CA Unpub Decisions

A jury found defendant Loren Scott Bratcher guilty of infliction of corporal injury on a person in a dating relationship and violation of a protective order. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to strike his prior strike conviction and found the prior strike allegation true, as well as three prior prison terms. The court sentenced defendant to serve nine years in state prison.

Appellant Thomas Mills appeals from a judgment entered following his convictions by pleas of no contest to two counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), with various sentence enhancements. We affirm.
Appellant was charged with two counts of second degree robbery in violation of section 211, and as to each it was further alleged that appellant personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (b)(1).
On May 9, 2016 a preliminary hearing was conducted, at which the following evidence was presented. On March 8, 2016, the manager of a 99 Cent Store found appellant in the store’s warehouse area searching through merchandise.

This is the third appeal filed by Eric H. (Father) relating to Los Angeles Superior Court juvenile dependency case No. CK97726. In Father’s 2015 appeal, we upheld the juvenile court’s determinations of jurisdiction, removal of Precious N. (born 2001) from Father’s custody and her placement with her mother, P.N. (Mother). (In re Precious N. (Jan. 29, 2015, B255648) [nonpub. opn.] (Precious I).) Thereafter, the juvenile court held additional proceedings, culminating in its orders terminating juvenile court jurisdiction, and ordering sole legal and physical custody in Mother. (April 14, 2015 Custody Order—Juvenile—Final Judgment.) These orders included an order under Welfare and Institutions Code section 362.4 (sometimes referred to as an “exit order”) specifying Father would be allowed monitored visits with Precious, but not stating the frequency of those visits. (In re Precious N. (Jan. 25, 2016, B265933) [nonpub. opn.] (Precious II).)

This is an appeal from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional order in dependency proceedings involving minor M.B. (minor) and his biological father, appellant K.L. (father). The sole contention raised by father is that the juvenile court erred in finding that he does not qualify as the “presumed parent” of minor within the meaning of Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d). Based upon this finding, the court then ordered that he was not entitled to reunification services pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, and that his relatives would not be considered for minor’s placement. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant C.C. (Mother) challenges the termination of her parental rights by the juvenile court at a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing on December 16, 2016. For the reasons set forth post, we shall affirm the judgment.

Gabriella L. (Mother) appeals an order terminating her parental rights to her son, G.L., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother contends the juvenile court erred when it found G.L. was likely to be adopted within a reasonable time if parental rights were terminated, and she argues the adoption assessment report prepared by the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) was deficient because it did not adequately ascertain G.L.'s views on terminating Mother's parental rights and adoption. Mother also argues there is insufficient evidence to support the court's finding that the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) did not apply. We affirm the findings and order.

Appellant A.D. appeals from a juvenile court order committing him to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF). Appellant contends the juvenile court improperly failed to exercise its discretion to determine whether he should be required to register as a sex offender upon his discharge from DJF. He also contends if the sex offender registration requirement is mandatory, it violates equal protection. We conclude under the circumstances of this case, the requirement that appellant register as a sex offender was mandatory. Because the registration requirement does not violate equal protection, we affirm.

Soon after filing this harassment action against their landlord, plaintiffs were granted an order to preserve evidence, requiring the landlord to allow plaintiffs’ experts to inspect cameras maintained on the property. After the landlord’s attorney ignored the preservation order and plaintiffs’ repeated requests for compliance, the trial court awarded terminating sanctions and eventually entered a default judgment against defendant Paul Kraaijvanger on the basis of the sanctions. Kraaijvanger filed a motion to vacate the judgment under the mandatory relief provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 473, accompanied by a declaration in which his attorney detailed her unjustified disregard for the preservation order. The trial court refused to grant mandatory relief from the default, concluding such relief is unavailable when the default is not entered by the court clerk. We reverse the ruling and vacate the default judgment.

A jury convicted Reyes Zazueta of two counts of sexual penetration with a child aged 10 years old or younger (counts 1 and 9; Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (b)) and seven counts of lewd act upon a child (counts 2-8; § 288, subd. (a)). The trial court imposed two consecutive terms of 15 years to life on the sexual penetration convictions in counts 1 and 9. On the lewd act convictions in counts 2-8, the court imposed an aggregate consecutive determinate term of 8 years, comprised of the upper term of 8 years on count 4, and six concurrent upper terms of 8 years on each of the convictions in counts 2-3 and 5-8.
Zazueta contends his convictions for sexual penetration must be reversed because the trial court did not instruct the jury sua sponte on the lesser included offense of attempted sexual penetration. Further, Zazueta contends the evidence is insufficient to support one of his sexual penetration convictions. We reverse on count 9, make a minor modification concerning AIDS testi

Anthony Kyle Stokes appeals following his no contest plea to transportation of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance for sale with enhancements due to his prior crimes. His court-appointed counsel has filed a brief seeking our independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. Stokes has also filed a brief asserting two bases of possible error. We conclude there are no issues requiring further review and affirm.

A jury convicted Isiah J. Nelson of evading a police officer with reckless driving (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count 1); being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29815; counts 2, 4, 5, 6); being a prohibited person in possession of ammunition (Pen. Code, § 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 7); and first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459; counts 8, 10.) It found true allegations as to counts 8 and 10 that the burglary was of an inhabited dwelling within the meaning of Penal Code section 460, subdivision (a) and as to count 10 that another person, other than an accomplice, was present in the residence during the commission of the crime (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (c)(21)). The court sentenced Nelson to six years eight months in prison.

Appointed counsel for defendant Tyron Lee Daniels has filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) After reviewing the entire record, we affirm the order.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)
In 2006, a jury found defendant guilty of multiple counts of robbery and burglary. The trial court sentenced him to serve an aggregate prison term of 25 years. (People v. Daniels (Nov. 2, 2009, C052984) [nonpub. opn.].)

S.H. (mother) seeks extraordinary writ review of the juvenile court’s orders denying her reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 361.5, subdivision (b)(11) and setting a section 366.26 hearing as to her now five-month-old son A.H. Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(11) applies where parental rights have been terminated as to a sibling and the parent failed to subsequently make reasonable efforts to remedy the problem requiring the child’s removal. Mother contends the juvenile court erred in finding she failed to make subsequent reasonable efforts. We deny the petition.

Defendant Patricia Weitl, as trustee for the Donald Pippo revocable trust, appeals a judgment entered in favor of plaintiffs Michael and Annie Purtill and Timothy and Elaine Snow on their complaint for, among other things, slander of title, malicious prosecution and conversion. On appeal, defendant contends there is insufficient evidence to support the judgment on plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution and slander of title claims. Defendant argues further the punitive damages awarded are either unsupported by substantial evidence or excessive. We agree with defendant that there is no substantial evidence to support the award of emotional distress damages to Timothy Snow and Elaine Snow on their claims for malicious prosecution so that that element of the judgment must be stricken, but we reject the remainder of defendant’s claims.