CA Unpub Decisions

Padraic C. Lane and Lane Family Funeral Home (LFFH) sued their former attorney and his firm, Jeffrey Zinder and Zinder & Koch (jointly, Zinder), after the Department of Consumer Affairs, Cemetery and Funeral Bureau (CFB) revoked Lane’s funeral director license and LFFH’s funeral establishment license following a disciplinary action. The trial court granted Zinder’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint, finding that Lane failed to establish any harm he may have suffered was caused by Zinder’s alleged malpractice. We affirm.

The Orange County District Attorney (OCDA) appeals from the trial court’s order granting Maurice Lucien Vanwyk’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The OCDA argues the following: the court erred by granting the habeas petition without first issuing an order to show cause (OSC); Vanwyk was not in custody on his prior conviction; and Proposition 47 did not apply to the prior prison term. Because we agree the trial court erred by granting relief without first issuing an OSC, we need not address the OCDA’s other contentions. We reverse the court’s order granting Vanwyk’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.

In 2015, a juvenile wardship petition was filed alleging appellant Ruben V. came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. In April 2016, it was found true that appellant Ruben had sodomized an unconscious person, in violation of Penal Code section 286, subdivision (f). At disposition, he was placed on probation in his father’s custody. Ruben appeals, contending he was eligible for deferred entry of judgment and the juvenile court erred in not holding a suitability hearing. He also contends the juvenile court erred in not awarding predisposition custody credits against his maximum confinement time. We reject both contentions and affirm the disposition.

The Orange County District Attorney (OCDA) appeals from the trial court’s order granting Raymond Javier Garcia’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The OCDA argues the following: the court erred by granting the habeas petition without first issuing an order to show cause (OSC); Garcia was not in custody on his prior conviction; Proposition 47 did not apply to the prior prison term ; and if Proposition 47 applied to the prior prison term, Garcia is entitled to resentencing not automatic sentence reduction. Because we agree the trial court erred by granting relief without first issuing an OSC, we need not address the OCDA’s other contentions. We reverse the court’s order granting Garcia’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Defendant and appellant A.L. (Mother) appeals after the termination of her parental rights for G.B. (Minor) at a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing.
Mother makes one claim on appeal that the San Bernardino County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) failed to make proper inquiry into Minor’s Indian heritage and provide adequate Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) notice. This court should order reversal of the order terminating her parental rights and remand to the juvenile court for proper ICWA notice to be given pursuant to Title 25 United States Code section 1901 et seq. We agree.

In this employment case, defendants Glendale Internal Medicine & Cardiology Medical Group, Inc., and several employees (together Glendale Internal) appeal the trial court’s order denying their motion to compel plaintiff cardiologist Arsen Hovansyan to arbitrate his breach of contract, statutory, and tort claims pursuant to a clause in his employment contract. The trial court found plaintiff’s tort claims were not covered by the arbitration agreement. For the contract and statutory claims, it concluded the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et al.) (FAA) did not apply, and even if it did, the agreement to arbitrate was unconscionable.
We conclude the trial court correctly held the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. Because that issue is dispositive, we need not address the court’s other holdings and affirm.

The trial court denied the writ of mandate sought by Friends of Big Bear Valley (Friends). The trial court determined the petition was barred by the statute of limitations, i.e., Government Code section 66499.37, which provides a 90-day deadline for bringing an action to challenge an advisory agency’s decision concerning a subdivision. Friends contends the trial court erred because Government Code section 66499.37 is not applicable to its petition. We reverse in part and affirm in part.

Plaintiff and appellant, Sandra Jean Dade, brought this lawsuit against defendant and respondent, State of California, for severe and permanent injuries she suffered in a single-vehicle accident on State Route 127 (SR 127) in July 2012. Dade alleged a puddle on SR 127 caused her vehicle to veer off-road and roll over numerous times. She pursued a single cause of action for a dangerous condition of public property on SR 127. The California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), acting for the state, prevailed at the jury trial in June 2015. The jury found no dangerous condition existed. The court awarded Caltrans over $100,000 in costs, including $96,228.87 in expert witness fees Caltrans incurred after making a statutory offer to compromise. (Code Civ. Proc., § 998, subds. (b), (c)(1).)

A real estate broker enters into an exclusive listing agreement with the master tenant of a city-owned parking garage for the purpose of finding a replacement subtenant for restaurant space on the ground floor. The listing agreement provides that a commission will be paid to the broker “[i]f a lease[] is entered into during the Term of this Agreement.” The broker finds a subtenant, who signs a lease with the master tenant, but that sublease is never approved by the city that owns the garage, as was required by the master lease between the city and the master tenant. Was the sublease “entered into,” such that the broker had a right to be paid the commission specified in the listing agreement? The trial court concluded the answer is yes.

Defendant Gloria Maria Hernandez was arrested and charged after a search of her residence turned up bindles of methamphetamine, scales, and a loaded gun. A jury convicted defendant of possession of methamphetamine while armed with a loaded firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1), being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)), receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)), and resisting a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)). She was placed on three years’ formal probation. She appealed the convictions.

The lender approved the short sale and the parties opened escrow. A few days before escrow was to close, Keating identified alleged “questions with chain of title” that would “probably delay closing.” Keating then froze the transaction and withdrew her consent to the proposed short sale.
The Tanners filed the underlying complaint seeking specific performance of their contract with Keating. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment for the Tanners and ordered Keating to execute all documents necessary to close escrow.
Keating argues the trial court erred because (1) the parties did not mediate and arbitrate the dispute as required by the contract; (2) the lender’s withdrawal of short sale approval rendered the contract void and unenforceable; (3) the lender was a necessary party to the action; and (4) the contract was the product of undue influence and elder financial abuse.
Since specific performance is a discretionary remedy, we must consider wh

Paramvir Singh (Singh) and Daljeet Singh Johaul (Johaul) agreed that Singh would take out a mortgage and purchase a home in Singh’s name with the understanding that the Johaul family would provide the down payment, make all insurance, property tax, utility and maintenance payments for one year, and then purchase the property from Singh or assume the mortgage. Singh claimed that the Johauls reneged on the agreement and failed to timely perform their obligations. Singh sued to quiet title and to recover damages. The Johauls claimed that Singh sought to delay sale of the property to allow Singh to benefit from a first-time homebuyer’s tax credit and mortgage and property tax deductions. The trial court credited the Johauls’ version of the facts and declared a resulting trust in the Johauls’ favor.

In a previous appeal in this action to which defendants and respondents Mariyan Khosravizadeh and Steadfast In Commitment, Inc., doing business as RE/MAX Grand Central (Steadfast) were not parties, we affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant Shahrokh Davood. Mr. Davood bought the home of plaintiffs and appellants Iskander and Sozan Sabbagh in a short sale to avoid foreclosure. (Sabbagh v. Davood (Mar. 30, 2016, B261104) [nonpub. opn.].) Some months after granting summary judgment for Mr. Davood, the court entered summary judgment in favor of Ms. Khosravizadeh, plaintiffs’ broker, and Steadfast, her employer (defendants). This appeal is from the summary judgment in favor of defendants.

Jonathan Truong (defendant) threatened two people with a skateboard before police arrested him with methamphetamine in his wallet. He stands convicted of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon, one count of making criminal threats, and one count of possessing a controlled substance. On appeal, he argues that his assault convictions rest on insufficient evidence and that the trial court committed instructional error. We reject his challenges, and affirm his convictions.