CA Unpub Decisions

In this criminal case, appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief presenting no argument for reversal, but requesting this court to review the record for error in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). We offered defendant Todd Eric Dalton the opportunity to file his own brief on appeal, and he has not done so. After independently reviewing the record for error, as required by Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders) and Wende, we affirm.

On March 8, 2016, the trial court revoked defendant Katherine Elizabeth Colston’s grant of probation and executed a previously suspended sentence of eight years in state prison. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to reinstate her probation. We conclude the trial court acted within its discretion and affirm the judgment.

Jacob Claus appeals the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of one count of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211; count 1) and one count of battery upon a peace officer (§ 243, subd. (b); count 2). The trial court found true the allegation in connection with count 1 that appellant had suffered a prior conviction for a serious and/or violent felony. (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (d), 1170.12, subd. (b).) The court denied probation and sentenced appellant to 11 years in state prison and 364 days in county jail.
Appellant contends his conviction for robbery lacks substantial evidentiary support. We disagree and affirm.

Defendant John Matthew Campbell pleaded no contest to driving in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property while fleeing from a pursuing police officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); case No. CM043634) and to unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); case No. CM043744). Defendant also admitted he had suffered a prior felony conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and had served one prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of eight years four months in prison.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to dismiss his strike prior pursuant to section 1385 and People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). We disagree and affirm the judgment.

N.G. appeals the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights to her son, Noah G., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She contends the juvenile court and the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) failed to conduct an appropriate inquiry as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq. (ICWA)) to determine if Noah's biological father has Native American heritage. N.G. asks this court to conditionally reverse the order and remand the case back to the juvenile court to conduct that inquiry. We affirm the order.

D.B. is the presumed father of M.W. At the disposition hearing, the court adjudged M.W. a dependent child and extended reunification services to both parents. D.B. accepted the reunification plan, including random drug testing, but he now objects to random testing and the additional requirements that he attend up to three NA/AA meetings a week and obtain a sponsor, complete outpatient drug counseling and, if he tests positive test for drugs, enter and complete a residential drug treatment. On the facts of this case, we agree the court abused its discretion by imposing drug counseling and residential drug treatment as a mandatory part of his reunification plan. We find the order for random testing reasonable. We therefore reverse the court’s order and strike all the treatment-related conditions save random testing, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

This appeal from a judgment confirming an arbitration award requires us to determine whether the contractual arbitrator exceeded his “powers” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1286.2, subd. (a)(4)) by awarding nothing on a breach of contract claim.
Defendants, cross-complainants, and appellants Acumen Technology Solutions for Healthcare, LLC (Acumen), J. Dale Ragone, and Robert B. Goetzinger (collectively Defendants) contend the arbitrator exceeded his powers by fashioning a remedy prohibited by the contract and not available in a court of law.
Plaintiffs, cross-defendants, and respondents maxIT Healthcare Holdings, Inc. (maxIT Inc.) and maxIT Healthcare, LLC (individually maxIT LLC, and together with maxIT Inc., Plaintiffs or maxIT ) claim the arbitrator did not exceed his powers, since the remedy was not prohibited by the contract and was available in a court of law.
We agree the arbitrator did not exceed his powers and affirm.

The trial court entered a final judgment of dissolution as to appellant Christopher Livingston and respondent Cozette Livingston. The judgment included the parties’ stipulated judgment of dissolution (Stipulation), which governed the parties’ division of property upon their divorce. Soon after judgment, however, the parties became locked in a dispute over the proper disposition of real estate located in Washington (the Washington property), which they owned as community property while married. The Stipulation awarded the Washington property to Christopher as his separate property, but also required the property to be put in “trust” for the benefit of the parties’ two sons, while also acknowledging Christopher’s right to sell the property. Christopher sought an order on the issue from the trial court. Over Christopher’s objection, the trial court interpreted the Stipulation to require Christopher to place the Washington property in an irrevocable trust for the benefi

Defendant and appellant Universal Bank (Universal) appeals a judgment after court trial in an action brought by LWL Investment Group, LLC (LWL). LWL cross-appeals from a postjudgment order taxing costs.
LWL deposited $2 million into escrow after it entered into an agreement with Universal to purchase certain property. Universal subsequently sold the property to another buyer, and then refused for 39 months to release LWL’s $2 million escrow deposit. Shortly before LWL’s motion for summary adjudication was to be heard, Universal stipulated to release the funds. The essential issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court erred in awarding prejudgment interest (Civ. Code, § 3289) to LWL for the 39-month period that the funds were withheld. We perceive no error and affirm the judgment.

Appellant Steve Cochrane (Cochrane) and respondent Chris Kuzdovich (Kuzdovich) entered into a contract according to which Cochrane agreed to pay Kuzdovich for renovation work performed by Kuzdovich on a property in Kensington, California. After Kuzdovich left the job, Cochrane discovered numerous problems with Kuzdovich’s work, and incurred significant time and expense making repairs. Cochrane failed to pay Kuzdovich, Kuzdovich sued Cochrane for breach of contract, and Cochrane asserted an affirmative defense of setoff. A jury awarded Kuzdovich $30,738.93 in damages on his breach of contract claim, and awarded Cochrane $6,023 in damages on his setoff claim. Cochrane argues on appeal that the trial court committed prejudicial error when it failed to permit the introduction of lost profits evidence during trial. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Stephanie H. (mother) appeals from the findings and orders made by the juvenile court at the combined jurisdictional/dispositional hearing concerning her son, S.H. Mother contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding that S.H. was at risk of serious physical harm. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b)(1).) Mother further contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s dispositional order removing S.H. from her custody. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) We find no error and shall affirm the juvenile court’s findings and orders.

This is an appeal from the juvenile court ruling allowing the mother, M.B. (Mother), only supervised visitation after a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition was found true and the minors were declared dependents and placed out of the home. The mother appeals only the visitation order. We affirm the order.

In this juvenile dependency case, defendant and appellant Brenda M. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s June 2, 2016 dispositional order removing her nine-year-old daughter M.C. (Daughter) from her custody. Mother argues substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s order. We disagree and affirm.

In this juvenile dependency appeal, the mother (Mother) of three minors (Minor 1, Minor 2 and Minor 3; collectively, the Siblings) appeals from orders of the juvenile court (Orders) following a contested selection and implementation hearing at which the court terminated Mother's parental rights as to Minor 1 and Minor 3 and ordered adoption as their permanent plan. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (b)(1); further statutory references are to this code.) Mother contends the juvenile court erred in ruling both that Minor 1 and Minor 3 (together, the Minors) were likely to be adopted and that the sibling relationship exception to termination of parental rights did not apply. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1) & (c)(1)(B)(v).)