CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant James Jeron Berryman appeals from the judgment entered following trial before a second jury, the trial court having declared a mistrial after the first jury declared it was hopelessly deadlocked. The jury found defendant guilty of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211; count 1), attempted second degree robbery (§§ 664, 211; count 2), and making criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a); count 3). The trial court found true the allegations that he had suffered two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)) that constitute strikes under the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)).
After dismissing one strike, the trial court sentenced defendant to prison to an aggregate term of 21 years 4 months on counts 1 and 2. Imposition of sentence was stayed on count 3 (§ 654).

A jury convicted Mark Alan Andrews of first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189), and found true an allegation that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm while committing his crime (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). In bifurcated proceedings, the jury determined that Andrews was sane at the time of the murder. The trial court sentenced him to a term of 25 years to life in state prison on the murder charge, and a consecutive term of 25 years to life on the firearm allegation. It calculated that Andrews was entitled to 724 days of actual custody credits.

Ralph Handel worked for defendant City of Stockton (the city) as a member of a bargaining unit covered by a memorandum of understanding between the city and plaintiff Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3, International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO (the union). After the city discharged Handel from his employment, the union filed a grievance that went to arbitration. The arbitrator found that Handel had violated the sexual harassment policies of the city, but the city did not have cause to discharge him; accordingly, the arbitrator ordered him reinstated.

The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of R.F. (Mother) to her children Maria (born in 2005) and Juan (born in 2008). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) The court exercised its discretion and denied Mother a contested hearing on the “beneficial relationship” exception to section 366.26. We affirm because Mother failed to offer relevant proof that she consistently visited the children, or held a parental role, or that the children would be greatly harmed if the court severed the maternal relationship.

Linda B. (Mother) appeals an order of the juvenile court denying her family reunification services pursuant to the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11). We affirm.

William P. (Father) and R.G. (Mother) appeal orders of the juvenile court declaring that their minor children J.P. and S.P. are adoptable and terminating their parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) We affirm.

Douglas G., Sr. (father) appeals from a restraining order issued under Welfare and Institutions Code section 213.5, subdivision (a). Father contends the dependency court erred by naming his two biological children as protected individuals. We affirm.

Janet Paredes, Alice Parades, Mercedes Paredes, and Elizabeth Paredes appealed from a judgment entered after the court granted their request for an order to enforce a settlement agreement. Thereafter, the court filed an amended judgment that corrected certain clerical errors in the judgment. Appellants contend that the amended judgment still fails to reflect the terms of the settlement agreement by omitting language requiring all parties execute mutual and general releases. We agree, and will direct the court to issue a further amended judgment to include the appropriate text.

Raphael M. (Father) appeals an April 2016 postjudgment order allowing Monica M. (Mother) to move to Georgia with the parties' 11-year-old son, K.M. On appeal, Father claims the move-away order must be reversed because the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court's finding of child abuse. We conclude substantial evidence supports the abuse finding. However, the court did not apply the correct legal standard in granting Mother's move-away request. We therefore reverse the April 2016 and June 2016 move-away rulings and remand for the trial court to make a determination as to move-away based on the correct legal standard.

Appellant Christine Nakamoto (Christine) filed a petition for dissolution of marriage against respondent Daniel Hsu (Daniel). In the dissolution proceeding, Christine joined respondents Brion Corporation, STPCA, Sun Ten Museum, Inc., Melissa See Hsu (Melissa), and Charleson Hsu (Charleson) (collectively referred to as claimants). Melissa and Charleson are Daniel’s siblings and the joined corporations were started by the Hsu family.
Claimants filed a motion for a separate trial on the validity of a transmutation agreement. Christine and Daniel contended at trial that a note from Daniel to Christine written the day after their wedding (the wedding note or the transmutation agreement) constituted a transmutation of his separate property to the community. The family court determined there was a valid transmutation from Daniel’s separate property to Christine’s separate property.

Plaintiff and appellant Crystal LeMieux appeals from a judgment following a successful defense motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8. LeMieux has been an employee of defendant and respondent K&M Meat Company (K&M) since 1992. Her claims are based on an alleged written employment agreement that she entered into in 1992 when she first started working at K&M. The case proceeded to trial on the understanding that the agreement was described in a letter from LeMieux dated July 17, 1992, that was countersigned by Felix Goldberg, the owner of K&M, that same day. During trial, it emerged that this agreement had been superseded by a later version of the July 17 letter, containing a different compensation term, that Goldberg had executed four days later. The trial court denied LeMieux’s motion to amend her complaint to incorporate the new agreement and, finding that the case had proceeded on the basis of a contract that was no longer operative, granted K&M’s motion for judg

The question presented is whether disabled members under the University of California Retirement Plan (UCRP) who receive “Duty Disability Income” (DDI) are considered retired for purposes of entitlement to a retired identification card and concealed weapons endorsement pursuant to the Penal Code. We conclude the answer is no. We therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition for writ of mandate by which appellants sought to compel The Regents of the University of California (Regents) to provide them with such identification cards and endorsements.

La.G. (Mother) and E.L. (Father) appeal from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order made after the juvenile court adjudged their son L.G. (born in 2015) a dependent under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. The parents contend that the evidence did not support the jurisdictional findings. We agree and therefore reverse.

A court found true allegations minor J.M. dissuaded a witness and committed a battery. The court granted probation and ordered minor to serve 180 less 24 days in custody.
Minor argues the court failed to orally pronounce a maximum term of confinement and the restitution fine amount, and imposed an overly broad curfew condition. The Attorney General concedes these points, and we agree.
Minor also asserts the court violated Penal Code section 654 (section 654) by imposing sentence on counts 1 and 2, but we find this contention to be meritless.
Therefore, we will vacate the sentence and remand the matter with directions to conduct a further sentencing hearing, but otherwise affirm the conviction.