarding attorney fees to plaintiff Patricia Ann Emery as Trustee of the Patricia Ann Emery and John H. Snyder IV Trust (Emery) following a bench trial concerning a lot line dispute.
In 2012, Marchick offered to purchase a residential property from Emery using a California Association of Realtors’ (CAR) Residential Purchase Agreement form (Purchase Agreement). The Purchase Agreement’s attorney fee clause required the parties to attempt to mediate disputes arising out of the agreement or any resulting transaction before filing a lawsuit. As part of her counter offer, Emery required Marchick to agree to cooperate in effectuating a lot line adjustment (Cooperation Agreement). The Cooperation Agreement included a different attorney fees clause, which did not require mediation before filing suit. Marchick agreed, the parties executed the documents, and escrow closed on November 2, 2012.

Petitioner Leobardo Hernandez appeals from the denial of his resentencing petition under Penal Code section 1170.95. Hernandez contends, and the People agree, that he made a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief and, as a result, the court should have issued an order to show cause and held an evidentiary hearing. We agree with the parties and, therefore, reverse the order denying Hernandez’s resentencing petition and remand the matter for further proceedings under section 1170.95.

A jury convicted appellant Jose Rivera of multiple counts of conspiracy to commit assault, extortion, and murder, as well as assault, based on his role as a facilitator for the Mexican Mafia. The jury also found true gang enhancement allegations as to each count. On appeal, he argued that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction on one count of conspiracy to commit assault. In an opinion filed November 9, 2021, we affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court subsequently denied appellant’s petition for review.
While appellant’s appeal was pending, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 699) (AB 333), amending Penal Code section 186.22 to require proof of additional elements for gang enhancement allegations. At appellant’s request, we vacated our prior opinion and permitted supplemental briefing on the applicability of AB 333 to his conviction.